Luftwaffe in North Africa (1941-1943)

The Luftwaffe’s involvement in North Africa began in early 1941 as a limited intervention to support the Italian forces after their heavy defeats at the hands of the British during Operation Compass. In January 1941 elements of the X. Fliegerkorps, initially based in Sicily and under the command of General der Flieger Hans Geisler, commenced operations against British shipping and targets in the eastern Mediterranean. The first major German raid on African soil, an attempted attack on the Suez Canal by Heinkel He 111 bombers of II./Kampfgeschwader 26 on 17 January 1941, ended in costly failure. Shortly afterwards the specialised tactical command Fliegerführer Afrika was established on 20 February 1941 within Luftgau VII and transferred to Libya, initially under Oberstleutnant Martin Harlinghausen and then under Generalmajor Stefan Fröhlich from 24 February. Its primary task was to provide close air support, fighter cover and reconnaissance for the newly arrived Deutsches Afrikakorps under Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel.

Early Luftwaffe strength in the desert was modest. The first fighters to arrive in April 1941 were the Messerschmitt Bf 109E of I./Jagdgeschwader 27 under Hauptmann Eduard Neumann, based at Ain-el-Gazala. They were soon joined by further Gruppen of JG 27, including II./JG 27 under Hauptmann Wolfgang Lippert, as well as the twin-engined Messerschmitt Bf 110 of III./Zerstörergeschwader 26. Dive-bomber support came from units of Sturzkampfgeschwader 1, 2 and 3 equipped with the Junkers Ju 87, while medium bombers of Lehrgeschwader 1 flying the Junkers Ju 88 conducted longer-range strikes from both African and Sicilian bases. Reconnaissance was performed by specialised Staffeln operating the Ju 88 and other types. From the outset the desert environment imposed severe difficulties: abrasive sand damaged engines and airframes, extreme heat reduced aircraft performance, and the long supply lines across the Mediterranean were constantly threatened by British forces based on Malta.

During Rommel’s first offensive in the spring of 1941 the Luftwaffe provided effective close support that helped the Deutsches Afrikakorps recapture Cyrenaica and invest Tobruk. The siege of Tobruk saw repeated Stuka attacks on the fortress and harbour, while fighters of JG 27 contested air superiority with the Royal Air Force’s Hurricanes and later Kittyhawks. In November 1941 the British launched Operation Crusader; Fliegerführer Afrika, still under Fröhlich and operating from airfields around Derna, struggled to provide adequate cover as Axis forces were pushed back to El Agheila. By the end of the year the headquarters had moved repeatedly in step with the ground fighting.

In early 1942 Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring assumed overall responsibility for the Mediterranean theatre as Oberbefehlshaber Süd, and Fliegerführer Afrika came under Luftflotte 2. On 12 April 1942 Generalleutnant Otto Hoffmann von Waldau replaced Fröhlich. The improved organisation and reinforcement of fighter and bomber units contributed to Axis success in the Battle of Gazala in May–June 1942. Concentrated Stuka and fighter-bomber attacks helped break the Free French defence of Bir Hacheim, after which Tobruk fell on 21 June. The rapid advance to the Egyptian frontier brought Fliegerführer Afrika forward to airfields at Gambut, Sidi Barrani and finally Fuka, close to the El Alamein line. At this peak the command controlled roughly 130–150 serviceable aircraft of all types on African soil, supplemented by longer-range operations from Sicily and Crete.

The first Battle of El Alamein in July 1942 and the subsequent defensive fighting exhausted both ground and air forces. On 30 August Generalleutnant Hans Seidemann took command of Fliegerführer Afrika. During the decisive Second Battle of El Alamein in October–November 1942 the Luftwaffe was heavily outnumbered by the reinforced Desert Air Force and suffered severe losses. After the Axis defeat the remnants of the flying units conducted a fighting withdrawal across Libya. The Anglo-American landings of Operation Torch in Morocco and Algeria on 8 November 1942 forced a rapid redeployment of additional Luftwaffe forces into Tunisia. Units of Jagdgeschwader 53, Jagdgeschwader 77 and further elements of JG 27 were rushed to the new front, while transport aircraft of the Ju 52 and the large Messerschmitt Me 323 flew continuous supply missions across the Sicilian Narrows.

In February 1943 the Stab of Fliegerführer Afrika was redesignated Fliegerkorps Tunis. Despite determined efforts, including the temporary concentration of remaining fighters and the use of Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighter-bombers, the Luftwaffe could not prevent the gradual isolation of the Axis bridgehead. Allied air superiority became overwhelming. Operation Flax in April 1943 systematically destroyed the Axis air-transport fleet, culminating in the “Palm Sunday Massacre” of 18 April when large numbers of Ju 52s were shot down. By early May 1943 fuel, ammunition and serviceable aircraft were critically short. Tunis and Bizerta fell on 7 May, and the remaining Luftwaffe personnel either escaped by air or were taken into captivity with the final surrender of Axis forces in North Africa on 13 May 1943.

Throughout the campaign the Luftwaffe never possessed the numerical strength or logistical depth to achieve lasting air superiority. Its successes in 1941 and the first half of 1942 were achieved through qualitative superiority of the Bf 109, skilled pilots such as those of JG 27 (including the famous Oberleutnant Hans-Joachim Marseille), and close cooperation with the ground forces. Once the Allies concentrated superior resources, the same factors that had limited the original German intervention—distance, vulnerability of sea supply routes, and the harsh desert environment—contributed to the ultimate failure of Axis air power in North Africa.

Source :
https://avi-8.com/blogs/the-aviation-journal/the-desert-foxs-air-war-aerial-combat-in-north-africa-during-world-war-ii?srsltid=AfmBOorRRacAwYkUvANHfbtcQHkIe-3-4yYOXHTGgodVuyd_B_1VSdC5
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fliegerf%C3%BChrer_Afrika
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=78684

Air Traffic Control Trainees Practice on Model Aircraft

U.S. Air traffic control trainees practice on model aircraft before working with the real thing. Despite prior close air support experiences beginning in World War I, the United States had no forward air control capability when World War II began. Although forward air control techniques were perfected by such US units as the 1st Air Commando Group in the China Burma India Theater, they would be ignored in the war's aftermath. When the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) was founded on 20 June 1941, it included provisions for Air Ground Control Parties to serve with the United States Army at the division, corps, and Army headquarters. The Air Ground Control Parties functions were to regulate bombing and artillery in close conjunction with the ground troops, as well as assess bomb damage. They were thus the first of similar units to try to fulfill the functions of the forward air controller (FAC) without being airborne. However, these units were often plagued by interservice rivalry and cumbersome communications between the respective armies and air forces involved. As a result, it could take hours for an air strike requested by ground troops to actually show up. However, the advent of World War II did not lead to a functional US air control system; the 1942 edition of the American Field Manual 31-35 did not even mention a forward air controller. Forward air control during World War II came into existence as a result of exigency, and was used in several theaters of World War II. Its reincarnation in action was a result of field expedience rather than planned operations.

Source :
National Archives and Records Administration, 342-C-K-1721
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_air_control_operations_during_World_War_II
https://www.flickr.com/photos/airandspace/albums/72157715574200936

Eighth Air Force Losses during World War II

Replacement Boeing B-17G Flying Fortresses lined up on an English airfield to replace squadron losses for the U.S. Eighth Air Force.

The 8th Air Force’s success during World War II came at a high price. Its losses – of both men and machine – were by far the most significant of any branch of the military at that time. The drawback of precision bombing was that it was necessary to bomb by day. Without night vision goggles, or radar technology, sunlight and clear skies were needed to find the targets. Unfortunately, if the bombers could see the targets, then the enemy could see the bombers. Initially the 8th Air Force took staggering losses – up to 86% of fliers were killed, MIA or POW. Although the Flying Fortress had twelve machine guns to defend itself, heavy attacks by German fighters and anti-aircraft ground cannons soon proved that a single squadron was too small of a combat unit. In fact, the Bombardment Group, with the combined force of four squadrons, was also too small. In total, the 8th Air Force lost over 26,000 men. An additional 28,000 men became prisoners of war. Aircraft losses were also grim: 10, 561 planes of varying types were shot down, 4754 of those were B-17 heavy bombers. The 390th Bomb Group lost 176 of its 275 assigned aircrafts.

Source :
National Archives and Records Administration, 342-C-K-2418
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum
https://390th.org/learn-about-390th/wwii-air-war-over-europe/
https://www.flickr.com/photos/airandspace/albums/72157715574200936

Norden Bombsight

U.S. Bombardier trainers are readied for instruction. The motorized units would simulate the track across the ground that the bombardier used to synchronize the optics in the Norden bombsight.

The Norden Mk. XV, known as the Norden M series in U.S. Army service, is a bombsight that was used by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) and the United States Navy during World War II, and the United States Air Force in the Korean and the Vietnam Wars. It was an early tachometric design that directly measured the aircraft's ground speed and direction, which older bombsights could only estimate with lengthy manual procedures. The Norden further improved on older designs by using an analog computer that continuously recalculated the bomb's impact point based on changing flight conditions, and an autopilot that reacted quickly and accurately to changes in the wind or other effects.

Together, these features promised unprecedented accuracy for daytime bombing from high altitudes. During prewar testing the Norden demonstrated a circular error probable (CEP)[a] of 75 feet (23 m),[b] an astonishing performance for that period. This precision would enable direct attacks on ships, factories, and other point targets. Both the Navy and the USAAF saw it as a means to conduct successful high-altitude bombing. For example, an invasion fleet could be destroyed long before it could reach U.S. shores.

To protect these advantages, the Norden was granted the utmost secrecy well into the war, and was part of a production effort on a similar scale to the Manhattan Project: the overall cost (both R&D and production) was $1.1 billion, as much as 2/3 of the latter or over a quarter of the production cost of all B-17 bombers.[1] The Norden was not as secret as believed; both the British SABS and German Lotfernrohr 7 worked on similar principles, and details of the Norden had been passed to Germany even before the war started.[citation needed]

Under combat conditions the Norden did not achieve its expected precision, yielding an average CEP in 1943 of 1,200 feet (370 m) (a CEP of 1200 feet means 16% of all bombs dropped land within 1000 feet of the target), similar to other Allied and German results. Both the Navy and Air Forces had to give up using pinpoint attacks. The Navy turned to dive bombing and skip bombing to attack ships, while the Air Forces developed the lead bomber procedure to improve accuracy, and adopted area bombing techniques for ever-larger groups of aircraft. Nevertheless, the Norden's reputation as a pin-point device endured, due in no small part to Norden's own advertising of the device after secrecy was reduced late in the war.

The Norden saw reduced use in the post–World War II period after radar-based targeting was introduced, but the need for accurate daytime attacks kept it in service, especially during the Korean War. The last combat use of the Norden was in the U.S. Navy's VO-67 squadron, which used it to drop sensors onto the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1967. The Norden remains one of the best-known bombsights.

Source :
National Archives and Records Administration, 342-C-K-885
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norden_bombsight
https://www.flickr.com/photos/airandspace/albums/72157715574200936

Captured Russian Tanks under German Command

Two captured Russian T-34 tanks with camo under german command. It was captured and used by Panzer-Regiment 35 / 4.Panzer-Division, as can be seen by the blue bear in the turret (bears are supposed to have been painted in company colors).

In the May-June 1950 issue of the Armored Cavalry Journal, Mr. Garrett Underhill, in Part IV of "The Story of Soviet Armor," writes that the poor quality of Russian tanks is demonstrated by the fact that Germany made no use of the large numbers of Russian tanks (T 34 and KV) which it had captured, although it used Czech tanks and, in the Balkans, in the fighting against the Partisans, French tanks.

This gives a false idea of the situation. In order to clear up this matter, I should like to make the following points:

It is undoubtedly true that from time to time the armor used for Russian tanks was of very poor quality and often did not have the resistance to penetration normally required.

But there are other reasons for the fact that Russian tanks, especially the T 34, were not used by the German Army:

Mere possession of a captured tank is not enough. It is useless unless continuous maintenance of the vehicles is possible, and this depends on the availability of spare parts. Aside from technical difficulties, manufacture of spare parts for the T 34 in German factories would have been possible only at the expense of a reduction in the number of German tanks turned out. For this reason the use of T 34 tanks could not be considered.

In isolated instances the German Army organized captured-tank companies using captured T 34 tanks and tried to get the needed spare parts from captured matériel. But the method was unsuccessful, and these captured-tank units were dissolved very soon. In was impossible to get enough spare parts from the matériel captured. The method also involved an irrational expenditure of effort, which was increased by the fact that maintenance itself required special experts thoroughly trained in the work and the manufacture of special repair tools.

As far as the Czech and French tanks were concerned the situation was different. Factories and repair installations for these types of tanks were available. However, the French tanks were at best useful only to frighten peasants; they were altogether inferior to the T 34 regardless of the poor materials used in the latter's construction.

The fact that in the East the captured T 34 was not used except in a few cases had a second and equally important reason:

From a tactical viewpoint the T 34 was inferior to the German tank types (Pz III and Pz IV with long barreled 75 mm gun) because it combined the functions of commander and gunner in one person. As soon as the commander began firing, he lost his overall viewpoint and was unable to direct his tank. Even as gunner, however, he was unable to fulfill his mission because when functioning as such he had no commander from which to receive directions. As a result, the T 34 was in most cases hopelessly inferior to the German tanks, especially after German tank were armed with a long gun, in the spring of 1942. I often saw Russian tank attacks in which the T 34's charged like a herd of wild bulls and continuously fired their guns, obviously without aiming, while driving forward. While the limited training given tank crews as a result of the high losses incurred may have been one of the reasons for adopting such tactics, it is certain that the union of the functions of commander and gunner in one person was a contributing factor.

Partly as a result of this tactical inferiority, in the Ukraine my Panzer regiment, from the end of October to the middle of December 1943, destroyed 356 Russian tanks, most of them T 34's, with a total loss of only 12 German tanks. The regiment was equipped with a little more than 100 tanks, half of them Pz IV and the rest Sturmgeschuetz III (self-propelled assault gun), both equipped with the long-barreled 75 mm gun model L 48.

Signed: B. Mueller-Hillebrand

Source :
https://panzerworld.com/german-opinion-of-captured-t-34s
https://www.wehrmacht-awards.com/forums/forum/wehrmacht-era-militaria/photos-and-paper-items-forum/586209-original-ww2-color-photo-slides/page111

P-51D Mustangs of the 52nd Fighter Group

P-51D Mustangs of the 4th Fighter Squadron, 52nd Fighter Group, 15th U.S. Air Force. These planes flew escorts for Italian-based bombers attacking targets in southeastern Europe late in the war. The USAAF 52nd Fighter Group enjoyed an outstanding record in World War II, but to date its story has never been told. Activated in January 1941, it moved to England in July 1942 for an assignment with the Eighth Air Force. It flew combat missions in Spitfires to France during the summer of 1942 before being reassigned to the invasion force attacking North Africa in November 1942. After moving to North Africa, it was assigned to the Twelfth Air Force and was again equipped with Spitfires. As part of the Twelfth Air Force, it flew combat missions in the Tunisian campaign, and during the invasion of Sicily. In mid-1944, the 52nd was reassigned to the Fifteenth Air Force and converted to P-51 Mustangs. During the remainder of the war, it flew bomber escort and strafing missions to targets in Italy, France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. For its outstanding service the Group was twice awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation. During its long campaign, the Group destroyed more than 425 enemy aircraft in aerial combat and damaged 135 plus many more on the ground. The 52nd Fighter Group produced 21 Aces.

Source :
National Archives and Records Administration, 342-C-K-2741
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum
https://www.flickr.com/photos/airandspace/albums/72157715574200936
https://www.specialtypress.com/spitfires-and-yellow-tail-mustangs-testing-british-and-us-carrier-aircraft.html

Height and Weight Measurements for Diver

Standard height and weight measurements are made on a U.S. Navy candidate during the deep sea diving physical examination, circa 1944. Photo taken prior to July 1944. Weight, height, and other anthropometric measurements were obtained on a cohort of 194 U.S. Navy divers 20-42 years old. Percent body fat was computed for each man using an established prediction equation derived from a population of U.S. Marine Corps personnel whose age, height, and weight characteristics were comparable to those of the divers. Among the divers, weight, weight-height indices, and percent body fat increased across age strata. The body mass index (W/H2) was the best predictor of adiposity, as it had the highest correlation with percent body fat and the lowest correlation with height. Regression analysis quantified this relationship. The relative obesity of the divers (18.2% body fat) and the implications for using the body mass index as a measure of adiposity in the medical examination of divers are discussed.

Source :
https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/underwater-activities/1940-1949.html
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/6732694/

Postage stamps of the Third Reich

Dressed in winter gear, two German soldiers look through a pile of mail, Soviet Union, 1942. The image was originally published as 'Das Heer im Grossdeutschen Freiheitskampf' (translated as 'The Army in the Greater German Freedom Struggle'), a collection of 50 plus images taken by the German Army's combat photography unit (Propagandakompanie) during the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The picture itself was taken by Kriegsberichter Bergmann.

Letters and other forms of written communication have been transported within and between countries since medieval times, although a cheap, easily accessible postal service only became generally available to the British public with the appearance of the world's first adhesive postage stamp, the Penny Black, on 6 May 1840. This system was based on the sender pre-paying a flat rate for an item, a charge of one penny being made for the delivery of a letter weighing less than ½ ounce (14 grams) regardless of distance, with charges increasing for heavier items.

Other countries, including Germany, soon developed similar postal systems based upon adhesive, pre-paid stamps of a design unique to the area concerned, but it was not until Germany's partial unification in 1871 that the Deutsche Reichspost (German Imperial Mail or DRP) was established as a state monopoly, on 4 May 1871. It then became the official national postal authority for the German Empire and Alsace-Lorraine, being separated from Bismark's Reich Chancellery in 1876 as the Reichpostamt and operated as a separate agency.

Adolf Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in 1933 and the establishment of the Third Reich saw the DRP retain its original form and purpose, with Reichspost Minister Paul Freiherr von Eltz-Rubenach kept in post until 1937, when Karl Wilhelm Ohnesorge was appointed Minister of the Reichspost. He held this post until the end of the war, having been the real power in the Ministry during the whole of Eltz-Rubenbach’s tenure under the Nazi regime.

 The Reich postal area was rapidly expanded during the period just before WWII, incorporating the Saar territory in 1935, and Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938.  Occupied Polish areas came under its jurisdiction in 1939, including the free port of Danzig which had previously issued its own stamps, although the Feldpost military postal organisation was the main postal authority in these occupied areas. The DRP finally ceased operations on 8 May 1945, the date of the German surrender, being replaced by two post-war organisations, West Germany’s Deutsche Bundespost (German Federal Post Office) and East Germany’s Deutsche Post.

Many early stamps issued by the Third Reich for general circulation typically showed the head of Adolf Hitler in either left or right profile, and in addition to these Hitler head stamps there were also issues of complete series of official stamps which bore only a swastika. Stamps were also issued to commemorate events such as the National Socialist’s 10 years in power or Hitler’s birthday and these usually included engravings appropriate to the event. After 1934, all Reich stamps show the value of the stamp in the top corner/corners and a subscript in Gothic script at the bottom of the stamp reading: ‘DEUTSCHES REICH’

After 1944, Deutsches Reich (German Empire) was replaced with Grossdeutsches Reich (Greater German Empire), as a subscript in Gothic script, reading:

‘GROSSDEUTSCHES REICH’.

As well as ordinary stamps Hitler’s postal service issued a considerable number of semi-postal stamps. These are stamps which include a surcharge and may be easily recognised because they are printed with the purchase price of the stamp, then an addition sign, followed by the surcharge: ‘12+8’ indicating a stamp for which 12 Pfennigs was charged for postage, with an additional surcharge of 8 Pfennigs going to the relevant government project for which the stamp was issued. These stamps were intended by most governments to serve as a contribution to various charitable institutions, but the surcharge from Nazi semi-postals was used to finance all manner of government projects, including the war.

The German government had operated a postal service of some sort specifically for its military personnel since the Seven Years War in 1756, but the system was based upon deliveries by civilian postal authorities and had no resources available to facilitate the delivery of letters and parcels to troops at the front. Even during WWI, when Britain’s GPO was delivering around 12 million letters each week to Allied soldiers, sailors and airmen, the German postal authorities responded to the 1915 pre-Christmas rush by telling soldiers at the front not to send Christmas cards, because the already overburdened postal service could not deliver them.

However, between 1937 and 1945 this system was vastly improved, the Wehrmacht operating a military postal service, the Feldpost (Army Postal Service), organised so that all branches of the German military (Luftwaffe, Kreigsmarine, Waffen SS, etc) were responsible for delivering their own mail, although Feldpost offices closest to the combat zone usually had a mobile facility which  processed mail for all the military branches. Charges for members of German military and paramilitary units (units composed of men not of German nationality serving with the Wehrmacht) were minimal, postcards and letters weighing less than 250gm (8oz) going free, while packages weighing between 250gm and 1kg (1,000gm/2.2lb) cost only 20 Reichspfennigs (about 5 old pence or 2p) to be delivered anywhere.

A semipostal from after 1944 commemorating the work of the German labour divisions, face value 12pf, surcharge 8pfComplications arose within this system as a result of the rapid movement of the German army through Europe in 1940 and, after a series of negotiations with the relevant governments, postal agreements were set up between Germany and the occupied countries providing for extended use of the Feldpost service. This was an important consideration for Hitler and his government cronies, as many of those occupied countries had significant numbers of volunteers in Wehrmacht units and Goebbels in particular must have quickly appreciated how the moral of these individuals was increased by access to a free post allowing them to write and receive letters from home. Even neutral countries which had volunteers serving with the Wehrmacht, such as Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey, were eventually included in these postal agreements, relatives receiving their letters from men serving with the German forces by the same Feldpost system as the average Berliner.

Stamps do not appear to have been generally issued for this service until 1942 and then only for parcels and airmail covers, ordinary letters being simply stamped with what was termed a Feldpost number (FPN), in a system similar to the modern postcode. Servicemen could also send items via the civilian postal system, in which case full postage was collected and stamps issued and cancelled upon dispatch.

Unit FPNs typically consisted of five digits indicating a location, preceded by a letter showing whether the recipient’s unit belonged to the Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine or some other service branch. There was also a letter following the digits which indicated whether the serviceman was serving in the headquarters company or as part of a line unit. This system was specifically developed to keep troop locations secret, relatives of service personnel receiving a messaging card (Benachrichtigungskarten) bearing the relevant FPN, with mail reaching the recipient in about two weeks. All correspondence from military personnel serving abroad was subject to censorship, although covers and postcards sent to addresses within Germany did not receive such scrutiny.

A Feldpost delivery on the Russian frontPerhaps needless to say, SS mail received special treatment. The SS-Feldpost mail was handled separately by the designated SS-units, the difference between ordinary Feldpost and SS-Feldpost mail being that an item for an SS soldier was required to bear the SS-Feldpost marking, SS unit seal and the sender's rank (SS-Mann), although these regulations do not appear to have been rigidly enforced. The SS also had mail surveillance centres, which used their own censorship markings. Initially the Feldpost was subject to the rules and regulations governing regular postal services and administered by the OKW (Wehrmacht High Command) but on 6 April 1944, all military mail, including its censorship, was removed from Wehrmacht control and came under the jurisdiction of the SS.

As well as their official stamps the Third Reich also produced several series of what are termed propaganda stamps and these include issues parodying the Royal family and the 1935 Silver Jubilee, which replaced the Silver Jubilee superscript with a picture of Stalin and the message ‘THIS WAR IS A JEWISH WAR’.

On the other side of the Channel, British MI6 produced a number of excellent forgeries of 3, 4, 6 and 8 Pfennig Reich stamps, while the OSS produced 6 and 12 Pfennig stamps, although their stamps were claimed to be inferior to MI6’s product. Both the SOE and OSS also produced propaganda stamps, in particular one with Himmler replacing Hitler, specifically intended to undermine the Fuhrer's confidence in his right hand man.

OSS stamp produced for Operation Cornflakes, showing Hitler as a Death's Head and with a subscript which translates as Ruined (or Lost) EmpireNot only did Allied intelligence forge genuine DRP stamps, they also set up an operation to fool the German postal service into delivering Allied propaganda. Designated Operation Cornflakes and run principally by the American OSS, the operation involved dropping subversive material in the form of letters enclosed in Reich-pattern mail bags from specially adapted planes on or near the site of a wrecked mail train. Letters were then re-collected and delivered in the normal way, OSS operatives having used captured German street directories to locate the addresses of real people within the Reich to whom this material was sent. From a collector's viewpoint this operation is of particular interest because the OSS produced a series of special stamps with unique engraving. One in particular shows Hitler’s face as a Death's Head in right profile with the usual subscript, ‘GROSSDEUTSCHES REICH’ replaced with the subscript ‘FUTSCHES REICH’, or ruined empire.

Although stamps, covers and postcards may not immediately seem something for the collector of militaria, many of these items have an intrinsic beauty of their own which can  prove very attractive. Also, they are relatively cheap so a small collection of items of intrinsic interest, say, stamps related to Stalingrad, need not break the bank and would add interest to an otherwise mundane collection.

Stamps issued by the Third Reich - Generally, the issues with Hitler's head and the official swastika stamps are fairly common and relatively inexpensive, 20 stamps of the Hitler head issue selling for as little as £6-£7, with the swastika stamps about the same price. Some semipostals and commemorative stamps are also relatively inexpensive, a set commemorating the 1936 winter Olympics being recently offered for only £5, although much depends upon condition and rarity.         

Propaganda stamps - Perhaps surprisingly, considering their interesting provenance, these stamps do not seem to fetch huge prices at auction, £5-£6 being the average internet price, depending upon condition and rarity.

Operation Cornflakes - Stamps from this operation are significantly more expensive than the general run of WWII stamps, £100-£200 being not unusual for the 12pf Death’s Head issue.

Feldpost covers and postcards - Normally Feldpost mail could not be dispatched nor received by civil post offices and envelopes (postal covers) or postcards delivered via the service are usually found stamped with a military Feldpost Cancellation and Official Military Unit Seal. Some covers and postcards from paramilitary units may be found with overprinted stamps, indicating that the item was dispatched from an occupied country before the German post office had begun issuing their own stamps, specifically printed for that area. These covers and postcards may also bear stamps from a censor, particularly after June 1944, when all postal items became the responsibility of the SS. Feldpost numbers were also sometimes reassigned to other units, particularly when a formation ceased to exist as a result of military action and consequently legitimate covers may be found which bear the same Feldpost number for two different units.

As usual, values depend upon rarity and provenance, but generally these are not expensive, good quality Bavarian covers starting at about £20.

Reichsparteitag Party Rally Propaganda postcard Postcards - These are really a collecting field in themselves but many of the examples produced by the Third Reich as propaganda tools are of extremely high quality and mint examples can fetch high prices, around £30-£40 being not unusual.

Source :
https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-events-second-world-war-wwii-back-area-military-mail-service-delivery-24441770.html?imageid=A6C4EDC4-6578-41A1-BAB7-1456CB9AB042&p=58867&pn=1&searchId=d7b5b9a049e0fb6db1aa0742a1ef9e44&searchtype=0
https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/dressed-in-winter-gear-two-german-soliders-look-through-a-news-photo/103137516?phrase=Das%20Heer%20im%20Grossdeutschen%20Freiheitskampf
https://www.militaria-history.co.uk/articles/postage-stamps-of-the-third-reich/

Luftwaffe Flight Cap

A Luftwaffe navigator checks his course while laying in the nose of his Heinkel He 111 medium bomber. He is wearing a fliegerkopfhaube (flight cap). During World War I, most pilots quickly realized the need for protective headgear due to the cold weather effects while in an open cockpit.  As no headgear was readily available, pilots were forced to utilize commercially produced leather motorcycle and automobile helmets.  During World War II, the German military produced approximately 10 variations of flight helmets for various operational conditions, as well as with or without radio communication equipment.  This specific helmet was designed with radio equipment for fighter and bomber pilots.  It was similar to the earlier model used in the early months of the Battle of Britain (LWpW100), however with updated features.

Source :
https://www.angelfire.com/on4/okw/luftwaffe2.htm
https://axis-militaria.com/product/ww-ii-german-aircraft-lkpw101-fliegerkopfhaube-winter-flight-cap-nice/

German Reconnaissance Pilot

Luftwaffe Fernaufklärer (long-distance reconnaissance pilot) with his aircraft in 1940. He is wearing Fliegerkopfhaube (aviator head cover) and Fliegerschutzbrille (aviator goggles). Despite a considerable technological and numerical head start, Germany gradually neglected aerial reconnaissance, at least relative to Britain. The reason, grounded in history and geography, was that Germany had no strategic bombing doctrine and viewed air power as an auxiliary of land armies. Numerous Aufklärungs (up-clearing, i.e. reconnaissance) units were established for marine and ground support purposes, but while this was effective in the tactical sense, the intellectual investment in interpretation, analysis, and strategic estimation lagged. From the German perspective, this was defensible considering that about 90% of the action lay in large land-battles in the East, and an expensive long-range air capability would have been unlikely to effectively change the outcome.

Source :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aerial_reconnaissance_in_World_War_II
https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threads/airwar-ww2-the-pilots.54010/page-16

German Victory Parade in Warsaw (1939)

Hitler's Motorcade Crosses Warsaw

On the threshold of Hitler’s visit to Warsaw on 5 October 1939, the center of the city, a maiden part of the upcoming motorcade route, had been practically sealed from the locals, abandoning the presence of any polish citizens in proximity to the event. A number of buildings along the planned route were now covered with the Nazi banners and a good few special security squads, armed with machine guns, were disposed within the windows and roofs across the city center. The local population of the occupied Warsaw was now forbidden (at least on October 5), under penalty of death, to leave their accommodation across the route or to open windows facing the chosen streets. the day before, Hitler personally alleviate the concerns of some SS soldiers and officers, who had already participated in mass killings in Poland. On October 4 he issued a secret order on amnesty, an act of oblivion for the Germans soldiers, who were now beyond the law in committing crimes within occupied territories.

For this once on October 5, 1939, Adolf Hitler made it to Poland from Berlin by means of a plane. As early as 11:30 a.m. the air cortege under the masterful lead of Hans Baur came down to the airfield of Okecie (The modern Warsaw Chopin Airport. Some sources state that they landed at the Kielce airport). As befits the supreme commander and the conqueror, Hitler was awaited and welcomed by his generals. Gerd von Rundstedt, the triumphal commander of ‘Heeresgruppe Süd’ (Army Group South); Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German army; Erhard Milch, the future Field Marshal of aviation and Goering’s deputy; Johannes Blaskowitz, the commander of the triumphal 8th army; Walter von Reichenau, the commander of the 10th army at that time; Friedrich von Cochenhausen, the future general of artillery. The planned VIP-like motorcade was to enter Warsaw from the East and proceed towards the initial point, which was the set of the military parade.

Hitler’s automobile cortege cross the Vistula river across the Most Poniatowskiego (Poniatowski Bridge), named after the Polish military leader of the 17-18 centuries. The bridge was rebuilt after the demolition during the ‘Great War (WWI) and would be totally devastated by Germans five years later in the midst of the Warsaw Uprising. Hereafter, the motorcade proceeded to an avenue, historically praised as ‘Aleje Jerozolimskie’ (The Jerusalem alley), now hastily renamed into Bahnhofstrasse (later one, in the course of the occupation, into ‘Reichsstraße’ and finally ‘Ostlandstrasse’). Subsequently, the cars turned into Nowy Swiat, the famous fashionable arteria of Warsaw, and finally to Ujazdów Avenue. All arrangements were made to orchestrate a parade of victory, thus paying tribute both to the German army and Hitler himself as a supreme commander and a Fuhrer.

The Two-Hour Military Parade

The long-drawn automobile column, which had been proceeding its way from the airfield, now eased down and entered the wide avenue. Hitler was the key figure of the cortege, all while standing and greeting the German soldiers (who had been carefully ranked by the side of the road hours before) from his Mercedes-Benz W31 type G4 of improved cross-country performance. The route was not accidental as for a while now his cortege had been moving forward across the so-called ‘King’s route’ the king’s road with a two-century history behind. The German dictator was known for his disdain toward the monarchy. Hitler was even much less concerned with the history of the independent Polish state and its kings, who had used this route to reach their royal residences in the South of Warsaw. ‘Ujazdów Avenue’ would later (May 1940) be renamed Lindenallee (Linde Avenue) with a barefaced parallel to the berlin Unter-den-Linden. A year from the day of Hitler’s visit it would be once again renamed (in the course of the orchestrated parade viewed by Hans Frank) to ‘Siegenallee’ (The avenue of Victory).

As far back in Warsaw’s history as the end of the XIX century, a broad street with an elite status of the former king’s road was settled on by rich aristocrats of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With the acquisition of independence and the fall of the Habsburgs at the back of the Great War, the spacious villas and adjoining green gardens were mainly turned into embassies. That very afternoon minutes of October 5 1939 Hitler’s cortege made a stop next to Ujazdowski Park and Pałacyk ‘Rembielińskiego’, a luxurious palace of 1840, hit by a German air bomb in the course of the recent raids. A large grandstand, ornamented with Nazi symbolics was erected prior to the event to accommodate Hitler and his close military entourage during the so-called ‘Siegesparade’ (Parade of victory).

Apart from Hitler himself, the made tribune was now to welcome and place forgoing Walther von Brauchitsch, Gerd von Rundstedt, and Friedrich von Cochenhausen. The attentive attendees of the parade had a glimpse to identify the future Feldmarschall of aviation Albert Kesselring, who had been recently (September 30) awarded with Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross (Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes) by Hitler personally. General Colonel Wilhelm Keitel, the chief of the OKW, had been disdainfully called ‘Lakeitel’ by some of the high-ranking officers of the army. He caught the sight of the battlefields in Poland only from the perspective of Hitler’s personal train, a fact, which had not get in the way of being awarded the ‘Knight’s Cross’ for the Polish campaign. It would take him seven years to get from the parade in Warsaw to the gallow in Nuremberg. Erwin Rommel, the chief of the ‘Führerbegleitbataillon’ was another prominent figure, summoned to Warsaw after a short stay at home and now present within the grandstand.

Among the others present, Johannes Albrecht Blaskowitz, the commander of the 8th army was now filled with a mix of pride and doubts watching his soldiers (the 8th army was the privileged regime of the parade) marching the conquered city. Following the Polish campaign, Blaskowitz was promoted to colonel-general, awarder with ‘Knight’s Cross’ and assigned as the Commander in Chief in the East. In under two subsequent months, the general would fall out of favor of Hitler after his deprecation towards the mass killings, performed by the SS in Poland with the extermination of the city citizens, the prelude to mass killing actions in the USSR such as Babi yar massacre in 1941. On that October afternoon, Blaskowitz could see Heinrich Himmler nearby, an architecture of the ‘Sonderauftrag’ (special tasks) against Polish and Jews, who had come purposively from Berlin to join the parade after a ten-day ‘vacation’.

As for Adolf Hitler, he was now making the most of the moment, while playing the role of the warlord, a colonizer who reviewed his self-made triumphant army for more than two hours in the heart of Warsaw downtown. October 5, 1939, was a warm and sunny day, yet the German Fuhrer favored a leather coat to appear in front of his army. The bloody war would demand another day until the shatters of the devastated Polish army would capitulate on October 6 (on that day Hitler would voice a triumphant speech in Berlin). In the meantime, waiting for such ‘formality’, Hitler addressed the foreign journalists next to the grandstand, who had been craving his commentaries for a few hours. He made emotional stress on the ruins of Warsaw and proclaimed a verbose statement, that Warsaw suffered so much because of the ‘criminal’ perseverance of its leaders and defenders. Hitler voiced the idea, that the Western powers should pay extreme attention to the possible aftermath of war. Subsequent to a two-hour orchestrated parade, Hitler was now to proceed with a short ride across Warsaw.

Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. Hitler specifically flew to Warsaw on a Focke-Wulf Fw 200 A-0 (S-8) AC+VH "Grenzmark" aircraft to watch the parade. He landed at Okecie airport in Aleja Krakowska, and armed convoy went to the central part of the city where the main event was taking place. After that, he made brief visits to various parts of Warsaw. In addition with Hitler, the main podium was filled by the commanders of the Wehrmacht, while at the bottom left were other generals of lower rank. Also, the bottom right is filled by aides. For identification of the people standing on the podium is, from left to right: Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Werner Kienitz (Kommandierender General XVII. Armeekorps), General der Kavallerie Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs (Kommandierender General XIII. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau (Oberbefehlshaber 10. Armee), Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz (Oberbefehlshaber 8. Armee), General der Flieger Alexander Löhr (Chef Luftflotte 4), General der Flieger Albert Kesselring (Chef Luftflotte 1), and SA-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Brückner (Chefadjutant des Führers und Reichskanzler). Photo by Hugo Jaeger, one of Hitler's personal photographer.

Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. Standing in the podium, from left to right: Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalmajor Friedrich-Carl Cranz (Kommandeur 18. Infanterie-Division), General der Artillerie Emil Leeb (Kommandierender General XI. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel (Chef der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), General der Kavallerie Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs (with glasses, Kommandierender General XIII. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz (Oberbefehlshaber 8. Armee), Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau (blocked by Blaskowitz, Oberbefehlshaber 10. Armee), and General der Flieger Albert Kesselring (Chef Luftflotte 1). Standing directly below Hitler is Generalmajor Erwin Rommel (Kommandeur Führer-Begleit-Bataillon). Photo by Hugo Jaeger, one of Hitler's personal photographer.

Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. Standing in the podium, from left to right: Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalmajor Friedrich-Carl Cranz (Kommandeur 18. Infanterie-Division), General der Artillerie Emil Leeb (Kommandierender General XI. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel (Chef der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), and Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau (Oberbefehlshaber 10. Armee). In the invasion of Poland, 18. Infanterie-Division (Cranz) was under the command of XI. Armekorps (Leeb), which itself is a part of the 10. Armee (Reichenau). Standing directly below Hitler is Generalmajor Erwin Rommel (Kommandeur Führer-Begleit-Bataillon). Photo by Hugo Jaeger, one of Hitler's personal photographer.



Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. From left to right: Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz (Oberbefehlshaber 8. Armee), General der Flieger Albert Kesselring (Chef Luftflotte 1), Generalleutnant Conrad von Cochenhausen (with stahlhelm, Kommandeur 10. Infanterie-Division), General der Flieger Alexander Löhr (Chef Luftflotte 4), Generalmajor Karl-Heinrich Bodenschatz (Verbindungsoffizier zwischen dem Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe und dem Führerhauptquartier), and SA-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Brückner (Chefadjutant des "Führers und Reichskanzlers“). In this photo, Brückner is wearing a rare wartime SA schirmmütze (visor hat) reserved only for Adolf Hitler's personal staff. This type of hat can be identified from the dark brown center with the Reichsadler SA emblem on the top center which resembles the Reichsadler Heer / Kriegsmarine. Photo by Hugo Jaeger, one of Hitler's personal photographer.

Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. This picture shows Panzerkampfwagen IIs passing Adolf Hitler and other Wehrmacht officials who were standing on the podium. Since the only armored formation belonging to the 8. Armee under the siege of Warsaw was I.Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 23, it is likely that the tanks is from that unit. Standing on the podium is, from left to right: General der Kavallerie Erich Hoepner (Kommandierender General XVI. Armeekorps [motorisiert]), Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel (Chef der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), General der Kavallerie Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs (Kommandierender General XIII. Armeekorps), Korvettenkapitän Karl-Jesko von Puttkamer (Adjutant der Kriegsmarine beim Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau (Oberbefehlshaber 10. Armee), Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz (Oberbefehlshaber 8. Armee), General der Flieger Alexander Löhr (Chef Luftflotte 4), and General der Flieger Albert Kesselring (Chef Luftflotte 1).

PaK (Panzerabwehrkanone) 35/36 37mm caliber belonging to a Wehrmacht anti-tank unit passing through the podium during the victory parade of the German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939 in the presence of Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht) and other high-ranking Wehrmacht officials. The PaK 35/36 itself was the standard German anti-tank weapon early in the war, before being replaced by the larger caliber as Allies and Soviet armored vehicles increased in thickness. Note that these anti-tank guns are painted with field gray color so they will "blend" with the color of the tires! The picture was taken by Hugo Jaeger, one of Adolf Hitler's personal photographer.

This photo was taken by Hugo Jaeger and shows the Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of the German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. The Einheits-PKW (standard passenger car) marching past Adolf Hitler and other dignitaries of the Wehrmacht, standing on the podium . The vehicle on the left is the Stoewer Typ M 12 RW, while the one in the center and right is the Horch 830 R Kübelwagen. Those standing in the podium is, from left to right: General der Kavallerie Erich Hoepner (Kommandierender General XVI. Armeekorps [motorisiert]), Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Werner Kienitz (Kommandierender General XVII. Armeekorps), General der Kavallerie Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs (Kommandierender General XIII. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau (Oberbefehlshaber 10. Armee), Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz (Oberbefehlshaber 8. Armee), General der Flieger Alexander Löhr (Chef Luftflotte 4), General der Flieger Albert Kesselring (Chef Luftflotte 1), and SA-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Brückner (Chefadjutant des Führers und Reichskanzler). The aides are watching below the podium and - in this photo - they can be seen at far right.

This photo was taken by Hugo Jaeger and shows the Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of the German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. A line of military trucks passes Adolf Hitler and other high-ranking Wehrmacht officials, followed by the Einheits-PKW (standard passenger cars). It seems that these vehicles have been added with a two-tone gray-brown camouflage paint, and they also have a glossy shine as if they were fresh from the factory (the order to use all-grey camouflage only came into effect after the end of French campaign in 1940). Here, too, we can see that the generals around Hitler changing according to their unit's turn to parade. From left to right: Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Werner Kienitz (Kommandierender General XVII. Armeekorps), and General der Kavallerie Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs (Kommandierender General XIII. Armeekorps)

Source :
http://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2010/10/koleksi-ratusan-foto-berwarna-dari-life.html
https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/m064km4b?hl=en
https://www.life.com/history/world-war-ii-erupts-color-photos-from-the-invasion-of-poland-1939/
https://war-documentary.info/hitler-goes-warsaw/

German Panzer Strength in the Operation Barbarossa

German Panzer III tank on the advance in the Ukraine during Operation Barbarossa, summer 1941. Photographer: Artur Grimm.

There are some that believe the sheer numerical superiority of the Red Army and Allies doomed Germany to defeat less than two years after continent wide war resumed in Europe late in 1939. For instance, the vast majority of David Stahel's decade long work posits that the Wehrmacht in general, but the German army (Heer) in particular, had shot their bolt as early as August of 1941. In assessing such claims this article will take a look at the primary component of the German army's striking power - it's panzer divisions. More to the point, I shall examine the state of the tank complement in those panzer divisions assigned to Operation Barbarossa (the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union) after the campaign's first three months. In doing so, I hope to highlight one of many elements (for instance manpower losses in the infantry divisions would be another) that taken together can help readers understand for themselves whether or not the Ostheer (German army in the east) was beyond repair early in the fall of 1941.

The panzer divisions ready to invade the Soviet Union late in June 1941 were at that time the most powerful combined arms organizations in the world. For that matter, the quality of the armor fleshing out those panzer divisions had taken a quantum leap over that of the previous year. Whereas more than half the panzers deployed in France during May of 1940 were light Panzer I and II variants, by June of 1941 fully two thirds of each division's panzer complement comprised the far more capable Pz 35/38t, Panzer III/IV, and StuG (assault guns). Most importantly, the Panzer III, arguably the main battle tank (MBT) of the German army in 1941, had been significantly improved. On the eve of Barbarossa the Panzer III Ausf G to J series served as the majority of medium tanks in Germany's inventory (1,090 of 1,440 Panzer III).These upgraded Panzer III's featured 30mm thicker frontal armor than their predecessors, offering for greater protection. In terms of hitting power the 50mm L/42 cannon represented a huge improvement over the old 37mm gun. From there, the 50mm L/60 main gun equipping the J model Panzer III's (see picture accompanying this article) that went into production in April 1941 had twice the muzzle velocity and thus penetrating power of even the L/42 gun.

In addition, each panzer division gained a motorized infantry regiment. This had increased the division's ability to operate in built up urban areas, guard it's flanks, sweep up bypassed centers of resistance, hold terrain, and ward off counterattacks. Off-road mobility also had improved as the number of half-tracks increased as did firepower further supplemented by the addition of assault guns and anti-aircraft battalions to the panzer divisions. Moreover, previous TO&E calling for two light artillery battalions had been upgraded so that each panzer division also deployed a heavy artillery battalion including a dozen 100mm cannons and 150mm howitzers. As such, the June 1941 era panzer divisions represented a far better balance of infantry, armor, artillery, supporting arms,and thus combined arms strength than did the Polish/French campaign vintage panzer divisions.

In terms of the number of tanks available, by June of 1941, and even with Rommel's Afrika Corps taking 314 panzers, the German army still held a surplus of 974 panzers and assault guns (including 490 Pz 35/38t, Panzer III/IV, and StuG) - and this doesn't include the 312 armored fighting vehicles produced by German factories in that same month. All told, the German army had 6,052 tanks in June 1941 (including those in repair and being upgraded). It's important to note here that sources vary in regards to the actual numbers of panzers/assault guns in the nineteen panzer divisions initially participating in Barbarossa. But, if one excludes those tanks assigned to the forces fighting in the Arctic Circle and includes the StuG assault guns assigned to the eleven assault gun battalions deployed for Barbarossa as well as those weapons given to the Waffen-SS motorized divisions and Motorized Infantry Regiment Grossdeutschland; and if one then goes with the most reputable estimates published we end up with over 3,500 panzer/assault guns deployed in Eastern Europe. This number can be further broken down as follows: 337 Panzer I, 890 Panzer II, 155 Panzer 35(t), 625 Panzer 38(t), 973 Panzer III, 439 Panzer IV, 225 Beflpz., 259 StuG. So that's what the Germans were starting with when they invaded the Soviet Union. Now, let's fast forward and look at that state of the panzer division's tank strength in each of the three German Army Groups (North, Center, South) following the brutal fighting that characterized Barbarossa's first three months. If Stahel's thesis is correct then by late in August/early September 1941 these divisions should have become mere shells of their former selves.

Let's start with Army Group North's Fourth Panzergruppe. It began Barbarossa with three panzer divisions (the 1st, 6th, 8th) equipped with 156, 256, and 223 panzers respectively. During the campaign it would be reinforced by additional armored elements from Army Group Center. However, by September 10th, or after Army Group North had reached the gates of Leningrad and five days before the Fourth Panzergruppe headquarters, the headquarters for three motorized corps, and four panzer/motorized divisions began their transfer to Army Group Center for Operation Typhoon, these three panzer divisions had lost 131 tanks as total write-offs (Totalausfalle). This meant that on September 10, 1941 the 1st, 6th, and 8th panzer divisions still retained 123, 196, and 187 panzers or 79, 77, and 84 percent of their respective strengths on June 21, 1941. Moreover, these three panzer division's retained these strength levels in spite of receiving only two replacement tanks from Germany during the entire first three plus months of the campaign. Needless to say, this is hardly indicative of a panzer force in collapse. More to the point, it's the first piece of evidence not only challenging Stahel's claims but leaving us to wonder something else: What had the German high command been doing with the surplus of unassigned armor in Germany's tank park (remember this totalled nearly 1,000 armored fighting vehicles) accumulated on the eve of Barbarossa. Perhaps the answer to that question lies in events elsewhere.

German Army Group Center started Barbarossa as by far the strongest Army Group the Wehrmacht had ever assembled. The Second Panzergruppe began Barbarossa with 1,086 panzers in it's 3rd, 4th, 10th, 17th, and 18th panzer divisions. Meanwhile, the Third Panzergruppe started the campaign with 989 panzers in its 7th, 12th, 19th, and 20th panzer divisions. Between June 22nd and early September these two panzer groups (and their initial 2,075 panzers) had fought a series of massive battles as well as penetrating hundreds of miles into the Soviet Union in dusty, hot summer weather not at all friendly to tank engines. Overall, the heavy fighting and rough conditions had resulted in the two panzer groups writing off as completely destroyed (Totalausfalle) 641 tanks. Yet, in spite of all of that by early September Army Group Center's two panzer groups still had 1,480 panzers available or 71.3% of their initial strength. What's more, only 67 of those tanks were replacement vehicles. One interesting takeaway from this is that of the nearly 1,000 surplus tanks in German stocks on the eve of Barbarossa and with German tank production averaging several hundred tanks per month in the intervening three months by early September of 1941 Army Group North and Army Group Center had received a combined total of only 69 replacement tanks. Now to be fair, at the end of September 1941 Army Group Center received from OKH reserve the entire 2nd and 5th Panzer Divisions with 194 and 186 tanks respectively. In addition, Army Group's North (AGN) and South (AGS) also dispatched three panzer divisions to Army Group Center in September (the 1st and 6th from AGN and the 11th from AGS). Many of these formations were quite strong. For instance the 11th Panzer Division while fighting with Army Group South had started Barbarossa with some 157 panzers, and yet it had only suffered permanent losses of 39 vehicles. This thus still leaves us wondering how it was that the Ostheer was already irrepairably damaged. Maybe Army Group South had been sucking up all the replacement tanks?

Army Group South began Barbarossa spearheaded by the First Panzergruppe, which included a powerful armored complement in the form of the 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th, and 16th Panzer Divisions as well as two battalions of assault guns. All told, 792 tanks and 42 StuG's. As is well known, the Soviet Southwestern Front ranked among the Red Army's most powerful formations in June of 1941. It did not fail to make the First Panzergruppe pay dearly for it's advance deep into the Ukraine. By September of 1941 Army Group South had lost 174 tanks as total write-offs. Nevertheless, early in September of 1941 and with the receipt of 20 replacement tanks from Germany First Panzergruppe still had 614 total available panzers of 78% of it's original strength.

So here we are, early in September of 1941 and the three German Army Group's that had been fighting for three and a half months still had on average well over three quarters of their original strength. This, by the way, is remarkable in and of itself. That's because tanks require a tremendous amount of maintenance to stay in running condition. The lay person often forgets that if a panzer division, or a U.S. armored division, or Soviet Tank Corps has an establishment strength of a certain number that in all likelihood and even in ideal conditions this number is almost never held once that unit takes the field. During the Second World War armored units from all nations moving under their own power at any distance greater than relatively short ranges almost always experienced significant numbers of broken down tanks. Even units equipped with the T-34 or M-4 Sherman, the gold-standard of Second World War era tanks in terms of mechanical reliability, often lost as much as twenty percent of their strength to break downs (regardless of combat losses) on extended cross-country operations over a period of days no less weeks or months.

Accordingly, for the Ostheer's panzer divisions to be operating at an average of three quarters their establishment strengths in armor following three plus months of combat against the Red Army says quite a bit about the supposed terminal decline those same panzer divisions had entered as of the late summer of 1941. Furthermore, the Ostheer's Panzergruppe's were maintaining these relatively high rates of available tanks in spite of having received a mere 89 replacement tanks to replace the losses in their original panzer divisions. Now, and to be fair, in September and October of 1941 the German command finally sent 316 replacement panzers to the Ostheer. But again this leaves unaddressed the question surrounding the bulk of the surpluses, what had been done with them, and thus why they weren't being used to maintain Barbarossa's panzer divisions in peak operating condition.

Addressing that issue we find a number of things happening. First off, the German high command had decided to forgo fully reinforcing Barbarossa's panzer divisions in order to pursue a number of competing and, in this author's opinion, questionable and secondary initiatives. For instance, they had been sending considerable numbers of replacement tanks to the Afrika Corp's two panzer divisions. An Afrika Corps that was at that time doing little more than fighting back and forth against the British and their Commonwealth Allies to see who could control Mussolini's strategically irrelevant Libyan colony. In addition, a larger number yet of Germany's surplus tanks had been redirected to equipping new armored formations being formed in the latter half of 1941, such as the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Panzer Divisions. We also know additional tanks were delivered to Germany's Axis allies - albeit these deliveries included only 184 mostly obsolete models such as the Panzer 38(t). As to this last decision it must be said that it greatly bolstered the strength of Germany's allies and thus represented a wise and, given the numbers and quality of vehicles involved, cheap investment.

Taking all of these decisions together however, a larger picture emerges. For instance, in terms of our understanding, does it seem more likely that Germany lacked the productive capacity to maintain Barbarossa's existing panzer divisions (an idea backed by quantitative based theorists like Stahel) and a development that would mean every additional lost tank in Russia truly represented a slow creeping disaster Germany could not overcome? Or are we seeing that, on the other hand, the German high command had decided to divert resources elsewhere at the expense of the most important campaign in the Third Reich's history? The latter would fit within a qualitative based approach to the war's ouctome as it implicates the way Germany prosecuted the war as a primary factor in her defeat, not the fact that she was massively outproduced by the Allies and Soviet Union.

Now, going back and taking this information presented so far we can see in regards to the Ostheer's panzer divisions during the fall of 1941 that far from having shot their bolt the four panzergruppe's deployed in Russia still retained formidable strength when compared to their original complement of pre-Barbarossa panzers. Furthermore, the only thing in September of 1941 standing between the Ostheer's panzer division's fighting at 100% strength instead of roughly 75% strength in reality were the decisions made by Hitler and OKH/OKW in terms of how they allocated the output of German factories producing more than enough vehicles to keep the Ostheer's tank park fully supplied if that is what they had wanted to accomplish. All of which is indicative not of a Wehrmacht being ground into the dust under the weight of Allied and Soviet numerical superiority as postulated by brute force advocates such as David Stahel, but a German high command whose own decision making was undermining the Axis war effort from within. All of which once again leads us back to the fact that the numbers game many use to show the hopelessness of the German position doesn't add up. Nor does it work for producing a better understanding for why the Second World War ended as it did.

Source :
https://www.globeatwar.com/article/state-barbarossas-panzer-divisions-fall-1941
https://www.reddit.com/r/WorldofTanks/comments/wcpo1q/ok_own_up_which_one_of_you_is_this_seen_on_rtinder/

Luftwaffe Camo Pattern in the Italian Front

A German heavy fighter Messerschmitt Bf 110 ready for takeoff at an airfield in Italy (probably South Italy), 1942. For Luftwaffe aircraft stationed in Italy and Sicily, the standard European camouflage pattern of RLM 71/02/65 (or a grayer RLM 74/75/76) was retained. But when squadrons of III./ZG 26 were transferred to North Africa, this splinter scheme of dark greens and grays over light blue was completely unsuitable in the Libyan desert. Eventually, these forest-favored colors were replaced by RLM 79 Sandgelb (Sand Yellow) over RLM 78 Himmelblau (Sky Blue). A white tactical band (which varied in size and placement) for the Mediterranean theater of operations, in imitation of Italy's Regia Aeronautica markings, provided more immediate recognition in the air. (Until paint stocks of RLM 79 were readily available, Italian Giallo Mimetico 3, which was similarly sand colored, may have been used in the interim.). Photographer: Artur Grimm.

Source :
http://losgrandesfotografos.blogspot.com/2018/02/arthur-grimm-1908-1990.html
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encyclopaedia_romana/luftwaffe/aircraft/Bf-110/3U+GS.html