Adolf Hitler and Erich von Manstein at Zaporozhye (1943)

The atmosphere of the war conference at the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye, Ukraine, on 8 September 1943. From left to right: SS-Sturmbannführer Fritz Darges (persönlicher SS Adjutant bei Adolf Hitler), Oberstleutnant Gerhard Engel (Adjutant des Heeres beim Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Oberst im Generalstab Joachim Meichßner (Chef der Organisationsabteilung im Wehrmachtführungsstab), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), and General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres).

On 8 September 1943, Adolf Hitler flew to the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye (also rendered Saporoschje or Zaporizhzhia), in southeastern Ukraine. The visit marked his final journey to the Eastern Front. That same day, news of Italy’s capitulation reached German high command, casting a heavy shadow over the discussions. The conference brought together Hitler, Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein, Commander-in-Chief of Heeresgruppe Süd, Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist, Commander-in-Chief of Heeresgruppe A, and General der Infanterie Richard Ruoff, whose 17. Armee still held the isolated Kuban bridgehead.

The strategic situation confronting Heeresgruppe Süd had deteriorated sharply since the failure of Operation Citadel in July. Soviet forces of the Voronezh, Steppe, Southwestern, and Southern Fronts had launched successive offensives that eroded German positions east of the Dnieper. Manstein’s armies had suffered heavy losses: by late August the army group reported approximately 133,000 casualties against only some 33,000 replacements. Divisions were under strength, reserves were scarce, and the front stretched thinly across the Donets Basin and the approaches to the lower Dnieper.

Earlier meetings had produced little resolution. On 27 August 1943 Hitler had conferred with Manstein at Vinnitsa. Manstein insisted that without substantial reinforcements the Donets region could not be held and that a timely withdrawal to the Dnieper was essential. Hitler refused both the reinforcements and a general retreat. A further conference at Führer headquarters in East Prussia on 3 September 1943, attended by Manstein and Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge of Heeresgruppe Mitte, proved equally fruitless. Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, supported Manstein’s assessment, warning that the choice was no longer whether the Donets area could be retained, but whether it would be abandoned alone or together with an entire army group.

Manstein’s teleprinter message of 7 September renewed the pressure. He reported that the enemy had already committed fifty-five divisions and two tank corps against Heeresgruppe Süd, drawing forces from other sectors of the Eastern Front, with additional formations still approaching. He demanded decisive action if the army group were to retain control of the situation. The following day Hitler arrived at Zaporozhye, having summoned Kleist and Ruoff as well.

At the conference Manstein again laid out the gravity of the position. He stressed the exhaustion of the troops, the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces, and the danger that a collapse of the northern wing of Heeresgruppe Süd would expose Heeresgruppe A. On the northern wing of 6. Armee a gap of some twenty-eight miles had already been torn open, held only by the remnants of two divisions. Manstein argued that the right wing of the army group could no longer be restored forward of the Dnieper and that only a rapid withdrawal behind the river offered any prospect of reconstituting a coherent defensive front.

Hitler initially resisted a general retreat. He authorised only a partial pull-back on the extreme southern wing and continued to insist on holding economically and politically significant points, among them the manganese deposits near Nikopol and the approaches to the Crimea. Prestige and the desire to retain a foothold east of the Dnieper still weighed heavily in his calculations. Nevertheless, the cumulative reports of the commanders present, combined with the wider crisis marked by Italy’s defection, produced a shift. Hitler conceded that Heeresgruppe Süd might withdraw toward the Dnieper if the situation made it “absolutely necessary.” He also promised additional divisions, to be taken if required from Heeresgruppe Mitte, in order to secure the Dnieper crossings, and he finally agreed to evacuate the Kuban bridgehead, thereby releasing forces of the 17. Armee that had been tied down in a remote and increasingly irrelevant theatre since the previous year’s Caucasus campaign.

The concessions remained limited and conditional. Full authority for a coordinated withdrawal of Heeresgruppe Süd to the so-called Panther Line along the Dnieper was not granted until a subsequent meeting at Führer headquarters on 15 September 1943. In the interval Manstein pressed his case further in writing. In a letter to Hitler he repeated the demand for rapid withdrawal and closed with a pointed observation: had the necessary reinforcements been provided in good time, the present crisis, which could decide the outcome in the east and thereby the war itself, might have been avoided. Few senior officers had ever addressed the Führer in such direct terms.

The conference at Zaporozhye thus represented a reluctant and incomplete acknowledgment by Hitler of the operational realities facing his southern armies. It did not restore the initiative to German arms, nor did it prevent the subsequent Soviet advance to and across the Dnieper. Yet it marked a turning point in the relationship between the Führer and his most capable field commander on the Eastern Front. Manstein obtained a measure of the freedom of manoeuvre he had long sought, while Hitler’s personal visit underscored both the seriousness of the crisis and the limits of his willingness to relinquish control. Within weeks the German forces would begin their fighting withdrawal to the great river, abandoning the Donets industrial region and preparing for the defensive battles that would follow on the west bank.

The atmosphere of the war conference at the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye, Ukraine, on 8 September 1943. From left to right: Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres), and Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe A).

Source :
https://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2012/11/album-foto-adolf-hitler-sebagai-ahli.html
https://www.criticalpast.com/video/65675078957_Hitler-visiting-von-Manstein_Zaporozhye-Airfield_Ukraine_Eastern-Front
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMbi6PFjG-M

Photograph of Erich Buschenhagen by Walter Frentz

General der Infanterie Erich Buschenhagen (Kommandierender General LII. Armeekorps) in a picture taken in July 1944 by Walter Frentz, during Eichenlaub award ceremony with Hitler at the Führerhauptquartier Wolfsschanze in Rastenburg, East Prussia. In the spring of 1944 General Buschenhagen, serving as Korpskommandeur within the 6. Armee of Heeresgruppe Südukraine, faced a critical threat on the lower Dniester front. Strong Soviet forces had established dangerous bridgeheads west of Butor and in the pronounced river bend at Koschniza, positions from which the Red Army could expand its lodgements and threaten the entire German defensive line in southern Ukraine and northern Romania. On 10 and 11 May 1944 Buschenhagen launched a carefully coordinated counter-offensive under the provisional designation Gruppe Buschenhagen. Employing the available infantry, artillery and limited armoured support of his corps, he directed concentric attacks that rapidly compressed and then annihilated the Soviet bridgeheads. In the course of these two days of intense fighting the LII. Armeekorps destroyed seven Soviet rifle divisions together with substantial elements of an artillery division and a Flak division, capturing large numbers of prisoners, guns and heavy weapons. The successful elimination of these bridgeheads restored the integrity of the Dniester line at a moment when the front was under severe pressure and prevented a potentially decisive Soviet breakthrough. For this outstanding command achievement Buschenhagen was mentioned by name in the Wehrmachtbericht of 12 May 1944 and, on 4 July 1944, received the Eichenlaub to the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes as the 521st recipient of the higher grade of the decoration. The award recognised not only the tactical skill displayed in the rapid destruction of the enemy lodgements but also the operational significance of securing the southern sector of Heeresgruppe Südukraine in the critical weeks preceding the major Soviet summer offensives of 1944.

Source :
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?p=2050789&hilit=buschenhagen#p2050789
https://www.walter-frentz-collection.de/fotoarchiv/personenarchiv-a-z/personen-a-b/
https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/3041/Buschenhagen-Erich-Otto-Ludwig-General-der-Inf.htm

Photographs of Wilhelm Burgdorf by Walter Frentz

General der Infanterie Wilhelm Burgdorf (Chefadjutant der Wehrmacht beim Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht) in a picture taken in 1945 by Walter Frentz. Burgdorf, serving as Chef des Heerespersonalamtes as well as Chief adjutant to Adolf Hitler since October 1944, remained at the Führer’s side throughout the final weeks of the Battle of Berlin in 1945. As Soviet forces encircled the capital in mid-April he moved permanently into the Führerbunker beneath the Reichskanzlei, attending the daily briefings where fragmented reports of collapsing fronts and failed relief attempts were presented. On 28 April, after news arrived that Heinrich Himmler had opened unauthorized surrender talks with the Western Allies, Burgdorf was appointed to the improvised military tribunal that examined Hermann Fegelein, Himmler’s SS-Verbindungsoffizier and Eva Braun’s brother-in-law; the proceedings under General Wilhelm Mohnke ended without formal sentence when Fegelein proved too intoxicated to stand trial. The following day, 29 April 1945, Burgdorf, together with Joseph Goebbels, General Hans Krebs and Martin Bormann, witnessed and signed Hitler’s politisches Testament and private will. He steadfastly rejected any notion of capitulation, on one occasion drawing his pistol against the radio commentator Hans Fritzsche who proposed contacting the Soviets. After Hitler’s suicide on 30 April and the subsequent deaths of the Goebbels family, Burgdorf and Krebs remained in the bunker. In the early hours of 2 May 1945 the two generals committed suicide by simultaneous gunshots to the head; their bodies were discovered by advancing Red Army troops inside the Führerbunker complex shortly thereafter, marking the end of Burgdorf’s unwavering service to the Führer in the last days of the Third Reich.

Source :
https://forum.axishistory.com/search.php?keywords=burgdorf&t=46430&sf=msgonly
https://www.walter-frentz-collection.de/fotoarchiv/personenarchiv-a-z/personen-a-b/

Hitler's 50th Birthday Celebration (20 April 1939)

Adolf Hitler’s fiftieth birthday on 20 April 1939 was marked throughout the German Reich as a national holiday, the only occasion on which the date was officially designated a public holiday by the government. The celebrations, carefully orchestrated under the direction of Reichsminister für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda Joseph Goebbels, were designed as a grand demonstration of national unity, the cult of the Führer, and the military strength of the rearmed Wehrmacht. Berlin served as the principal stage for the most elaborate of these observances, while similar festivities, including military parades and party ceremonies, took place in cities and towns across the Reich and in annexed territories.

Preparations had been underway for weeks. Public buildings, streets, and private houses were ordered to display flags bearing the Hakenkreuz. The newly completed Ost-West-Achse, a broad ceremonial boulevard designed by Albert Speer as a central element of the planned transformation of Berlin into Welthauptstadt Germania, was prepared as the main route for processions and the principal parade. On the afternoon of 19 April, Hitler led a motorcade of fifty white limousines along this thoroughfare. Crowds lined the route, and the occasion was used to inaugurate the avenue formally. In the evening, Goebbels delivered a nationwide radio address praising Hitler as a man of historic stature who had achieved bloodless territorial gains and restored German power. Later that night, members of the “old guard” of the NSDAP from the various Gaue staged a torchlight procession. At midnight, within the Neue Reichskanzlei, leading figures of the regime offered formal congratulations and presented gifts. These included works of art, porcelain from Meissen, statues, tapestries, models of architectural projects and military equipment, rare coins, antique weapons, and numerous other items. Speer offered a large model of a planned triumphal arch. Heinrich Himmler presented a painting of Frederick the Great. Ferdinand Porsche and representatives of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront delivered a convertible Volkswagen. Hitler also inspected a model of the Westwall fortifications and a model of his personal Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor aircraft. Contemporary accounts note that he examined some gifts with interest, mocked others, and largely ignored the rest.

On the morning of 20 April itself, the band of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler performed a short concert in the garden of the Reichskanzlei, playing the national anthem and the Horst-Wessel-Lied. Hitler appeared briefly to acknowledge the musicians before returning indoors to view the accumulated presents. Shortly after 10:00, he departed the Reichskanzlei in an open Mercedes, travelling via the Stadtkommandantur to the reviewing stand erected opposite the Technische Hochschule in Charlottenburg along the Ost-West-Achse. There he took his place on a raised dais under a canopy decorated with eagles and Iron Crosses, seated on a gilded chair covered in red plush. Surrounding him on the grandstand were senior officers of the Wehrmacht, party leaders, and approximately 20,000 official guests, including foreign diplomats and military attachés.

The military parade that followed was the largest yet staged by the German armed forces. It lasted more than four hours and involved between 40,000 and 50,000 troops drawn from all branches. Units of the Heer, Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine each contributed twelve companies, supplemented by formations of the Schutzstaffel. Marching contingents were interspersed with motorised columns that included roughly 600 Panzer vehicles of various types (among them PzKpfw II, III, and IV), heavy artillery pieces, anti-aircraft guns such as the 8.8 cm Flak, searchlights, motorcycle units, engineer equipment, and other specialised vehicles. Overhead, 162 aircraft of the Luftwaffe flew in formation. The parade route stretched along the Ost-West-Achse, with troops forming up over a considerable distance beforehand so that the flow past the reviewing stand remained continuous and precise. Contemporary film and photographic records show infantry, cavalry, sailors, airmen, Fallschirmjäger, and SS men marching in close order, dipping their standards as they passed Hitler. The event was intended both as a birthday homage and as a public display of the Wehrmacht’s recovered strength and modern equipment, directed as much at domestic audiences as at foreign observers.

Hundreds of thousands of spectators lined the route and filled side streets. Security was provided by large contingents of the SA, NSKK, regular police, and several hundred men of the SS positioned near the reviewing stand. Similar, though smaller, military parades and ceremonial assemblies took place the same day in garrisons throughout the Reich. In many locations, the day began with a Großer Wecken by military bands, followed by formal appeals, promotions, and the presentation of gifts from local populations. Evening events often featured party rallies at which the Führer’s achievements were praised and the national anthems sung.

The scale of the Berlin parade and the accompanying nationwide observances reflected the high point of the pre-war cult of the Führer. Propaganda emphasised national recovery, territorial expansion achieved without major bloodshed, and the restoration of military power. Gifts and messages arrived not only from within Germany but also from German communities abroad. Foreign military attachés present in Berlin noted the emphasis on motorised and anti-aircraft units, even if little entirely new equipment was displayed. The celebrations concluded without incident, leaving a carefully constructed image of unity, discipline, and strength that the regime sought to project both at home and abroad in the months preceding the outbreak of war later that year.

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RECEPTION AND GIFTS

Some of Hitler's 50th birthday gifts, including vases with swastikas and paintings, in the Neue Reichskanzlei (New Reich Chancellery). The picture was taken by Hugo Jaeger. On 20 April 1939, Adolf Hitler celebrated his 50th birthday amid elaborate festivities in Berlin, during which he received a vast array of gifts from Nazi officials, military leaders, organizations, and citizens that filled rooms in the Reich Chancellery. Albert Speer presented a detailed scale model of the planned gigantic triumphal arch intended for the reconstruction of Berlin as Welthauptstadt Germania. His personal pilot Hans Baur offered a model of the four-engined Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor, known as the Führer plane that later entered service as his official aircraft. Ferdinand Porsche, accompanied by Robert Ley of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront, delivered a black convertible prototype of the KdF-Wagen, the forerunner of the Volkswagen. Hermann Göring, head of the Luftwaffe, gave a solid gold model of the Haus der Deutschen Kunst in Munich. Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler presented a prized portrait of Frederick the Great, which Hitler kept until the final days in the bunker. Other presents included statues, bronze casts, Meissen porcelain, oil paintings, tapestries, rare coins, antique weapons, and numerous kitsch items such as swastika-embellished vases and embroidered textiles. The Free City of Danzig conferred honorary citizenship upon him through Albert Forster. A Munich brewery specially produced low-alcohol beer suited to his digestive preferences. Additional offerings comprised silver architectural models, porcelain from the Allach factory associated with the SS, handcrafted clocks from the Sudetenland, food items like hop salad and apples from grateful regions, and even thousands of pairs of soldiers’ socks along with a living eagle!

Source :
Hugo Jaeger photo collection
https://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2010/10/koleksi-ratusan-foto-berwarna-dari-life.html
https://artsandculture.google.com/search/asset?q=hugo%20jaeger&hl=en

Photograph of Maximilian von Weichs by Walter Frentz

Generalfeldmarschall Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe B) in a picture taken on 1 February 1943 by Walter Frentz, during Generalfeldmarschall promotion ceremony with Hitler at the Führerhauptquartier Wolfsschanze in Rastenburg, East Prussia. Weichs received his special promotion to the rank of marshall on that day in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophic German defeat at Stalingrad. At that time he held the position of Commander-in-Chief of Army Group B, the formation responsible for the advance toward the Volga during Fall Blau. Heeresgruppe B had included 2. Armee, 4. Panzerarmee, 6. Armee under Friedrich Paulus, as well as the allied 2. Hungarian Army, 8. Italian Army and the Romanian armies whose collapse during Operation Uranus sealed the encirclement. Although Weichs had repeatedly warned of the overstretched flanks and had recommended a timely withdrawal, Adolf Hitler refused, and large parts of Heeresgruppe B were subsequently detached to form Heeresgruppe Don under Erich von Manstein. Despite the destruction of nearly the entire 6. Armee and the effective dissolution of Heeresgruppe B, Weichs was elevated to Generalfeldmarschall together with Paulus, Ewald von Kleist and Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen. The promotion, announced on the same day that Paulus was also made Generalfeldmarschall inside the Stalingrad pocket, served both as a formal recognition of senior command responsibility and as a propaganda gesture intended to mask the scale of the disaster. Weichs retained the rank for the remainder of the war, later serving as Oberbefehlshaber Südost and commander of Heeresgruppe F in the Balkans. The elevation therefore marked the highest point of his military career even as his operational authority on the Eastern Front was simultaneously being reduced. After a brief period in the Führerreserve he returned to active duty later in 1943, carrying the rank of Generalfeldmarschall until his final transfer to reserve status in March 1945. Thus the promotion of 1 February 1943 stands as a paradoxical culmination of his service with Heeresgruppe B amid one of the Wehrmacht’s greatest defeats.

Source :
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?p=2018989&hilit=weichs#p2018989
https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/35803/Weichs-von-Maximillian.htm
https://www.walter-frentz-collection.de/fotoarchiv/personenarchiv-a-z/personen-t-z/

Blue Division's Swearing-in Ceremony at Grafenwöhr (1941)

From left to right: Generalleutnant Agustín Muñoz Grandes (Kommandeur 250. Infanterie-Division [spanien]), Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm (Chef der Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres), Gauleiter Fritz Wächtler (NSDAP-Gauleiter der Bayerischen Ostmark), and Dr.phil. Friedrich von Cochenhausen (Kommandierenden General des Stellvertretenden XIII. Armeekorps in Nürnberg und Befehlshaber vom Wehrkreis XIII). The picture was taken at Truppenübungsplatz Grafenwöhr on 31 July 1941 during swearing-in ceremony of the Spanish volunteers in the Wehrmacht.

In the summer of 1941, as German forces advanced deep into the Soviet Union following the launch of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June, a contingent of Spanish volunteers prepared to join the campaign on the Eastern Front. These men formed what became known as the División Azul, or Blue Division, a unit of volunteers raised in Francoist Spain to fight against Bolshevism. After recruitment and initial organization in Spain, the volunteers travelled by train across France and into Germany, arriving at the large military training ground of Grafenwöhr in Bavaria between 17 and 23 July 1941. There, under German supervision, they underwent rapid reorganization, outfitting, and instruction before formal incorporation into the Wehrmacht as the 250. Infanterie-Division.

Grafenwöhr was a major Truppenübungsplatz with extensive facilities capable of accommodating large formations. The Spanish contingent, numbering roughly 18,000 men, was placed under the overall administration of the camp authorities, which operated from the Kommandantur. German instructors oversaw the issue of Wehrmacht uniforms, equipment, and weapons, including the distinctive MG 34 machine gun that the Spaniards quickly came to admire. The only outward marks distinguishing the Spaniards from German personnel were a silk arm shield in the Spanish national colours bearing the word “España” on the right sleeve and, in many cases, the continued wearing of the blue Falange shirt or the red Carlist beret beneath or in place of standard headgear. The division was restructured from the Spanish four-regiment model to the standard German three-regiment organization to facilitate integration into the Wehrmacht supply system. The infantry regiments received the designations 262., 263., and 269. Infanterie-Regiment, supported by an artillery regiment and various independent units and services. Spanish military justice and certain internal police functions remained under Spanish control, in accordance with agreements reached between the two governments.

Training was intensive but abbreviated. German expectations of rapid deployment, combined with the high proportion of veterans of the Spanish Civil War among the volunteers, led to a compressed schedule of roughly two to five weeks rather than the longer period originally envisaged. The men adapted to German drill, marching discipline, and weapons handling while living in the camp’s two-storey barracks built in a style reminiscent of Bavarian architecture.

The formal swearing-in ceremony that sealed the division’s incorporation into the Wehrmacht took place on 31 July 1941 on the instruction field known as Kramemberg (sometimes rendered Kramerbrg in contemporary accounts). The entire division formed up for the occasion, accompanied by a German company of honour. Presiding over the event were the Spanish commander, General Agustín Muñoz Grandes, together with his staff; Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm, representing the German high command as Chef der Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres; and General der Artillerie Dr.phil. Friedrich von Cochenhausen, who acted as the officer in charge of the ceremony. The Spanish and German national flags stood side by side.

The proceedings began with a Catholic field mass, reflecting the predominantly Catholic character of the Spanish volunteers. After the religious service came the central act: the oath of allegiance. At the insistence of the Spanish authorities, the standard Wehrmacht formula of personal loyalty to Adolf Hitler was modified to limit the obligation to the struggle against communism. General von Cochenhausen first read the oath in German:

“Schwörst Du vor Gott und bei Deiner Ehre als Spanier, dem Obersten Befehlshaber der Deutschen Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler, im Kampf gegen den Kommunismus unbedingten Gehorsam entgegenzubringen und schwörst Du, als tapferer Soldat zu kämpfen, der jederzeit bereit ist, sein Leben in Erfüllung dieses Eides hinzugeben?”

Colonel José María Troncoso then repeated the text in Spanish:

“¿Juráis ante Dios y por vuestro honor de españoles, absoluta obediencia al jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas alemanas, Adolf Hitler, en la lucha contra el comunismo, y juráis combatir como valientes soldados, dispuestos a dar vuestra vida en cada instante por cumplir este juramento?”

The assembled ranks raised their right arms in the Fascist salute and answered with a collective “¡Sí, juro!” or “Yes, I swear.” Muñoz Grandes himself took the oath separately, adding the emphatic Spanish declaration: “Lo que un español jura, lo cumple o muere” (“What a Spaniard swears, he fulfils or dies”).

Contemporary accounts describe the atmosphere as one of solemn intensity. One participant later recalled the emotional impact of thousands of voices answering as one. After the oath, Muñoz Grandes addressed the division, declaring that the volunteers had sworn to die rather than allow Bolshevism to continue its work of destruction, and instructing that the Führer be informed of their readiness and their determination to keep their word.

A second, smaller ceremony took place on 3 August for those who had not yet sworn. With the formalities completed and the brief period of intensive training concluded, the 250. Infanterie-Division was considered ready for active service. Movement toward the front began in the second half of August 1941. The division travelled by rail and then on foot through Poland and into the Soviet Union, eventually being assigned to the northern sector of the Eastern Front near Leningrad and the Volkhov River.

The Grafenwöhr ceremony of 31 July 1941 marked the official transformation of the Spanish volunteer formation into a unit of the German army. It formalized a carefully negotiated arrangement in which Spanish volunteers fought under German operational command while retaining certain national characteristics in justice, pay, and internal administration. The modified wording of the oath underscored the anti-communist motivation that Spanish authorities emphasized, distinguishing the commitment from a broader personal allegiance. In the months and years that followed, the division would see hard fighting in the frozen landscapes of northern Russia, earning a reputation for tenacity even as it operated far from home under foreign command. The events at Grafenwöhr remain a defining moment in the short but intense history of the División Azul.

Source :
https://www.ebay.com/itm/305590004014
https://www.worldmilitariaforum.com/forums/topic/320832-the-m18-helmet-worn-during-the-war/

Motorcyclists of 3. Panzer-Division in the Summer 1942

In the summer of 1942 the 3. Panzer-Division, under the command of Generalmajor Hermann Breith, formed part of the German forces committed to Fall Blau, the major offensive launched on the southern sector of the Eastern Front with the strategic aim of seizing the Caucasian oil fields. After participating in the successful counteroffensive that eliminated the Soviet bridgehead west of the Donez during the Second Battle of Kharkov in May, the division was fully reconstituted and assigned to the XXXX. Panzerkorps within the 1. Panzerarmee of Heeresgruppe A. Beginning on 28 June it advanced rapidly eastward from the Kharkov area toward Voronezh, contributing to the capture of that city by early July before turning south along the Don. Crossing the lower Don near Rostov, the division pressed deep into the Kuban steppe and the northern Caucasus, covering hundreds of kilometres in successive advances that carried its Panzer-Regiment 6 and supporting Panzergrenadier elements through Armavir and beyond. By mid-August the 3. Panzer-Division had reached the Terek River sector near Mozdok, where it engaged in intense fighting against determined Soviet defences protecting the approaches to Grozny. Supply difficulties, fuel shortages and lengthening lines of communication progressively slowed the advance, while Soviet resistance stiffened amid the rugged terrain of the Caucasus foothills. Throughout these operations the division’s tanks, predominantly Panzer III and Panzer IV models, spearheaded rapid thrusts in cooperation with neighbouring formations such as the 13. Panzer-Division and 23. Panzer-Division. Despite initial successes that brought German forces to within striking distance of the vital oil centres, the offensive ultimately stalled short of its objectives. Heavy casualties accumulated during the prolonged engagements around Mozdok and along the Terek, depleting the division’s combat strength by the end of the summer campaign. On 1 October 1942 command passed from Generalleutnant Hermann Breith to Generalleutnant Franz Westhoven as the division prepared for further operations in the Caucasus theatre.

Source :
https://yuripasholok.livejournal.com/14933905.html

Photographs of Ferdinand Schörner by Walter Frentz

Generaloberst Ferdinand Schörner (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Nord) in a picture taken on 16 January 1945 by Walter Frentz, during Brillanten award ceremony with Hitler at the Neue Reichskanzlei in Berlin, Germany. Schörner formally received the Brillanten zum Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Eichenlaub und Schwertern on 1 January 1945 as the 23rd recipient for his determined leadership as Oberbefehlshaber of Heeresgruppe Nord during the defensive battles in the Baltic region in late 1944. After taking command of Heeresgruppe Nord in July 1944, he faced the massive Soviet Baltic Offensive that began on 14 September 1944 against German forces still holding positions in Estonia and northeastern Latvia. Under Schörner’s direction the troops of Heeresgruppe Nord conducted an orderly withdrawal from these territories without suffering significant losses, despite being heavily outnumbered and repeatedly cut off. Once the remaining formations of the 16. Armee and 18. Armee were compressed into the Kurland-Kessel, Schörner organized the defence of the Courland Peninsula and directed the first three of the four major Kurland battles that followed. In these prolonged and bitter engagements the Soviet forces, employing overwhelming numerical and material superiority in infantry, armour and artillery, launched repeated large-scale assaults but were able to achieve only limited territorial gains at the cost of severe personnel and equipment losses. Schörner’s personal presence at the front, his energetic reorganization of the defensive lines, and the resolute resistance he inspired among the isolated units of Heeresgruppe Nord prevented a complete collapse of the pocket and tied down substantial Soviet strength that might otherwise have been transferred to other sectors of the Eastern Front. For these sustained defensive successes, which were among the last German operational triumphs of the war, he was awarded the Brillanten while still serving as Oberbefehlshaber of Heeresgruppe Nord, shortly before his transfer to command Heeresgruppe Mitte.

Source :
"Hitler's Personal Security: Protecting the Führer 1921-1945" by Peter Hoffmann
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?p=1020564&hilit=sch%C3%B6rner#p1020564
https://www.walter-frentz-collection.de/fotoarchiv/personenarchiv-a-z/personen-s/
https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/1054/Sch%C3%B6rner-Johann-Ferdinand.htm

Afrikakorps in Color

DEUTSCHES AFRIKAKORPS


SdKfz 141 Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf. G tanks of Panzer-Regiment 5 being unloaded in Tripoli, 10 March 1941. These were armed with the 5 cm L/42 gun and had the addition of a turrent ventilator added to the top of the turret just forward of the cupola. They also came with the new cupola design. Also seen are Le.gl. Einheits LKW 2.5 ton 6x6 "Einheitsdiesel” transport trucks loading supplies. The bulk of the Panzer-Regiment 5 /  5.Leichte-Division arrives in Tripoli where they are unloaded. The following were unloaded : PzKpfw I Ausf A (25), PzKpfw II Ausf C (45), PzKpfw III Ausf G (61), PzKpfw IV Ausf D (17), Panzer Befehlswagen command tanks (3 x SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen based on the Panzer I chassis and 4 x Sd.Kfz. 266 Panzerbefehlswagen Ausf. E based on the Panzer III chassis). Leutnant Joachim Schorm of 6.Kompanie / II.Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 5 records in his diary his arrival in Tripoli and the vivid scenes greeting him and the rest of the regiment: “We enter the harbour at Tripoli. We have done it! 15 miles from us, it's true, an Italian merchant ship and two tankers were sunk by submarines. Behind the colonel and adjutant, I leave the Marburg at 1300 hours at the head of half of 6th Company. The scene in the docks is indescribably picturesque. Rommel and German officers [are dressed] in field grey, the Luftwaffe in khaki trousers, breeches, shorts, the Italians in every conceivable uniform.”



Deutsches Afrikakorps (DAK) soldiers on the open rear gate of a truck. One has received a field main package from home. The contents are eagerly inspected - cigarettes, a piece of ham and a sausage. Behind the side one can see two drinking water canisters. Gasoline and water canisters had the same appearance, and so in order to prevent accidental mix-ups, a white cross was painted on both sides of the water canisters. The German Feldpost system provided essential postal services for the soldiers of the Deutsches Afrikakorps throughout the North African campaign from 1941 to 1943, enabling free transmission of postcards and letters up to certain weights while packages required only a nominal fee, thereby sustaining morale among the ranks in the harsh desert environment. Each unit down to the level of an Abteilung received a unique five-digit Feldpostnummer to conceal locations and troop movements from potential enemy intelligence, with the first Feldpostamt serving the initial deployments being number 735 attached to the Generalkommando and the 5. Leichte-Division. Soldiers such as a simple Gefreiter or an Oberleutnant would write their Feldpostnummer on envelopes addressed home, often receiving Benachrichtigungskarten informing families of the code for return correspondence, while the service operated through mobile Feldpostämter that processed mail for Heer, Luftwaffe, and supporting elements under the command of Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel. Transport of these letters across the Mediterranean relied on ships and aircraft amid constant Allied interdiction, yet the priority given to Feldpost reflected the recognition that delayed news from the Heimat could undermine a Soldat’s resolve and duty performance in the face of extreme heat, sand, and scarcity. Distinctive Palmenstempel cachets featuring palm trees appeared on many covers from Afrikakorps units as unofficial marks of unit pride applied at rear-area or Feldpostamt level, though regulations strictly forbade revealing locations or using alternative civilian routes such as Italian post offices. Airmail via limited Luftpost stamps allowed faster delivery for a restricted number of items per month, while ordinary mail traveled by whatever means available, including trucks of Nachschub columns, ensuring contact between the front and Germany even as the force expanded toward nearly 200,000 men supported by multiple Feldpostämter by early 1943. Censorship remained rigorous to prevent leakage of operational details, and soldiers were instructed not to carry letters into combat positions lest they fall into enemy hands, yet many still treasured correspondence from loved ones. The system continued functioning under increasingly difficult conditions during the retreat into Tunisia, handling front-to-home, home-to-front, and even front-to-front mail until the final capitulation, after which surviving personnel sometimes continued correspondence as prisoners. Overall, the Feldpost of the Deutsches Afrikakorps stood as a vital logistical and psychological bridge, operated by dedicated postal personnel integrated into the Wehrmacht structure, that linked every rank from the ordinary Landser to senior officers with their families across vast distances and wartime hazards.



Afrikakorps Panzergrenadiere from Schützen-Regiment 115 / 15.Panzer-Division with an MG34 in the desert nest during Operation Scorpion. They were part of Kampfgruppe von Herff, commanded by Oberst Maximilian von Herff. Operation Scorpion or Unternehmen Skorpion, from 26–27 May 1941, was a military operation during the North African Campaign of World War II, fought between Axis forces under Oberst Herff and British forces under Lieutenant-General William "Strafer" Gott. A counter-attack was made on British positions at Halfaya Pass in north-western Egypt, which had been captured during Operation Brevity (15–16 May 1941). Skorpion was the second offensive operation commanded by Rommel in Africa (apart from the Siege of Tobruk) and pushed the British out of Halfaya Pass, back to the area from Buq Buq to Sofafi. The Germans and Italians fortified the pass and built other strong points back towards Sidi Azeiz as tank killing zones, ready to meet another British attack. The British continued preparations for Operation Battleaxe (15–17 June 1941). Battleaxe was another costly British failure that led to the sacking of General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East and other senior officers.



BMW R 75 of DAK (Deutsches Afrikakorps) in the North African desert. Motorcycle showing symbols for 1.(leichte)Batterie / I.Abteilung / Artillerie-Regiment 155 / 21.Panzer-Division (also symbol on sidecar mudguard is for motorized infantry). Motorcycles equipped with sidecar and machine gun just like in this picture were widely used by the german messengers along the various war fronts. The BMW R 75 motorcycle combination, with its powerful opposed-twin engine and robust sidecar, served as a vital asset for the Deutsches Afrikakorps throughout the North African desert campaigns of the Second World War. Operating under the leadership of Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, these machines enabled rapid reconnaissance, courier missions, and mobile fire support across the vast sands of Libya and Egypt. Crews typically consisting of an Unteroffizier or Gefreiter as driver and a second soldier manning an MG 34 machine gun mounted on the sidecar could traverse soft dunes and rocky tracks with relative ease thanks to the large balloon tires and locking differential. The shaft drive system resisted the abrasive effects of sand far better than chain-driven alternatives, while the air-cooled engine endured extreme heat without frequent overheating. In the fluid battles around Tobruk, Gazala, and El Alamein, Aufklärungsabteilungen of the Deutsches Afrikakorps employed the BMW R 75 for flanking maneuvers and to maintain contact between dispersed units. Spare fuel cans and water containers strapped to the frame extended operational range in the waterless Sahara, where mechanical reliability often decided survival. Despite relentless dust storms that clogged filters and scorched metal, the motorcycle’s simple construction allowed field repairs by ordinary Soldaten using basic tools. Its distinctive silhouette became a familiar sight in the Afrika Korps columns advancing toward the Nile or withdrawing westward under pressure. The combination of speed, firepower, and endurance made the BMW R 75 indispensable for the mobile warfare doctrine practiced by the Deutsches Afrikakorps. Even after the final retreat from Tunisia, veterans remembered the machine as a symbol of ingenuity amid the harsh desert environment that tested both men and equipment to their limits.

DAK (Deutsches Afrikakorps) soldiers eating their rations in the desert of North Africa. The very important issue of rations had to be addressed as well and was not just a matter of transferring the European diet and applying it the the Tropical theatre. The hot climate would turn many foods inedible in a relatively short space of time and foods such as potatoes and bread were replaced with black bread in a carton and dried peas and beans. Rice was also issued but the main food was bread which was either German Kommisbrot or Italian Maisbrot with olive oil instead of butter which would go off rapidly in the heat of the desert but the olive oil proved very unpopular with German troops. The Italians were forced to provide foodstuffs for the Germans which included coffee beans, cooking oil, marmalade and tins of preserved meat which was also very unpopular with both German and Italian troops. The tins were stamped with the initials AM which stood for "Administrazione Militare" but the Germans always refereed to this as Alte Mann (Old Man) or as some Italians called it "Asinus Mussolini" (Mussolini's Arse) due to it's rancid taste but they  went one better calling it Arabio Morte (Dead Arab). Captured tins of British corned beef, white bread, jam, hard tack biscuits and tinned fruit were considered a luxury and was most a most welcome supplement to the bland tasting rations issued to the Afrika Korps. The British thought their rations were terrible and welcomed captured German foodstuffs as well! Fresh meat was sometimes procured in the shape of a goat or pig but this was a rare occurrence as livestock was relatively hard to come by and the preservation of fresh meat in the desert was difficult to say the least. Perhaps the most important commodity in the desert was water. Vital for sustaining life and keeping vehicles moving it was important to preserve it as best as possible. The "Jerrycan" as it was nicknamed by the British could hold 4.5 gallons of either water, fuel or lubricants and was much preferred to the British petrol can which would often leak and much of its precious cargo of fuel or water would be lost, a very serious situation as being stranded in the desert miles from friendly or even hostile lines could prove fatal. Both sides marked their respective water cans with a white cross to denote it was carrying water and  this would mean that the particular can in question would never hold the wrong substance as water stored in a can that previously contained petrol would be undrinkable ( a lesson found out by the United Nations troops stationed in the congo during the 1960's).

These young Afrikakorps troopers are resting somewhere in the Western Desert, probably during 1942. Their uniforms need to be suitable for the hot days and cool nights. In the vast expanse of the Western Desert during 1942, soldiers of the Deutsches Afrikakorps sought rest after long days of marching and combat under the relentless African sun. By day they wore lightweight olive cotton Tropenuniformen consisting of open-collar Feldblusen, Tropenhemden, and either lange Hosen or kurze Hosen that allowed air to circulate freely in the intense heat. As darkness fell and temperatures plummeted toward freezing, these same men pulled on dark chocolate-brown woolen Tropenmäntel over their cotton garments and often added olive-brown wool pullovers for extra warmth. An Obergefreiter might curl up beside his Unteroffizier under a shared Zeltbahn, while a Gefreiter lay on the hard sand wrapped tightly in his greatcoat, his Tropenhelm or faded Feldmütze resting nearby. The sudden chill forced every Schütze to layer carefully, for the same fabric that had shielded him from midday glare now trapped precious body heat against the night wind. Many improvised by drawing captured British blankets across their shoulders or sleeping close to their vehicles for residual warmth from the engines. Sand still found its way into every fold of clothing, and the desert silence was broken only by occasional coughs or the distant howl of jackals. Despite exhaustion, sleep remained light and uneasy, for sentries of the Afrikakorps kept watch against surprise attacks. The practical design of their tropical kit, from breathable daytime shirts to heavy night coats, enabled these troops to endure the extreme diurnal swings that defined desert warfare. In this harsh setting the men of the Deutsches Afrikakorps learned that survival depended as much on adaptation of uniform as on courage in battle.


German Afrikakorps soldiers under camouflage net in African Campaign, Northern Africa, 1942. Like other militaries, the Wehrmacht understood that concealing war machines or HQ in either defensive or offensive manoeuvres would increase the likelihood to survived in the encounter. In addition to camouflage painted on to the machines itself, they would also use foliage (branches from bushes and trees, grass or hay from fields, river-side reeds, even stacks of wood) to cover the machines, usually from the front to make it even harder to spot and differintiate from its surroundings. They would also, on occassion, use camouflage tarps and canvases, as well as camouflage netting to further conceal the machines from being spotted. As the war became more defensive for the Germans, the frequency of war machines being camouflaged in this way, waiting in ambush for the enemy, also increasingly common. Retreating units would often cut out foliage and leave it along the roads to help other retreating units conceal their vehicles as they fell back and to make setting up the next ambush that much faster. There were also ocassions where crews would apply a thin layer of mud or snow to the vehicle to help camouflage it with its surroundings. The picture was taken by Reinhard Schultz



In the summer of 1942, Il Duce Benito Mussolini (marked with arrow) visits Tobruk, Libya, not long after its recaptured from the Commonwealth forces by "The Desert Fox" Erwin Rommel. In this picture, Mussolini is surrounded by his officers: the first officer from left is Vice Admiral Giuseppe Lombardi (Superior Naval Commander in Libya, with headquarters in Tobruk), then another Admiral (or maybe an Air force general). The third and fourth is Army generals. Mussolini himself have the peculiar rank insigna of Primo Maresciallo dell' Impero (a rank only for him and the King). The two officers at far right were Germans, from left to right: General der Infanterie Enno von Rintelen (Bevollmächtigten Deutschen General beim Hauptquartier der italienischen Wehrmacht) and Oberst Hans Hecker (Pionierführer Panzerarmee Afrika). Look at the ribbon bar (italian decorations), the Spange zum Eisernes Kreuz I.Klasse, and Kriegsverdienstkreuz I.Klasse mit Schwertern in Rintelen's uniform, while Hecker (a Ritterkreuzträger) wearing Spange zum Eisernes Kreuz I.Klasse, Verwundetenabzeichen in Silber, and Allgemeines-Sturmabzeichen.

German Afrikakorps soldiers reading "Deutsche Illustrierte" and "Die Woche" magazines in their staff car that parked in the barren North African desert, while a Kar98k rifle protruding in the back seat. "Deutsche Illustrierte" was a large-format weekly magazine, while "Die Woche" was a weekly issued family magazine. These magazines are packed with photos and home front activities. It also depicts news, art, culture etc. During the North African campaign of the Second World War the soldiers of the Deutsches Afrikakorps received a range of printed materials designed to inform, entertain and sustain morale under the harsh desert conditions. The principal field newspaper was Die Oase, the Feldzeitung der deutschen Truppen in Afrika (also styled Feldzeitung des Deutschen Afrikakorps), which appeared weekly from March 1941 until at least May 1943 and was produced by the local Propagandakompanie under the supervision of the Abteilung Wehrmachtspropaganda of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. Edited by Soldat Martin Gläser and distributed free of charge in a large two-page format, Die Oase carried reports on the fighting in Libya and Egypt, news from other fronts, unit notices and lighter features that reminded the men of home. After the Allied landings in November 1942 a companion paper, Die Karawane – Feldzeitung der deutschen Soldaten in Tunesien, began publication for the troops then concentrated in Tunisia. In addition to these front newspapers the men of the Deutsches Afrikakorps regularly received home editions of major Reich newspapers and illustrated magazines such as Signal through the Feldpost system, although sandstorms, fuel shortages and enemy action frequently delayed delivery. The Propagandakompanien attached to the corps, among them elements later known as Propagandakompanie Tunis, also prepared photographic reports and occasional special issues that were shared among the ranks. Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel and successive commanding officers recognised the value of these publications in maintaining the cohesion of the force, which had begun life in February 1941 under Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel as Befehlshaber der deutschen Truppen in Libyen before being redesignated Deutsches Afrikakorps. Even as the campaign turned against the Axis in late 1942 and early 1943, copies of Die Oase continued to reach the forward positions, offering the last regular written contact with the wider war and with the homeland until the final capitulation in May 1943.

Rare Colour Picture of German Marder III (7.5cm PaK40.3 auf PzKpfw 38(t) Ausf H - Sd.Kfz. 138 Model) Tank Destroyers in Tunisia. Probably newly arrived and prepared to be sent to the front packed with gasoline drums and jerrycans. An unknown number of 7,5cm Pak40/3 auf Pz.38(t) Ausf.H (Sd.Kfz 138) did make it to Tunisia, and the only known units thus far to be known to have this vehicle was the 2.Kompanie / Panzerjäger-Abteilung 39 and the schwere Schwadron / Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 580. There is another image title "North Africa-unknown date. Vehicle captured in Tunis" on page 24 of the Zimmerit Press booklet by David V. Nielsen entitled 'Panzerkampfwagen 38(t)' which shows a 7,5cm Pak40/3 auf Pz.38(t) Ausf.H (Sd.Kfz 138). There appears that the DAK palm tree is located on the right side of the front plate and on the left there is a tactical symbol that looks like the front of an elephant's head. While the tactical marking, is for a Kavallerie Aufklärungs-Abteilung. It seems that units of the 90. leichte Afrika-Division carried some variations on the elephant theme of troop markings, (i.e. the 7,62cm FK auf SdKfz6, w/ H.Pz.Jg.Abt.605 etc.), so it is possibly belongs to the Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 580.BTW, an excellent reference on how the shade of RAL8000 looked like on the Hull and Wheels, RAL8020 on the Jerrycans, in addition to their fuel stowage!

A pile of helmets taken from the German Afrika Korps after their surrender at the Battle Of El Guettar, April 1943. Photo by Eliot Elisofon. Helmets were usually only retained until POW physically left the combat zone, most prisoners then discarded them and wore their field caps instead. This will have been a dumping point for helmets - note also that a lot of the unpopular pith helmets have been thrown away! Clothing, hats, medals,gear were frequently stolen by those who captured them. BTW, The Geneva convention dictate that POWs should be kept within 200 miles of the latitude they were captured in. Germans captured in North Africa were largely detained along Georgia, Texas, and Arizona corridor. The US was one of very few nations that actually followed this protocol!

German exchange POWs (mostly Afrikakorps) during welcoming ceremony in Stuttgart, summer of 1944. The Geneva Convention makes provision for the repatriation of all Prisoners of War, even during hostilities. During 1939-1945 it was only possible for the British and Germans to reach agreement over the seriously ill and disabled. For the majority of the 40,000 British servicemen who were taken prisoner in 1939 and 1940, the war was to be a very long and dispiriting experience. Negotiations, conducted through the Red Cross, over the repatriation of seriously wounded men, had begun in late 1940. They did not progress very far because there were far fewer German men in this category than British. It was only after substantial numbers of Germans were taken prisoner in the Desert campaign of 1942 that the talks resumed. The actual exchange of prisoners did not take place until October 1943. Other pictures from this series can be seen HERE.

 
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LUFTWAFFE

The Luftwaffe’s involvement in North Africa began in early 1941 when elements of the X. Fliegerkorps were transferred from Sicily to support the newly arrived Deutsches Afrikakorps under Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel, with the specialised command Fliegerführer Afrika being established in February 1941 under Generalmajor Stefan Fröhlich to provide tactical air support from Libyan bases such as Sirte and later Derna. Operating initially under the X. Fliegerkorps and from late 1941 under Luftflotte 2, the Fliegerführer Afrika directed a relatively small force that rarely exceeded 130 operational aircraft at any one time, including Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters of Jagdgeschwader 27, Junkers Ju 87 Stukas of Sturzkampfgeschwader 1 and Sturzkampfgeschwader 3, twin-engined Messerschmitt Bf 110s of Zerstörergeschwader 26, and Junkers Ju 88 bombers of Lehrgeschwader 1, together with reconnaissance and transport units. These formations flew close air support, fighter sweeps, and interdiction missions during Rommel’s advances across Cyrenaica in 1941, the prolonged siege of Tobruk, the successful Gazala offensive of 1942 that culminated in the capture of Tobruk, and the subsequent drive to El Alamein. Despite often achieving temporary local air superiority and delivering effective dive-bombing against Allied positions, the Luftwaffe in North Africa was chronically hampered by long supply lines across the Mediterranean, chronic shortages of fuel, spare parts and replacement aircraft, and the need to divert substantial strength against the stubborn British base at Malta. After the Allied victory at the Second Battle of El Alamein in October–November 1942 and the Anglo-American landings in Operation Torch, the remaining forces under Generalmajor Hans Seidemann retreated into Tunisia, where the Stab of Fliegerführer Afrika was redesignated Fliegerkorps Tunis in February 1943; by then Allied numerical superiority in the air had become overwhelming, and the last Axis aircraft were destroyed or captured when the campaign ended with the surrender of all German and Italian forces in May 1943.



German Luftwaffe soldiers near the burning wreck of an American Lockheed P-38 Lightning "ES-J" fighter aircraft that shot down in Tunisia, early 1943. The plane belong to the USAAF's 48th Fighter-Squadron / 14th Fighter Group. This picture was first published in the SIGNAL magazine, May 1943 edition. Operation Torch (the invasion of North West Africa) was the first major Anglo-American operation of the Second World War. It was also the first time the P-38 saw significant action against the Luftwaffe. The only indication of how the P-38 would cope against German fighter aircraft came from a test flight against a captured Fw 190. Two P-38 equipped Fighter Groups – the 1st and 14th – were allocated to Operation Torch, with a third (the 78th) kept in reserve in Britain. They did not play a part in the initial landings on 8 November 1942 – the 14th FG did not go operational in North Africa until 11th November. At first they were based in western Algeria, as part of the Central Task Force that had occupied by Oran, but in the days that followed the Germans built up an impressive presence in Tunisia, and the P-38 groups were moved east, initially to Algiers. The 14th FG was first, moving to the recently captured airbase at Youks-les-Bains, with the first squadron moving on 21 November. This base was close to the Tunisian border, and the P-38s soon found themselves coming up against the increasingly strong Luftwaffe presence in North Africa. Over the next two months the 14th FG carried out a mix of ground attack, bomber escort and air superiority missions. At first they had been involved in supporting the first, unsuccessful, attempt to capture Tunis, which had occupied most of late November 1942. The front line was 150 miles east of Youks, not a problem for the P-38, but there were never enough aircraft. P-38 formations on fighter sweeps over Tunisia were often outnumbered by formations of Bf 109s and Fw 190s. The 14th FG suffered very heavy losses during this period. Between November 1942 and 28 January 1943 the group lost 32 pilots (out of an original complement of 54) and had been reduced to only seven operational aircraft. During its first period of service in North Africa, the 14th FG claimed 62 victories. Even though North Africa had been given the highest possible priority for new P-38s, there simply weren’t enough aircraft being produced in late 1942 to sustain such heavy losses. On 28 January the 14th FG was withdrawn, and replaced by the 82nd Fighter Group, also equipped with the P-38.

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ERWIN ROMMEL


This picture was taken by Fritz Sturm and it shows Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel (Kommandierender General Deutsches Afrikakorps) with his staff in the inspection to the gun positions of I.Abteilung / Artillerie-Regiment 33 (motorisiert) / 15.Panzer-Division near Point 206, about 5 km south of Fort Capuzzo at Solum front, May/June 1941. Behind him facing the camera and holding a pair of binoculars is Major Lucius Günther Schrivenbach (12 September 1911 - 2007), a staff officer of the "Desert Fox" in his campaign in Africa (1941-1943) and in Normandy (1944), followed by the same position for Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt to the end of war. Rommel was loved by the enlisted men under his command and quite detested by his officers as they considered him interfering and that he didn’t trust them to do their actual jobs. As a general though he acted as a captain. Rommel is quite often praised for his tactical abilities. Tactics though (the small scale stuff, what soldiers do in battle) wasn’t supposed to be what a general worried about. Rommel was quite an interfering general. German military officers were trained to think for themselves. Today this is known as Mission Type Tactics. The commander was supposed to give an order which stated the resources available to be used (troops, tanks, etc.) and the objective. It was up to the lower ranked officers to use their own initiative in how to obtain the objective. Erwin Rommel gave orders with specific instructions and expected them to be followed to the letter. He would also drive around the front and give orders to soldiers thus cutting their actual officers off (there’s accounts of him issuing individual targets to anti-tank guns rather than let their own officers decide and almost being killed by the return fire!).



Together with his staff officers, on 2 July 1941 General der Panzertruppe Erwin Rommel (left, Kommandierender General Deutsches Afrikakorps) made a visit to the headquarters of I.Bataillon / Schützen-Regiment 104 / 15.Panzer-Division in the Sollum front, which is on the border Libya-Egypt. During this visit, in particular "Der Wüstenfuchs" (The Desert Fox) congratulated the commander of the battalion, Hauptmann der Reserve Wilhelm Bech (walking at the forefront with Rommel), who in the battle a month earlier managed to withstand the British tank forces who were trying to break through the Halfaya Pass in order to free their comrades who were besieged in Tobruk, in a mass attack codenamed Operation Battleaxe (15-17 June 1941). For three full days Bach and his men endured wave after wave of enemy tank attacks, with only a platoon of Flak 88 cannons as their main weapon. Although Rommel himself had ordered the Bataillonskommandeur to retreat to a more adequate defensive location "if possible", Bach interpreted his commander's last words in the opposite direction: a counterattack that succeeded in repelling the British troops! For this phenomenal achievement, Bach - who is a former priest (!) - was awarded the prestigious Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes on July 9, 1941, just a week after this photo was taken. The Flak 88 itself was originally an anti-aircraft gun, but it can be just as good when it comes to hitting tank targets on the ground. BTW, in April 1941 - which was only one month after Rommel arrived in North Africa - German forces managed to defeat the invading British army and driven it out of Libya, except for one stubborn ANZAC garrison which remained in the port city of Tobruk (despite being besieged by a combined force of Italian and German Afrikakorps). Over the next year, the re-capture of Tobruk became Rommel's biggest obsession, because without it all German efforts to conquer Egypt would be vulnerable. When the port city was finally occupied in June 1942, a grateful Hitler rewarded Rommel with an extraordinary promotion to Generalfeldmarschall.

Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (Oberbefehlshaber Panzerarmee "Afrika") was seen listening seriously as an unknown Hauptmann explained the current, critical situation. To the right stood Oberstleutnant Otto Heymer (Stabs-Offizier der Luftwaffe beim Afrikakorps) who is holding a map. These two people (Heymer and Rommel) were known for not getting along and not liking each other. In the end, Heymer left the African front not long after. This photo itself was taken at the El Alamein Front, Egypt, in late October 1942. Rommel left North Africa on sick leave on 22 September 1942, and only returned on 25 October. During his absence, British troops from Montgomery's Eighth Army carried out a surprise attack on German and Italian defense positions around El Alamein on October 23, and succeeded in making breakthroughs on several fronts. The condition of the German troops worsened the next day when Rommel's temporary replacement in Africa, General der Panzertruppe Georg Stumme, died suddenly of a heart attack. All of these unfortunate events forced "The Desert Fox" to rush back to North Africa to stabilize the situation.


Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (Oberbefehlshaber Panzerarmee "Afrika") was seen listening seriously as an unknown Hauptmann explained the current, critical situation. Blocked by him is Oberstleutnant Otto Heymer (Stabs-Offizier der Luftwaffe beim Afrikakorps) who is holding a map. These two people (Heymer and Rommel) were known for not getting along and not liking each other. In the end, Heymer left the African front not long after. This photo itself was taken at the El Alamein Front, Egypt, in late October 1942. Rommel left North Africa on sick leave on 22 September 1942, and only returned on 25 October. During his absence, British troops from Montgomery's Eighth Army carried out a surprise attack on German and Italian defense positions around El Alamein on October 23, and succeeded in making breakthroughs on several fronts. The condition of the German troops worsened the next day when Rommel's temporary replacement in Africa, General der Panzertruppe Georg Stumme, died suddenly of a heart attack. All of these unfortunate events forced "The Desert Fox" to rush back to North Africa to stabilize the situation.

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FIGURES


Generalmajor Carl Böttcher (Kommandeur 21. Panzer-Division) wearing an early model, factory-made, General officers' tropical peaked cap. The soutache and the officers' braid are gold-coloured, and the eyelets green. The ends of the soutache appear to be folded between the base of the cap's brow and its peak. Böttcher, born on 25 October 1889 in Thorn, served as an experienced artillery officer who arrived in North Africa with Artillerie-Kommandeur 104 under the Deutsches Afrikakorps commanded by Erwin Rommel. In the autumn of 1941, during the intense fighting of Operation Crusader, he led an independent Kampfgruppe that successfully repelled superior British forces attempting a breakthrough toward Tobruk between 24 and 28 November, thereby preventing the lifting of the siege until the main forces of the Afrika-Korps could intervene. Following the capture of Generalmajor Johann von Ravenstein on 29 November 1941, Böttcher assumed command of the 21. Panzer-Division on 1 December 1941 as its Kommandeur. Under his leadership the division played a key role in the fluid desert battles of the Cyrenaica, checking advances by the British 7th Armoured Division and supporting counterattacks that delayed Allied relief efforts. For his skillful and continuous personal direction of operations in the foremost line he was awarded the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes on 13 December 1941 while still holding the rank of Generalmajor and serving as Kommandeur of the 21. Panzer-Division within Heeresgruppe Afrika. Throughout December 1941 and into early 1942 the division under Böttcher participated in the hard-fought withdrawal from positions around Tobruk and the subsequent defensive actions as Axis forces pulled back westward. His tenure as Kommandeur lasted until mid-February 1942, when illness forced his evacuation from the African front and transfer to the Führerreserve. During these critical months on the North African battlefield Böttcher demonstrated the ability of an artilleryman to command a full Panzer-Division effectively under the extreme conditions of desert warfare, contributing to the temporary stabilization of the Axis position in Libya before the later campaigns of 1942.

Oberst Johannes Kümmel was born on 21 July 1909 in Coswig, Saxony, and after joining the Reichswehr in 1928 he transferred in 1938 as a Feldwebel to Panzer-Regiment 8, with which he later took part in the campaigns in Poland and France before the unit was sent to North Africa in January 1941 as part of the 15. Panzer-Division within the Deutsches Afrikakorps. Serving as Oberleutnant and Chef of the 1./Panzer-Regiment 8, he distinguished himself during the defensive fighting around Halfaya Pass and especially on 15 June 1941 west of Capuzzo, where he independently led an attack against a much larger British tank force, destroying numerous enemy vehicles and preventing them from advancing northward to cut off vital German supply columns, an action that earned him the nickname “Der Löwe von Capuzzo” and the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes on 9 July 1941. Promoted to Hauptmann, he assumed command of the I. Abteilung of Panzer-Regiment 8 in early 1942 and played a decisive role in the successful assault on Tobruk on 20 June 1942 as well as in the destruction of a British armoured formation near Marsa Matruk during the subsequent advance. For these and further achievements during the fighting around El Alamein he was awarded the Eichenlaub to the Ritterkreuz on 11 October 1942 as the 133rd recipient. After promotion to Major in December 1942 he left North Africa for a posting in Germany, later serving in Italy where he rose to Oberstleutnant and Kommandeur of Panzer-Regiment 26; he was killed in a road accident near Cisterna on 26 February 1944 and was posthumously promoted to Oberst.




Oberstleutnant Georg Briel (21 August 1907 - 16 May 1980) was born in Ellers, in the Fulda District, and joined the police in 1927 as Polizei-Anwärter (Police Aspirant). He trained at the Polizeischule in Münden and transferred to the Schutzpolizei Kassel in 1929.  By 1934, he was a Polizei-Leutnant (Second Lieutenant of the Police).  He was inducted into the army as an Oberleutnant (First Lieutenant) in 1935 and became adjutant of the Maschinengewehr-Bataillon 2 (motorisiert).  Subsequently he was a company commander in the Heeres-Flak-Bataillon 606.  Promoted to Hauptmann (Captain) in 1938, he assumed command of Battalion in 1941, and became a Major in 1942. In the North African theater, Heeres-Flak-Bataillon 606 became a part of 90.leichte-Afrika-Division, which Rommel liked to use as an antitank unit with the the forward troops. Briel was awarded the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes (Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross) in 23 July 1942 for shooting up a French breakout attempt at Bir Hacheim. He later commanded the Panzergrenadier-Regiment 200 (formerly Schützen-Regiment 200) in Tunisia, but fell seriously ill and returned to Europe, a short time before the Axis surrendered in North Africa. As an Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) in 1945, he commanded Grenadier-Regiment 57 of 79. Volks-Grenadier-Division on the Western Front until he was wounded again in the last weeks of the war.  Briel was in a hospital in Erlangen when Germany surrendered. Apart from the Ritterkreuz, he received the following medals for his military service in World War II: Dienstauszeichnung IV. Klasse (2 October 1936); Eisernes Kreuz II.Klasse (22 September 1939) und I.Klasse (30 August 1940); Deutsches Schutzwall-Ehrenzeichen (20 March 1940); Allgemeines-Sturmabzeichen (15 January 1942); Italian Medaglia commemorativa della campagna italo-tedesca in Africa (19 January 1942); Verwundetenabzeichen in Schwarz (3 February 1942); Italian Medaglia d'Argento al Valore Militare (18 February 1942); Deutsches Kreuz in Gold (20 February 1942); Ärmelband "Afrika" (12 April 1943); and Heeres-Flak-Abzeichen (27 April 1943). 



SS-Brigadeführer Alfred-Ingemar Berndt (born 22 April 1905 in Bromberg (Posen); died 28 March 1945 at Veszprém, Hungary) was a German journalist, writer and close collaborator of National Socialist Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels. Berndt wrote an eyewitness account of the 1940 German invasion of the Low Countries and France, Tanks Break Through!, and is regarded as propagandistic creator of the "Desert Fox" myth attached to the German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. Although he had been a high-ranking official in the Propaganda Ministry from Hitler's early days in 1933, Berndt was willing to relinquish his comfort zone to then register as a volunteer for the Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces) when World War II broke out, with the rank of ordinary soldier! After Blitzkrieg's success in the West in 1940, Berndt returned to his old job as a writer and journalist. In May 1941 he returned to the front, and this time together with Rommel in Africa. Berndt - who has six fingers on one of his leg (!) - was trusted to be a propaganda reporter as well as filling Rommel's diary. Although shortly afterwards he was called home by Goebbels, Berndt still did not leave Afrikakorps, and went back and forth between Germany and Africa until finally Rommel was expelled from there in 1943. Berndt then continued his work as a propaganda expert, and was trusted to writes about the Battle of Stalingrad, surrender of German troops in Tunisia and the Katyn Massacre. On May 24, 1944, two weeks before the Allies landed in Normandy, he shot dead an American pilot captured by the Germans. His actions clearly violated the laws of war set by the Geneva Conventions, but Berndt was never brought before a military tribunal because he died in combat in Hungary. It turned out he had registered as a war volunteer (again!), and this time was assigned to the Wiking Division as a Waffen-SS officer. Medals and awards he has received: Eisernes Kreuz II.Klasse (May 27, 1940) und I.Klasse (June 6, 1940); Allgemeines-Sturmabzeichen; Verwundetenabzeichen; Medaglia d'Argento al Valore Militare (Italy); and Deutsches Kreuz in Gold (July 17, 1943)

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