Showing posts with label Conference and Discussion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Conference and Discussion. Show all posts

Sunday, September 20, 2026

Adolf Hitler and Erich von Manstein at Zaporozhye (1943)


The atmosphere of the war conference at the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye, Ukraine, on 8 September 1943. From left to right: SS-Sturmbannführer Fritz Darges (persönlicher SS Adjutant bei Adolf Hitler), Oberstleutnant Gerhard Engel (Adjutant des Heeres beim Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Oberst im Generalstab Joachim Meichßner (Chef der Organisationsabteilung im Wehrmachtführungsstab), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), and General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres).


On 8 September 1943, Adolf Hitler flew to the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye (also rendered Saporoschje or Zaporizhzhia), in southeastern Ukraine. The visit marked his final journey to the Eastern Front. That same day, news of Italy’s capitulation reached German high command, casting a heavy shadow over the discussions. The conference brought together Hitler, Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein, Commander-in-Chief of Heeresgruppe Süd, Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist, Commander-in-Chief of Heeresgruppe A, and General der Infanterie Richard Ruoff, whose 17. Armee still held the isolated Kuban bridgehead.

The strategic situation confronting Heeresgruppe Süd had deteriorated sharply since the failure of Operation Citadel in July. Soviet forces of the Voronezh, Steppe, Southwestern, and Southern Fronts had launched successive offensives that eroded German positions east of the Dnieper. Manstein’s armies had suffered heavy losses: by late August the army group reported approximately 133,000 casualties against only some 33,000 replacements. Divisions were under strength, reserves were scarce, and the front stretched thinly across the Donets Basin and the approaches to the lower Dnieper.

Earlier meetings had produced little resolution. On 27 August 1943 Hitler had conferred with Manstein at Vinnitsa. Manstein insisted that without substantial reinforcements the Donets region could not be held and that a timely withdrawal to the Dnieper was essential. Hitler refused both the reinforcements and a general retreat. A further conference at Führer headquarters in East Prussia on 3 September 1943, attended by Manstein and Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge of Heeresgruppe Mitte, proved equally fruitless. Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, supported Manstein’s assessment, warning that the choice was no longer whether the Donets area could be retained, but whether it would be abandoned alone or together with an entire army group.

Manstein’s teleprinter message of 7 September renewed the pressure. He reported that the enemy had already committed fifty-five divisions and two tank corps against Heeresgruppe Süd, drawing forces from other sectors of the Eastern Front, with additional formations still approaching. He demanded decisive action if the army group were to retain control of the situation. The following day Hitler arrived at Zaporozhye, having summoned Kleist and Ruoff as well.

At the conference Manstein again laid out the gravity of the position. He stressed the exhaustion of the troops, the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces, and the danger that a collapse of the northern wing of Heeresgruppe Süd would expose Heeresgruppe A. On the northern wing of 6. Armee a gap of some twenty-eight miles had already been torn open, held only by the remnants of two divisions. Manstein argued that the right wing of the army group could no longer be restored forward of the Dnieper and that only a rapid withdrawal behind the river offered any prospect of reconstituting a coherent defensive front.

Hitler initially resisted a general retreat. He authorised only a partial pull-back on the extreme southern wing and continued to insist on holding economically and politically significant points, among them the manganese deposits near Nikopol and the approaches to the Crimea. Prestige and the desire to retain a foothold east of the Dnieper still weighed heavily in his calculations. Nevertheless, the cumulative reports of the commanders present, combined with the wider crisis marked by Italy’s defection, produced a shift. Hitler conceded that Heeresgruppe Süd might withdraw toward the Dnieper if the situation made it “absolutely necessary.” He also promised additional divisions, to be taken if required from Heeresgruppe Mitte, in order to secure the Dnieper crossings, and he finally agreed to evacuate the Kuban bridgehead, thereby releasing forces of the 17. Armee that had been tied down in a remote and increasingly irrelevant theatre since the previous year’s Caucasus campaign.

The concessions remained limited and conditional. Full authority for a coordinated withdrawal of Heeresgruppe Süd to the so-called Panther Line along the Dnieper was not granted until a subsequent meeting at Führer headquarters on 15 September 1943. In the interval Manstein pressed his case further in writing. In a letter to Hitler he repeated the demand for rapid withdrawal and closed with a pointed observation: had the necessary reinforcements been provided in good time, the present crisis, which could decide the outcome in the east and thereby the war itself, might have been avoided. Few senior officers had ever addressed the Führer in such direct terms.

The conference at Zaporozhye thus represented a reluctant and incomplete acknowledgment by Hitler of the operational realities facing his southern armies. It did not restore the initiative to German arms, nor did it prevent the subsequent Soviet advance to and across the Dnieper. Yet it marked a turning point in the relationship between the Führer and his most capable field commander on the Eastern Front. Manstein obtained a measure of the freedom of manoeuvre he had long sought, while Hitler’s personal visit underscored both the seriousness of the crisis and the limits of his willingness to relinquish control. Within weeks the German forces would begin their fighting withdrawal to the great river, abandoning the Donets industrial region and preparing for the defensive battles that would follow on the west bank.


The atmosphere of the war conference at the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye, Ukraine, on 8 September 1943. From left to right: Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres), and Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe A).




Source :
https://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2012/11/album-foto-adolf-hitler-sebagai-ahli.html
https://www.criticalpast.com/video/65675078957_Hitler-visiting-von-Manstein_Zaporozhye-Airfield_Ukraine_Eastern-Front
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMbi6PFjG-M

Sunday, August 23, 2026

Gebirgsjäger in the Balkan Invasion 1941


Gebirgsjäger (German Mountain Troops) in the Balkan Invasion 1941. Studying the map in the Kompanietrupp, the company squad. The men were issued the tapered feldgrau M40 trousers for the campaign. The officers are wearing tailormade Bergmützen. In the foreground, the arm of the company adjutant (Spiess) is visible with his two silver stripes. During the Balkanfeldzug of 1941 the Gebirgsjäger of the Wehrmacht demonstrated their specialized training in mountainous terrain when German forces launched simultaneous invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April. The 1. Gebirgs-Division, operating under the XXXXIX. Gebirgskorps of the 2. Armee, crossed from Carinthia near Bleiburg and advanced rapidly through the Slovenian Alps toward Cilli and Zagreb, with a Vorausabteilung under Major Lang reaching Karlstadt by 13 April and motorized elements pressing on to Bihać against limited resistance. Simultaneously the 4. Gebirgs-Division, attached to the XIV. Panzerkorps, struck from Bulgaria into southern Yugoslavia and marched at great speed across rugged country. In the Greek theater the XVIII. Gebirgskorps, comprising the 5. and 6. Gebirgs-Division, advanced from Bulgarian positions through the Rhodope Mountains amid snow blizzards and steep slopes to assault the fortified Metaxas Line. The 5. Gebirgs-Division conducted costly frontal attacks against determined Greek defenders before breaking through to the plains and advancing toward Salonika, while the 6. Gebirgs-Division forced a quicker penetration and pursued withdrawing British and Commonwealth forces southward toward Corinth. After the mainland campaign the 5. Gebirgs-Division reinforced the Fallschirmjäger during Unternehmen Merkur on Crete, arriving partly by fishing vessels that suffered heavy losses to the Royal Navy and partly by Ju 52 air landings at Maleme, where the Gebirgsjäger then fought New Zealand troops in the surrounding mountains until the Allied evacuation. Throughout the twelve-day Yugoslav campaign and the subsequent Greek operations these mountain troops, identifiable by their Bergmütze and Edelweiss insignia, overcame extreme terrain, weather, and fortified positions through rigorous mountain training, light equipment, and aggressive marching, contributing decisively to the rapid Axis victory before redeployment eastward.



Source :
https://www.facebook.com/100076430438564/photos/gebirgsj%C3%A4ger-german-mountain-troops-in-the-balkan-invasion-1941-studying-the-map/912503424640664/

Tuesday, August 18, 2026

Luftwaffe in North Africa (1941-1943)


The Luftwaffe’s involvement in North Africa began in early 1941 as a limited intervention to support the Italian forces after their heavy defeats at the hands of the British during Operation Compass. In January 1941 elements of the X. Fliegerkorps, initially based in Sicily and under the command of General der Flieger Hans Geisler, commenced operations against British shipping and targets in the eastern Mediterranean. The first major German raid on African soil, an attempted attack on the Suez Canal by Heinkel He 111 bombers of II./Kampfgeschwader 26 on 17 January 1941, ended in costly failure. Shortly afterwards the specialised tactical command Fliegerführer Afrika was established on 20 February 1941 within Luftgau VII and transferred to Libya, initially under Oberstleutnant Martin Harlinghausen and then under Generalmajor Stefan Fröhlich from 24 February. Its primary task was to provide close air support, fighter cover and reconnaissance for the newly arrived Deutsches Afrikakorps under Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel.

Early Luftwaffe strength in the desert was modest. The first fighters to arrive in April 1941 were the Messerschmitt Bf 109E of I./Jagdgeschwader 27 under Hauptmann Eduard Neumann, based at Ain-el-Gazala. They were soon joined by further Gruppen of JG 27, including II./JG 27 under Hauptmann Wolfgang Lippert, as well as the twin-engined Messerschmitt Bf 110 of III./Zerstörergeschwader 26. Dive-bomber support came from units of Sturzkampfgeschwader 1, 2 and 3 equipped with the Junkers Ju 87, while medium bombers of Lehrgeschwader 1 flying the Junkers Ju 88 conducted longer-range strikes from both African and Sicilian bases. Reconnaissance was performed by specialised Staffeln operating the Ju 88 and other types. From the outset the desert environment imposed severe difficulties: abrasive sand damaged engines and airframes, extreme heat reduced aircraft performance, and the long supply lines across the Mediterranean were constantly threatened by British forces based on Malta.

During Rommel’s first offensive in the spring of 1941 the Luftwaffe provided effective close support that helped the Deutsches Afrikakorps recapture Cyrenaica and invest Tobruk. The siege of Tobruk saw repeated Stuka attacks on the fortress and harbour, while fighters of JG 27 contested air superiority with the Royal Air Force’s Hurricanes and later Kittyhawks. In November 1941 the British launched Operation Crusader; Fliegerführer Afrika, still under Fröhlich and operating from airfields around Derna, struggled to provide adequate cover as Axis forces were pushed back to El Agheila. By the end of the year the headquarters had moved repeatedly in step with the ground fighting.

In early 1942 Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring assumed overall responsibility for the Mediterranean theatre as Oberbefehlshaber Süd, and Fliegerführer Afrika came under Luftflotte 2. On 12 April 1942 Generalleutnant Otto Hoffmann von Waldau replaced Fröhlich. The improved organisation and reinforcement of fighter and bomber units contributed to Axis success in the Battle of Gazala in May–June 1942. Concentrated Stuka and fighter-bomber attacks helped break the Free French defence of Bir Hacheim, after which Tobruk fell on 21 June. The rapid advance to the Egyptian frontier brought Fliegerführer Afrika forward to airfields at Gambut, Sidi Barrani and finally Fuka, close to the El Alamein line. At this peak the command controlled roughly 130–150 serviceable aircraft of all types on African soil, supplemented by longer-range operations from Sicily and Crete.

The first Battle of El Alamein in July 1942 and the subsequent defensive fighting exhausted both ground and air forces. On 30 August Generalleutnant Hans Seidemann took command of Fliegerführer Afrika. During the decisive Second Battle of El Alamein in October–November 1942 the Luftwaffe was heavily outnumbered by the reinforced Desert Air Force and suffered severe losses. After the Axis defeat the remnants of the flying units conducted a fighting withdrawal across Libya. The Anglo-American landings of Operation Torch in Morocco and Algeria on 8 November 1942 forced a rapid redeployment of additional Luftwaffe forces into Tunisia. Units of Jagdgeschwader 53, Jagdgeschwader 77 and further elements of JG 27 were rushed to the new front, while transport aircraft of the Ju 52 and the large Messerschmitt Me 323 flew continuous supply missions across the Sicilian Narrows.

In February 1943 the Stab of Fliegerführer Afrika was redesignated Fliegerkorps Tunis. Despite determined efforts, including the temporary concentration of remaining fighters and the use of Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighter-bombers, the Luftwaffe could not prevent the gradual isolation of the Axis bridgehead. Allied air superiority became overwhelming. Operation Flax in April 1943 systematically destroyed the Axis air-transport fleet, culminating in the “Palm Sunday Massacre” of 18 April when large numbers of Ju 52s were shot down. By early May 1943 fuel, ammunition and serviceable aircraft were critically short. Tunis and Bizerta fell on 7 May, and the remaining Luftwaffe personnel either escaped by air or were taken into captivity with the final surrender of Axis forces in North Africa on 13 May 1943.

Throughout the campaign the Luftwaffe never possessed the numerical strength or logistical depth to achieve lasting air superiority. Its successes in 1941 and the first half of 1942 were achieved through qualitative superiority of the Bf 109, skilled pilots such as those of JG 27 (including the famous Oberleutnant Hans-Joachim Marseille), and close cooperation with the ground forces. Once the Allies concentrated superior resources, the same factors that had limited the original German intervention—distance, vulnerability of sea supply routes, and the harsh desert environment—contributed to the ultimate failure of Axis air power in North Africa.



Source :
https://avi-8.com/blogs/the-aviation-journal/the-desert-foxs-air-war-aerial-combat-in-north-africa-during-world-war-ii?srsltid=AfmBOorRRacAwYkUvANHfbtcQHkIe-3-4yYOXHTGgodVuyd_B_1VSdC5
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fliegerf%C3%BChrer_Afrika
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=78684

Tuesday, March 24, 2026

Visit of Hitler to Heeresgruppe Weichsel (Army Group Vistula)

 


This photo was taken on 11 March 1945 when Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht) inspected the Heeresgruppe Weichsel, and it is recorded as the Hitler's last visit to the front! He departed for Bad Freienwalde on the Oder. In a meeting with the commander of the 9th Army, Theodor Busse, the Führer emphasized to his officers to hold back the Russian troops across the Oder River for as long as possible until his latest ultimate weapon was ready (although Hitler himself did not specify what that weapon was!). For identification in this photo, standing around Hitler from left to right: General der Artillerie Wilhelm Berlin (General der Artillerie im Oberkommando des Heeres und Kommandierender General CI. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Robert Ritter von Greim (Chef Luftflotte 6), Generalmajor Franz Reuß (Kommandeur 4. Flieger-Division), General der Flakartillerie Job Odebrecht (Kommandierender General II. Flakkorps), General der Infanterie Theodor Busse (Oberbefehlshaber 9. Armee), and SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS Heinz Lammerding (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Weichsel)


On March 11, 1945, as the noose of the Soviet Red Army tightened around the remnants of Nazi Germany’s Eastern Front defenses, Adolf Hitler undertook what would become his final journey away from the Reich Chancellery in Berlin to visit the forward command elements of Heeresgruppe Weichsel, the army group hastily formed to shield the approaches to the German capital. The destination was Schloss Freienwalde, a stately palace in the town of Bad Freienwalde along the Oder River, roughly sixty kilometers northeast of Berlin and serving as a discreet headquarters for units of the Ninth Army. This excursion, conducted under conditions of strict secrecy and by motorcade rather than aircraft to minimize exposure to Soviet air reconnaissance, represented a last personal effort by the Führer to rally his commanders, assess the collapsing Oder line, and project unyielding resolve in the face of imminent catastrophe. The meeting, preserved in a now-restored historical photograph depicting Hitler seated at a table strewn with operational maps while surrounded by his senior officers, captured a moment of desperate strategic deliberation amid the final weeks of the Third Reich.

The broader military context for this visit was one of unrelenting disaster for German forces. Following the devastating Soviet Vistula-Oder Offensive launched in January 1945, which had swept through Poland and driven the Wehrmacht back across the Oder River in a matter of weeks, Hitler had ordered the creation of Heeresgruppe Weichsel on January 24 as a new formation to consolidate the northern sector of the Eastern Front. Command was entrusted not to a seasoned professional soldier but to Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer-SS, reflecting Hitler’s growing preference for ideological loyalists over traditional generals and his belief that fanaticism could compensate for material shortages. By early March, however, the army group—comprising the Third Panzer Army, Ninth Army, and Eleventh Army along with various ad-hoc formations—was stretched to the breaking point. Manpower was critically depleted, with divisions often reduced to regimental strength; ammunition, fuel, and heavy weapons were in short supply; and Soviet bridgeheads across the Oder, particularly around Küstrin, threatened to erupt into a full-scale breakthrough toward Berlin at any moment. Just one day after Hitler’s visit, on March 12, Soviet forces of the 1st Belorussian Front under Marshal Georgy Zhukov would capture Küstrin, further exposing the fragility of the German positions. The Ninth Army, commanded by General der Infanterie Theodor Busse, bore the brunt of the central sector’s defense, facing overwhelming Soviet artillery barrages and armored superiority while attempting to fortify makeshift lines with whatever reserves could be scraped together from retreating units and Volkssturm militias.

Hitler’s motorcade departed Berlin in the morning of March 11, traveling along roads that had been cleared of unnecessary traffic and placed under heightened security to prevent any disruption or intelligence leaks. Upon arrival at Schloss Freienwalde, he was greeted by a small but select group of commanders who had been summoned for the situation conference. Prominent among them were General Theodor Busse, whose Ninth Army headquarters elements hosted the meeting; Generaloberst Robert Ritter von Greim, the highly decorated Luftwaffe officer who would soon be appointed the last Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; Generalmajor Franz Reuss, commanding the 4th Flieger Division responsible for air support operations; and General Job Odebrecht, another Luftwaffe general involved in coordinating flak and fighter assets for the Oder front. The officers stood clustered around large-scale maps spread across a table in one of the palace’s rooms, their uniforms bearing the Iron Crosses, Knight’s Crosses, and other decorations earned through years of brutal combat, while Hitler, dressed in his plain field-gray tunic with black trousers and polished boots, leaned forward in his chair to examine the dispositions. The photograph of this scene, originally grainy and faded from wartime processing, now appears in crystal-clear 4K detail after restoration, revealing every facial expression, the texture of the wool uniforms, the gleam of medals, and the intricate lines on the maps with the sharpness of a modern professional DSLR capture.

According to accounts of the conference, Busse opened with a candid briefing on the tactical realities confronting Heeresgruppe Weichsel. He detailed the Soviet concentrations opposite the Ninth Army, the exhaustion of German troops after months of continuous withdrawal and counterattacks, the critical lack of armored reserves following transfers to other sectors, and the devastating impact of Red Army artillery that could deliver thousands of shells per kilometer of front. Von Greim and the other Luftwaffe officers contributed assessments of available air assets, noting that fuel shortages and Allied bombing had reduced the once-mighty Luftwaffe to sporadic sorties by jet prototypes and night fighters, with little prospect of sustained close air support. Hitler listened intently, his left hand trembling noticeably from the effects of Parkinson’s disease and the cumulative strain of the war, yet he maintained a composed demeanor. In response, he delivered a characteristically fervent monologue, insisting that the Oder line must be held at all costs. He spoke of imminent “wonder weapons” that would soon enter mass production and deployment—vague references to advanced jet aircraft like the Me 262, improved V-2 rockets, or even rumored experimental technologies—claiming they would inflict catastrophic losses on the Soviets and allow Germany to regain the initiative. He deliberately withheld specifics, perhaps to preserve morale or because the projects themselves were still mired in delays and resource shortages. The generals, aware of the growing disconnect between Hitler’s optimism and the battlefield facts, nonetheless responded with formal assurances of loyalty and determination, a reflection of the atmosphere of obedience that still prevailed even as defeat loomed.

The conference extended for several hours, blending operational discussion with Hitler’s broader strategic exhortations about the need to tie down Soviet forces and buy time for reinforcements or political developments on the Western Front. No major new directives emerged from the meeting; instead, it served primarily as a morale-boosting exercise and a means for Hitler to demonstrate his personal engagement with the troops. By afternoon, the entourage returned to Berlin via the same cautious route, with Hitler retreating once more into the protective confines of the Führerbunker. This journey marked the absolute end of his frontline visits; never again would he leave the capital or directly inspect his armies in the field. Within days, the pressure on Heeresgruppe Weichsel escalated dramatically. Himmler, whose command had proven ineffective amid his own health problems and lack of military expertise, was relieved on March 20 and replaced by Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, a more pragmatic defender who would orchestrate the final, futile stand along the Oder and Seelow Heights. The Soviet Berlin Offensive, launched in mid-April, would shatter these defenses, leading to the encirclement of Berlin and the regime’s collapse.

The restored photograph from the Schloss Freienwalde conference stands today as one of the most evocative images of the war’s closing phase. It shows Hitler in profile, his mustache and slicked hair sharply defined, gazing toward the maps while Busse and the Luftwaffe generals lean in attentively, their faces etched with the fatigue and gravity of men who understood the odds. The lighting and contrast have been balanced to modern standards, eliminating every trace of dust, scratches, and chemical degradation from the original print, yet the historical authenticity remains untouched—no expressions altered, no proportions changed. It is as though the moment was photographed yesterday with contemporary equipment, yet it still depicts the exact individuals, poses, and tense atmosphere of that March day in 1945.

This photo was taken on 11 March 1945 when Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht) inspected the Heeresgruppe Weichsel, and it is recorded as the Hitler's last visit to the front! He departed for Bad Freienwalde on the Oder. In a meeting with the commander of the 9th Army, Theodor Busse, the Führer emphasized to his officers to hold back the Russian troops across the Oder River for as long as possible until his latest ultimate weapon was ready (although Hitler himself did not specify what that weapon was!). For identification in this photo, standing around Hitler from left to right: General der Artillerie Wilhelm Berlin (General der Artillerie im Oberkommando des Heeres und Kommandierender General CI. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Robert Ritter von Greim (Chef Luftflotte 6), Generalmajor Franz Reuß (Kommandeur 4. Flieger-Division), General der Flakartillerie Job Odebrecht (Kommandierender General II. Flakkorps), and General der Infanterie Theodor Busse (Oberbefehlshaber 9. Armee).


This photo was taken on 11 March 1945 when Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht) inspected the Heeresgruppe Weichsel, and it is recorded as the Hitler's last visit to the front! He departed for Bad Freienwalde on the Oder. In a meeting with the commander of the 9th Army, Theodor Busse, the Führer emphasized to his officers to hold back the Russian troops across the Oder River for as long as possible until his latest ultimate weapon was ready (although Hitler himself did not specify what that weapon was!). For identification in this photo, standing around Hitler from left to right: Generaloberst Robert Ritter von Greim (Chef Luftflotte 6), Generalmajor Franz Reuß (Kommandeur 4. Flieger-Division), General der Flakartillerie Job Odebrecht (Kommandierender General II. Flakkorps), and General der Infanterie Theodor Busse (Oberbefehlshaber 9. Armee).


Source :
https://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2014/08/foto-adolf-hitler-di-tahun-1945.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_Group_Vistula

Friday, October 13, 2023

Prince Umberto of Italy in 1944


HRH Prince Umberto conferring with officers over a map table at an Italian camp during his visit to the Italian Corps of Liberation, Sparanise, Italy, 31 May 1944. The picture was taken by Captain A.R. Tanner, British War Office official photographer. Umberto was the only son among the five children of Victor Emmanuel III of Italy and Elena of Montenegro. As heir apparent to the throne, he received a customary military education and pursued a military career afterwards. He commanded an army group during the brief Italian invasion of France shortly before French capitulation. In 1942, he was promoted to Marshal of Italy but was otherwise inactive as an army commander during much of the Second World War. Umberto turned against the war following Italian defeats at Stalingrad and El Alamein, and tacitly supported the ouster of Benito Mussolini. In 1944, Victor Emmanuel, compromised by his association with Italian fascism and desperate to repair the monarchy's image, transferred most of his powers to Umberto. He transferred his remaining powers to Umberto later in 1944 and named him Lieutenant General (Luogotenente) of the Realm; Victor Emmanuel retained the title of King.


Source :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umberto_II_of_Italy
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205188903

Rommel in the El Alamein Front


Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (Oberbefehlshaber Panzerarmee "Afrika") was seen listening seriously as an unknown Hauptmann explained the current, critical situation. To the right stood Oberstleutnant Otto Heymer (Stabs-Offizier der Luftwaffe beim Afrikakorps) who is holding a map. These two people (Heymer and Rommel) were known for not getting along and not liking each other. In the end, Heymer left the African front not long after. This photo itself was taken at the El Alamein Front, Egypt, in late October 1942. Rommel left North Africa on sick leave on 22 September 1942, and only returned on 25 October. During his absence, British troops from Montgomery's Eighth Army carried out a surprise attack on German and Italian defense positions around El Alamein on October 23, and succeeded in making breakthroughs on several fronts. The condition of the German troops worsened the next day when Rommel's temporary replacement in Africa, General der Panzertruppe Georg Stumme, died suddenly of a heart attack. All of these unfortunate events forced "The Desert Fox" to rush back to North Africa to stabilize the situation.




German military leaders at the El Alamein Front, late October 1942. From left to right: an unidentified Hauptmann, Oberstleutnant Otto Heymer (Stabs-Offizier der Luftwaffe beim Afrikakorps), and Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (Oberbefehlshaber Panzerarmee "Afrika"). These two people (Heymer and Rommel) were known for not getting along and not liking each other. In the end Heymer left the African front not long after.


Source :
http://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2014/09/foto-berwarna-erwin-rommel.html
https://www.gehm.es/segunda-guerra-mundial/muerte-de-un-general-aleman-ii-heinrich-von-prittwitz/

Sunday, November 13, 2022

Capt. Jack Westward instructs combat fliers


Captain Jack Westward of Lewiston, Idaho, instructs combat fliers on the fine points of B-17 formation flying at an Eighth Air Force base in England. The basic element of a typical formation was a squadron “box” of 9 or 12 aircraft; three squadron boxes staggered vertically and horizontally formed a group, and three groups in trail formed a combat wing. In the event, the need to keep such tight defensive formations over Europe compromised the accuracy of the Norden bombsight, since individual bomb runs were not possible without breaking the formation. Whole bomb formations had to drop their loads on the lead bombardier’s command, and the inevitable small differences in timing and heading led to dispersed bomb patterns.

Source :
https://www.britannica.com/technology/B-17
National Archives and Records Administration 342-C-K-2268
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum
https://www.flickr.com/photos/airandspace/albums/72157715574200936

Sunday, February 13, 2022

Hitler and Manstein in Conference

On 8 September 1943, Hitler flies to the headquarters of the Heeresgruppe Süd at Zaporozhye, Ukraine, to meet with Erich von Manstein. The situation in the Dnieper area has become a large problem. On 15 September 1943, Hitler ordered Heeresgruppe Süd to retreat to the Dnieper defence line. From left to right: SS-Sturmbannführer Fritz Darges (persönlicher SS Adjutant bei Adolf Hitler), Oberstleutnant Gerhard Engel (Adjutant des Heeres beim Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), and General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres).

From left to right: Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres), and Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe A).

Source :
http://ritterkreuztraeger.blogspot.com/2022/02/hitler-and-manstein-in-conference.html

Saturday, May 15, 2021

Wehrmacht Soldiers in Lithuania

Soldiers of the 126. Infanterie-Division of the Wehrmacht in Lithuania, June 1941. Photographer Günter Buss. During the opening of Operation Barbarossa, the division attacked the Soviet Union from the Memel area and advanced across the Baltic to Lake Ladoga in order to take up positions east of the Volkhov. At the end of 1941 the division was replaced by the Spanish Blue Division and moved west of the Volkhov. The reinforced Infanterie-Regiment 424, detached from the division for several months, meanwhile advanced to Lake Ilmen and was involved in the capture of the cities of Novgorod, Sinyavino, Schluesselburg and Lipki.

Source :
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/126._Infanterie-Division_(Wehrmacht)
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=305865577670315&set=gm.2842395736027653

Sunday, March 14, 2021

An intelligence officer briefs pilots for “Operation Strangle”

An intelligence officer briefs pilots for “Operation Strangle” in spring 1944. They were to attack key supply lines keeping German forces operating in Italy. Operation Strangle was a series of air interdiction operations during the Italian Campaign of World War II by the United States Fifteenth and Twelfth Air Forces to interdict German supply routes in Italy north of Rome from 19 March 1944 to 11 May 1944. Its aim was to prevent essential supplies from reaching German forces in Central Italy and compel a German withdrawal. The strategic goal of the air assault was to eliminate or greatly reduce the need for a ground assault on the region. The Allies failed in the overly ambitious objective of the campaign, namely the forced withdrawal of German forces from the Gustav Line, but the air interdiction seriously complicated the German conduct of defensive operations and played a major role in the success of the subsequent Allied ground assault Operation Diadem.

 

Source :
National Archives and Records Administration 342-C-K-4136
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Strangle_(World_War_II)
https://www.flickr.com/photos/airandspace/albums/72157715574200936

Sunday, February 21, 2021

Briefing of 355th Fighter Squadron

 

Fighter pilots from the U.S. 355th Fighter Squadron gather around their squadron commander as he briefs them prior to a figher mission, near Ober-Olm, Germany, 1945.


Source :
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=440499133885583&set=gm.1677772582408158

Friday, December 25, 2020

Pilots and Gunners of StG 1 Discussing a Map

 

 
All wearing their multi-zippered summer flying suits, pilots and gunners from I.Gruppe / Sturzkampfgeschwader 1 (StG 1) gather around a Leutnant holding a map and compass in front of a Ju 87B at Falaise in the early summer of 1940. They have yet to don their bright yellow kapok lifejackets. Stuka pilots were seen as the elite aviators of the Luftwaffe in the lead up to World War II.


Source :
"RAF Fighters vs Luftwaffe Bombers; Battle of Britain" by Andy Saunders

Sunday, September 13, 2020

Manstein and Breith Discussing Map Strategy

Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (left, Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd) met with General der Panzertruppe Hermann Breith (Kommandierender General III. Panzerkorps) to discuss the upcoming military operation in northeastern Bjelgorod, May 1943, as a preparation of "Unternehmen Zitadelle" (Operation Citadel) a.k.a. the Battle of Kursk. The officer wearing the monocle at right is Oberst im Generalstab Ernst Merk (Chef des Generalstabes III. Panzerkorps). After the conclusion of the battle for the Donets, as the spring rasputitsa (mud) season came to an end in 1943, both the German and Soviet commands considered their plans for future operations. Manstein arguing for a mobile defence that would give up terrain and allow the Soviet units to advance, while the German forces launched a series of sharp counterattacks against their flanks to inflict heavy attrition. But for political reasons, Hitler insisted that the German forces go on the offensive, choosing the Kursk salient for the attack. On 15 April 1943 the Führer authorised preparations for Unternehmen Zitadelle.

Source :
http://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2011/10/album-foto-terbaik-erich-von-manstein.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Citadel

Casablanca Conference (1943)



The Casablanca Conference (codenamed SYMBOL) or Anfa Conference was held at the Anfa Hotel in Casablanca, Morocco, from January 14 to 24, 1943, to plan the Allied European strategy for the next phase of World War II. In attendance were United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill. Also attending were the sovereign of Morocco Sultan Muhammad V and representing the Free French forces Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud, but they played minor roles and were not part of the military planning. USSR General Secretary Joseph Stalin had declined to attend, citing the ongoing Battle of Stalingrad as requiring his presence in the Soviet Union.

The conference's agenda addressed the specifics of tactical procedure, allocation of resources, and the broader issues of diplomatic policy. The debate and negotiations produced what was known as the Casablanca Declaration, and perhaps its most historically provocative statement of purpose, "unconditional surrender". That doctrine came to represent the unified voice of implacable Allied will and the determination that the Axis powers would be fought to their ultimate defeat.

The work of the conference was primarily military—deciding on the invasion of Sicily (after completion of the North African campaign) rather than an immediate invasion of western Europe, apportioning forces for the Pacific theatre and outlining major lines of attack in the Far East, and agreeing on the concentrated bombing of Germany. Roosevelt and Churchill also found time to discuss nuclear bomb research, to consider competing claims between Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle for the leadership of the French war effort against the Axis powers, and, most important of all, to demand an “unconditional surrender” from Germany, Italy, and Japan.


American president Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882 - 1945) and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1874 - 1965) at the Casablanca Conference in Morocco, 16 January 1943. Roosevelt, with advice from General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, lobbied for a cross-Channel invasion of Europe. Churchill, with advice from the British Chiefs of Staff, led by General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS, the professional head of the British Army), felt the time was not opportune, and favored an Allied assault on the island of Sicily followed by an invasion of mainland Italy. The British argument centred on the need to pull German reserves down into Italy where, due to the relatively poor north-south lines of communication, they could not be easily extracted to defend against a later invasion of northwest Europe. Additionally, by delaying the cross-Channel landing, it would mean that any invasion would be against a German army further weakened by many more months fighting on the Eastern Front against the Red Army. Throughout the conference, Roosevelt's attention was prominently focused on the Pacific War front and he faulted the British for what he felt was not a full commitment against Japanese entrenchment. The Italian strategy was agreed upon, a compromise between the two leaders, Roosevelt acceding to Churchill's approach for Europe. Churchill, in turn, pledged more troops and resources to the Pacific and Burma to reinforce positions held by Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese. The United States would provide assistance to the British in the Pacific by supplying escorts and landing craft.


American military commander Brigadier General William Hale Wilbur (1888 - 1979) (second right) kneels to receive the Medal of Honor from American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882 - 1945) (seated, second left) outside the Anfa Hotel, Casablanca, Morrocco, January 22, 1943. Roosevelt is assisted by Major General George S. Patton (1885 - 1945) (right) while US Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall (1880 - 1959) (left) watches. The men where in Morrocco for the Casablanca Conference where they planned Allied strategy for the European campaign in World War II.
 1943-Casablanca, Morocco: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill (seated) pose with their staffs after historic allied conference at Casablanca. Standing (L to R) are: Lt. Gen. H.H. Arnold, Adm. Ernest J. King, Gen. George C. Marshall, Sir Dudley Pound, Sir Charles Portal, Sir Alan Francis Brooke, Sir John Dill, Lord Louis Mountbatten, and Brehon H. Somervell. Others are unidentified

American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882 - 1945) (seated left) and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1874 - 1965) (seated right) review documents at the Casablanca Conference where they planned Allied strategy for the European campaign in World War II, Casablanca, Morrocco, January 17, 1943. Among those behind them are, from left, Chief of the US Army Forces Lieutenant General Henry 'Hap' Arnold (1885 - 1950), Commander-in-Chief of the US Navy Admiral Ernest J. King (1878 - 1956), US Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall (1880 - 1959), Chief of British Naval Staff Admiral Sir Dudley Pound (1877 -1943), Chief of the Imperial General Staff General Sir Alan Brooke (1883 - 1963), and Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal (1893 - 1971)


President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill talk on the lawn of the President's villa during the Casablanca conference, 17 January 1943. The conference produced a unified statement of purpose, the Casablanca Declaration. It announced to the world that the Allies would accept nothing less than the "unconditional surrender" of the Axis powers. Roosevelt had borrowed the term from US Army General Ulysses S. Grant (known as "Unconditional Surrender" Grant), who had communicated that stance to the Confederate States Army commander during the American Civil War. So Roosevelt stated at the concluding press conference on 24 January that the Allies were demanding "unconditional surrender" from the Germans, the Italians and the Japanese.


Military journalists at a press conference listen to President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill during a press conference at the Casablanca Conference, January 1943. Roosevelt and Churchill excluded the press from the conference—partly for safety reasons and partly to allow them to work without scrutiny of their every move. But, toward the end of the conference, Allied Forces Headquarters invited a group of approximately 50 journalists to Casablanca, promising them a history-making event. With space short in Anfa, the journalists received lodgings at the Excelsior, an upscale hotel on Casablanca’s main thoroughfare across from the entrance to the old medina. They were instructed not to talk about their assignment in front of hotel employees or others in Casablanca. They were also told to behave as if their rooms were bugged. The Excelsior’s bar had been a favorite hangout for the German Armistice Commission, and the current extent of Nazi infiltration of the hotel staff remained unclear. To help with security, the U.S. Army temporarily took over the hotel’s switchboard and kitchen.


General Charles de Gaulle of Free French Forces at Casablanca Conference, 17 January 1943. He had to be forced to attend, and he met a chilly reception from Roosevelt and Churchill. No French representatives were allowed to attend the military planning sessions. Elliott Roosevelt’s book, 'As He Saw It' (1946) describes how Franklin Roosevelt wanted the French provisional government to be set up with Giraud and de Gaulle, who would be “equally responsible for its composition and welfare.” That is because Franklin Roosevelt saw de Gaulle as Churchill’s puppet and thought that Giraud would be more compliant with US interests. Complications arose because most people in the French Resistance considered de Gaulle the undisputed leader of the Resistance and so Giraud was progressively dispossessed of his political and military roles. Roosevelt eventually recognized de Gaulle as the head of the Free French in mid-1944.


 Roosevelt's Delegation At Casablanca. Seated in the center, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882 - 1945) discusses the British problem with a group of Casablanca Conference attendees, Morocco, 1943. Left to right, front row: General Goerge C. Marshall (1880 - 1959), Chief of Staff, President Roosevelt, Admiral E.J. King (1878 - 1956), Commander in Chief of the US Navy. Left to right, back row: Lieutenant General Harry Hopkins (1890 - 1946), Lieutenant General HH Arnold (1886 - 1950), Commander of US Army Air Forces, Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell (1892 - 1955), and Averell Harriman (1891 - 1986). Roosevelt presented the results of the conference to the American people in a radio address on February 12, 1943. During the return trip to the United States, President Roosevelt met with the President of Brazil, Getúlio Vargas, at the Potenji River Conference, where they discussed Brazil's participation in the war effort and defined the agreements that led to the creation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. The conference took place aboard the USS Humboldt in the Potenji River harbor in Natal, on January 28 and 29, 1943.


 View of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's delegation at the Casablanca Conference, January, 1943, Casablance, Morocco.




Allied leaders (from left) French General Henri Giraud, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, French General Charles de Gaulle, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on the lawn of President Roosevelt's villa during the Casablanca conference, 24 January 1943. The conference called for the official recognition of a joint leadership of the Free French forces by de Gaulle and Henri Giraud. There was notable tension between the two men, who limited their interactions to formalities like pledging their mutual support. Roosevelt encouraged them to shake hands for the photographers eager for a photo opportunity, but the ritual handshake was with reluctance and done so quickly that they reportedly had to pose for a second shot! Roosevelt would later describe this meeting between the French leaders as a "shotgun wedding".



Source :
https://www.britannica.com/place/Casablanca-Morocco
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casablanca_Conference
https://www.facebook.com/groups/237076659811098/
https://www.gettyimages.com/photos/casablanca-conference-1943?family=editorial&phrase=casablanca%20conference%201943&sort=best

Sunday, August 30, 2020

Hitler and Mussolini at Salzburg Train Station

German Chancellor Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) meets with Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) and Axis officers at Salzburg railway station. This picture was taken by Walter Frentz on 22 April 1944 during the two-day meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at Schloss Kleßheim near Salzburg, Austria. The meeting also attended by Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Rudolf Rahn and Karl Wolff on the German side and Serafino Mazzolini, Rodolfo Graziani, Filippo Anfuso and general Umberto Morera for the Italians. Mussolini and his delegation presented a list of problems the Italian Social Republic was having which they attributed to the lack of cooperation with German authorities, but the German delegation no longer respected Mussolini who by now resembled a shadow of his former self.


 Adolf Hitler shaking hands with the Italian and German officials. SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff saluting at right.



SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff saluting to Hitler, while at right standing General der Infanterie Rudolf Toussaint


Adolf Hitler ready to shaking hands with SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, while at far right is General der Infanterie Rudolf Toussaint






Benito Mussolini with German officials in Italy. At far left is General der Infanterie Rudolf Toussaint (Bevollmächtigten General der deutschen Wehrmacht in Italien), followed to the right by Oberst Heinz Heggenreiner (Verbindungsoffizier zum Marschall Graziani in den Stab des Bevollmächtigten General der deutschen Wehrmacht in Italien), and Oberstleutnant i.G. Hans Jandl (Chef des Verbindungsstabes in Bevollmächtigten General der deutschen Wehrmacht in Italien).


 Adolf Hitler shaking hands with Oberstleutnant i.G. Hans Jandl (Chef des Verbindungsstabes in Bevollmächtigten General der deutschen Wehrmacht in Italien).


 Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini walks past through saluting German and Italian officials.


 Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini walks past through saluting German and Italian officials.


Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini saluting each other








Source :
Aboubakre Boukhris photo collection
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_1944#April_22,_1944_(Saturday)
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=oa.1061781580891012&type=3&__cft__[0]=AZXXl8bU6RZ5QWolWF6JhME0vCCDOKSDeuJf3mRmLdbX2Nc9bLW6uLmEmcCIsEE9caha5FBi4D4usQkToh-uvMHkBjYqr1aURMOmOZ7qYSeS147BsUvYJi8vwwO7wpOfMXzSaG8bN2x-JUq1-Lz79P8weT57eF6z-GYHI0Jqp1mvy0QnPnr-OfOn_pinvCGzR2w&__tn__=-UC%2CP-R

Friday, August 14, 2020

Keitel Göring Dönitz Himmler Bormann

High ranking Nazi officials in conversation at Platterhof Hotel, Obersalzberg. They are waiting for Hitler to come. From left to right: Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel (Chef Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring (Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe), Großadmiral Karl Dönitz (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine), Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler (Chef der SS und Deutschen Polizei), and Reichsleiter Martin Bormann (Leiter Parteikanzlei der NSDAP und Privatsekretär Führer und Reichskanzler). The picture was taken in May 1944 by Heinrich Hoffmann.


Source :
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=2838528286414648&set=gm.1517702435081841&type=3&theater&ifg=1

Thursday, May 7, 2020

Stuka Ace Johann Zemsky Near Stalingrad


German Luftwaffe Knights Cross Winner Stuka Bomber Ace Johann Zemsky talks to stuka pilots near Stalingrad 1942. Zemsky flew a total of 600 sorties, dying on his 600th when his parachute failed to open.


Source :
https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/photos/stuka-pilot?mediatype=photography&phrase=stuka%20pilot&sort=best

Tuesday, April 21, 2020

Briefing by a Gebirgsjäger Commander

Briefing by the commander of a Gebirgsjäger company in Italian Front, 1944.


Source :
Archiv für Zeitgeschichte, Stuttgart
Courtesy of Franz-Paul Peterka at https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=2920081871363987&set=gm.1417480991770653&type=3&theater&ifg=1

Monday, March 9, 2020

Heinz Guderian during Barbarossa


Generaloberst Heinz Guderian (Oberbefehlshaber Panzergruppe 2) holding a map during a field briefing with his generals in Russia, in front of a Panzerkampfwagen III medium tank, summer 1941. From left to right: Generalmajor Walther Nehring (Kommandeur 18. Panzer-Division), Oberst im Generalstab Rudolf Bamler (Chef des Generalstabes XXXXVII. Armeekorps), General der Panzertruppe Joachim Lemelsen (Kommandierender General XXXXVII. Armeekorps), Generalleutnant Hans-Jürgen von Arnim (Kommandeur 17. Panzer-Division), and Generaloberst Guderian. Panzergruppe 2 was formed in November 1940 from Panzergruppe Guderian (in October 1941 it was renamed the 2. Panzerarmee). It played a significant role in the early stages of the German invasion of the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa in 1941, when it was a constituent part of Heeresgruppe Mitte. Guderian troops formed the Army Group's southern pincer while Generaloberst Hermann Hoth's Panzergruppe 3 formed the northern pincer destroying several Soviet armies during the opening phase of Barbarossa. During the battles of Bialystok and Minsk, substantial numbers of prisoners and weapons were captured by Guderian's Gruppe. One of its subordinate was XXXXVII. Armeekorps, who controls 17. and 18. Panzer-Division.The photo was taken by Kriegsberichter Heinz Eckert (Propaganda-Kompanie 670).

Source :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2nd_Panzer_Army
http://forum-console.worldoftanks.com/index.php?/topic/55379-wwii-in-color/

Saturday, May 18, 2019

Bio of General der Artillerie Walter Warlimont


General der Artillerie Walter Warlimont, the son of a publisher, was born in Osnabrück, Germany, on 3 October 1894. An artillery cadet, he was commissioned into the German Kaiserliche Armee in June 1914. During the First World War he fought on the Western Front as a battery officer. He was promoted several times and progressed to become an brigade adjutant and battery commander. After the war Warlimont was active in the right-wing Freikorps group. He remained in the army and in 1922 was selected for general staff training. This included spending time in England (1926) and the United States (1929). Promoted to Major, Warlimont sent to Spain in September 1936 where he worked as a military adviser to General Francisco Franco during the early stages of the Spanish Civil War. Warlimont returned to Nazi Germany in 1937 where he was given command of the Artillerie-Regiment 26 at Düsseldorf. In September 1938 Warlimont became head of Home Defence. The following year he worked under Alfred Jodl as deputy head of the operations office in Berlin. In this role he attended Hitler's military conferences and drafted most of Germany's major operational plans and directives. Warlimont was seriously injured by the bomb placed by Claus von Stauffenberg on 20th July 1944. After the war Warlimont was sentenced to life imprisonment for war crimes. However he was released in 1957. His book 'Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939-45' was published in 1964. Walter Warlimont died at Kreuth in Upper Bavaria on 9 October 1976.



Source:
"Fuhrerhauptquartier Wolfschanze 1940-1945" by Walter Frentz
https://spartacus-educational.com/GERwarlimont.htm