Luftwaffe Ace Werner Machold and His Aircraft

Oberfeldwebel Werner Machold (Flugzeugführer in 7.Staffel / III.Gruppe / Jagdgeschwader 2 "Richthofen") stands by his Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-7 "Weisse 1" fighter aircraft. The picture was taken in France, April 1941. At the beginning of World War II, Machold was serving with 1./JG 2. He was particularly successful over France in 1940 gaining at least 10 victories, including his first on 14 May. Oberfeldwebel Machold continued to score heavily during the Battle of Britain. He was the eighth German fighter pilot to reach 20 victories. On 5 September 1940, he was awarded the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes for 21 victories.On 7 September, Machold was transferred to 9./JG 2. He recorded his 24th through 26th victories on 30 September, shooting down three RAF fighters. Oberleutnant Machold was appointed Staffelkapitän of 7./JG 2 in spring 1941. On 9 June 1941, Oberleutnant Machold, flying his Bf 109 E-7/Z (W.Nr. 5983) “White 15”, force-landed near Swanage, Dorset after receiving damage from anti-aircraft fire from a Royal Navy destroyer during a low-level Jabo attack on a shipping convoy off Portland. He became a prisoner-of-war for the remainder of hostilities. Werner Machold amassed 32 victories in over 250 combat missions. All his victories were recorded over the Western front.

Source :
https://www.asisbiz.com/il2/Bf-109E/JG2-III/pages/Messerschmitt-Bf-109E7-7.JG2-White-1-Staka-Werner-Machold-France-Apr-1941-02.html
https://waralbum.ru/403494/

Hitler in SA Rally in Dortmund

Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler addressing an SA (Sturmabteilung) rally in Dortmund, Germany, during “Aufmarsch der SA-Gruppe Westfalen” (also known as the “SA-Westfalentreffen”), 9 July 1933. From left to right: Gauleiter Josef Wagner (NSDAP-Gauleiter des Gaus Westfalen-Süd), SA-Gruppenführer Wilhelm Schepmann (Führer SA-Gruppe Westfalen), SA-Brigadeführer Georg von Walthausen (Gruppenstaffelführers der SA-Gruppe Nord-West), Hitler, Adolf Hühnlein (blocked by Hitler, NSKK-Korpsführer ), and SA-Obergruppenführer Viktor Lutze (Oberpräsident der Provinz Hannover). This picture was taken by Hugo Jaeger, and was first published in the book "Deutschland Erwacht – Werden, Kampf und Sieg der NSDAP".

Source :
"Deutschland Erwacht", Bild Nr. 155, Album Nr. 8
https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/hitler-jaeger-file/ngHRdAjU47eUHQ?hl=en
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=45&t=251161&start=120
https://www.granger.com/results.asp?inline=true&image=0112430&wwwflag=1&itemx=8
https://www.lookandlearn.com/history-images/M429572/Nazi-leader-Adolf-Hitler-with-Josef-Wagner-Gauleiter-of-South-Westphaliam-and-senior-members-of-the-SA-Wilhelm

Idiot's Delight

Master Sergeant Penrose Bingham watches Sergeant Pilla (no first name given) paint another bomb on the side of a Boeing B-17F Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bomber, nicknamed 'Idiot's Delight' of the U.S. 8th Air Force, England, to commemorate the planes 50th successful mission, 1944. Idiots’ Delight (42-30301 XM * J) belonged to the 94th Bomb Group, 332nd Bomb Squadron and was the first in that group to survive 50 missions. She flew her first mission on July 14, 1943 to Le Bourget and her fiftieth mission on March 22, 1944 to Berlin. Camouflage is standard Olive Drab over Neutral Gray with Neutral Gray (instead of white) stars in the national insignia.

Source :
https://www.facebook.com/groups/2598504867039308
https://www.ipmsstockholm.se/home/in-colour/

German Reconnaissance Pilot

Luftwaffe Fernaufklärer (long-distance reconnaissance pilot) with his aircraft in 1940. He is wearing Fliegerkopfhaube (aviator head cover) and Fliegerschutzbrille (aviator goggles). Despite a considerable technological and numerical head start, Germany gradually neglected aerial reconnaissance, at least relative to Britain. The reason, grounded in history and geography, was that Germany had no strategic bombing doctrine and viewed air power as an auxiliary of land armies. Numerous Aufklärungs (up-clearing, i.e. reconnaissance) units were established for marine and ground support purposes, but while this was effective in the tactical sense, the intellectual investment in interpretation, analysis, and strategic estimation lagged. From the German perspective, this was defensible considering that about 90% of the action lay in large land-battles in the East, and an expensive long-range air capability would have been unlikely to effectively change the outcome.

Source :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aerial_reconnaissance_in_World_War_II
https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threads/airwar-ww2-the-pilots.54010/page-16

German Tanks Near Moscow

White winter camouflaged tanks of the 11. Panzer-Division in the village of Matronino near Volokolamsk. On the left, the first and third are Panzer III tanks, while between them and on the right is Panzer II tanks. The picture was taken by Kriegsberichter Artur Grimm in Moscow area, November 1941. From 31 October to 13–15 November 1941, the Wehrmacht high command stood down while preparing to launch a second offensive towards Moscow. Although Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) still possessed considerable nominal strength, its fighting capabilities had thoroughly diminished because of wear and fatigue. While the Germans were aware of the continuous influx of Soviet reinforcements from the east as well as the presence of large reserves, given the tremendous Soviet casualties, they did not expect the Soviets to be able to mount a determined defense.

Source :
https://en.topwar.ru/189069-tanki-shli-naprolom-podvigu-geroev-panfilovcev-80-let.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moscow

German 88mm Flak Gun during Barbarossa

Positioning of an 8.8 cm Flak gun of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) at the Eastern Front during Unternehmen Barbarossa, summer 1941. Photographer: Artur Grimm. For the invasion of the Soviet Union, Germany deployed the 8.8 cm Flak in 51 mixed Anti-Aircraft battalions. They were mostly Luftwaffe-subordinated units attached to the Heer at corps or army level, with approximately one battalion per corps. The weapon saw continuous use on the eastern front. The appearance of the outstanding T-34 and the later KV tanks shocked the German panzer crews and anti-tank teams, who could only penetrate the Soviet tanks' armor at extremely close range on the order of 200 yards when using the standard 37 mm and 50 mm guns, while the Russian 76 mm gun was effective out to 1000 yards.

Source :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8.8_cm_Flak_18/36/37/41
https://photochronograph.ru/2019/04/20/gitlerovskie-vojska-vo-vremya-nastupleniya-v-sssr-1941-43-gody/

German Bf 110 and Italian Macchi C.200

German fighter-bomber Messerschmitt Bf 110 and an Italian Macchi C.200 Saetta flying over a (southern?) Italian city, somewhere in 1942. Photographer: Artur Grimm. At least three Bf.110 C-3 supplied by Luftwaffe to Italian Regia Aeronautica for night fighter units. After training and familiarization of Italian crews with the German twin engine in Germany, the planes was transferred in Italy in July and August 1942 and assigned to Nucleo Addestramento Intercettori, an unit for interceptor’s training operating inside of 235th Squadriglia transferred from Treviso to Lonate Pozzolo, near Varese, in Lombardy. Role of this unit was train the Italian pilots to new methods of night fighting against the Allied strategic bombers. In this color photo the commander of 235th Squadriglia, captain Aramis Ammannato, and his dog, standing in front of a Bf.110 of the unit at Lonate Pozzolo.

Source :
https://id.pinterest.com/pin/386887424240669388/
http://losgrandesfotografos.blogspot.com/2018/02/arthur-grimm-1908-1990.html

Mussolini in the Cover of Nazi Propaganda Magazine

The cover of "Die Woche" magazine, 9 October 1940: Italian dictator Benito Mussolini with German Ambassador in Rome behind him, Hans Georg von Mackensen. Mackensen was a very committed supporter of the Nazi regime, and as ambassador in Rome he worked tirelessly to strengthen the Axis. Mussolini had appointed his son-in-law Ciano Foreign Minister in 1936 to order to overcome the reluctance of the professional diplomats of the Palazzo Chigi towards closer ties with Germany, thus providing a bond with Ciano who was also keen to strengthen the Axis alliance.

Source :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Georg_von_Mackensen
https://www.reddit.com/r/HistoryMemes/comments/pnguk2/mussolini_at_the_march_on_rome/

German Soldiers Warming Themselves

German soldiers at the Eastern Front warming themselves at a fire. In the background a tank. November / December 1941. Photographer: Artur Grimm. Despite their military successes, the German offensive stalled on the outskirts of Moscow in the end of November, 1941. They were not equipped for the Russian brutally cold winter. A Soviet counter offensive pushed the Nazis back before they could take Moscow. The Wehrmacht could no longer mount a simultaneous offensive along the entire strategic Soviet–Axis front, which contributed to their ultimate defeat.

Source :
https://www.jchb.org/neveragain-eastern-front-map/
https://twitter.com/dhkriegbericher?lang=en

A Burning Soviet T-34

Aftermath of the repel of a Soviet tank attack by German forces in the Eastern Front: a hit, burning T 34 tank. The picture was taken by Kriegsberichter Artur Grimm, early or late 1943 (winter). The T-34 seemed impervious to German weapons and able to destroy German tanks with ease. Panzer commander General Heinz Guderian saw the heavy losses inflicted by the T-34 and realized what a game-changer it was, outclassing his own Panzer IIIs and IVs: “Up to this time we had enjoyed tank superiority, but now the situation was reversed,” Guderian wrote. “The prospect of rapid, decisive victories was fading in consequence."

Source :
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32439030/t-34-soviet-tank-history/

German Infantryman Taking Cover

German infantryman taking cover on the Eastern Front. No place given, probably Russia 1942. Photographer: Artur Grimm. The troops had been pushed to the extreme limit of endurance since the beginning of the Russian campaign, particularly during the intensive fighting in the areas of Sevastopol and Feodosia. The infantry companies as well as units of pioniers, panzerjaegers, reconnaissance battalions, the forward observers of the artillery, and the supply units had repeatedly demonstrated how good soldiers conform and react to a given situation, regardless of the strength of the opposition, when provided the proper training and leadership.

Source :
"In Deadly Combat: A German Soldier's Memoir of the Eastern Front" by Gottlob Herbert Bidermann
http://losgrandesfotografos.blogspot.com/2018/02/arthur-grimm-1908-1990.html

German Victory Parade in Warsaw (1939)

Hitler's Motorcade Crosses Warsaw

On the threshold of Hitler’s visit to Warsaw on 5 October 1939, the center of the city, a maiden part of the upcoming motorcade route, had been practically sealed from the locals, abandoning the presence of any polish citizens in proximity to the event. A number of buildings along the planned route were now covered with the Nazi banners and a good few special security squads, armed with machine guns, were disposed within the windows and roofs across the city center. The local population of the occupied Warsaw was now forbidden (at least on October 5), under penalty of death, to leave their accommodation across the route or to open windows facing the chosen streets. the day before, Hitler personally alleviate the concerns of some SS soldiers and officers, who had already participated in mass killings in Poland. On October 4 he issued a secret order on amnesty, an act of oblivion for the Germans soldiers, who were now beyond the law in committing crimes within occupied territories.

For this once on October 5, 1939, Adolf Hitler made it to Poland from Berlin by means of a plane. As early as 11:30 a.m. the air cortege under the masterful lead of Hans Baur came down to the airfield of Okecie (The modern Warsaw Chopin Airport. Some sources state that they landed at the Kielce airport). As befits the supreme commander and the conqueror, Hitler was awaited and welcomed by his generals. Gerd von Rundstedt, the triumphal commander of ‘Heeresgruppe Süd’ (Army Group South); Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German army; Erhard Milch, the future Field Marshal of aviation and Goering’s deputy; Johannes Blaskowitz, the commander of the triumphal 8th army; Walter von Reichenau, the commander of the 10th army at that time; Friedrich von Cochenhausen, the future general of artillery. The planned VIP-like motorcade was to enter Warsaw from the East and proceed towards the initial point, which was the set of the military parade.

Hitler’s automobile cortege cross the Vistula river across the Most Poniatowskiego (Poniatowski Bridge), named after the Polish military leader of the 17-18 centuries. The bridge was rebuilt after the demolition during the ‘Great War (WWI) and would be totally devastated by Germans five years later in the midst of the Warsaw Uprising. Hereafter, the motorcade proceeded to an avenue, historically praised as ‘Aleje Jerozolimskie’ (The Jerusalem alley), now hastily renamed into Bahnhofstrasse (later one, in the course of the occupation, into ‘Reichsstraße’ and finally ‘Ostlandstrasse’). Subsequently, the cars turned into Nowy Swiat, the famous fashionable arteria of Warsaw, and finally to Ujazdów Avenue. All arrangements were made to orchestrate a parade of victory, thus paying tribute both to the German army and Hitler himself as a supreme commander and a Fuhrer.

The Two-Hour Military Parade

The long-drawn automobile column, which had been proceeding its way from the airfield, now eased down and entered the wide avenue. Hitler was the key figure of the cortege, all while standing and greeting the German soldiers (who had been carefully ranked by the side of the road hours before) from his Mercedes-Benz W31 type G4 of improved cross-country performance. The route was not accidental as for a while now his cortege had been moving forward across the so-called ‘King’s route’ the king’s road with a two-century history behind. The German dictator was known for his disdain toward the monarchy. Hitler was even much less concerned with the history of the independent Polish state and its kings, who had used this route to reach their royal residences in the South of Warsaw. ‘Ujazdów Avenue’ would later (May 1940) be renamed Lindenallee (Linde Avenue) with a barefaced parallel to the berlin Unter-den-Linden. A year from the day of Hitler’s visit it would be once again renamed (in the course of the orchestrated parade viewed by Hans Frank) to ‘Siegenallee’ (The avenue of Victory).

As far back in Warsaw’s history as the end of the XIX century, a broad street with an elite status of the former king’s road was settled on by rich aristocrats of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With the acquisition of independence and the fall of the Habsburgs at the back of the Great War, the spacious villas and adjoining green gardens were mainly turned into embassies. That very afternoon minutes of October 5 1939 Hitler’s cortege made a stop next to Ujazdowski Park and Pałacyk ‘Rembielińskiego’, a luxurious palace of 1840, hit by a German air bomb in the course of the recent raids. A large grandstand, ornamented with Nazi symbolics was erected prior to the event to accommodate Hitler and his close military entourage during the so-called ‘Siegesparade’ (Parade of victory).

Apart from Hitler himself, the made tribune was now to welcome and place forgoing Walther von Brauchitsch, Gerd von Rundstedt, and Friedrich von Cochenhausen. The attentive attendees of the parade had a glimpse to identify the future Feldmarschall of aviation Albert Kesselring, who had been recently (September 30) awarded with Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross (Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes) by Hitler personally. General Colonel Wilhelm Keitel, the chief of the OKW, had been disdainfully called ‘Lakeitel’ by some of the high-ranking officers of the army. He caught the sight of the battlefields in Poland only from the perspective of Hitler’s personal train, a fact, which had not get in the way of being awarded the ‘Knight’s Cross’ for the Polish campaign. It would take him seven years to get from the parade in Warsaw to the gallow in Nuremberg. Erwin Rommel, the chief of the ‘Führerbegleitbataillon’ was another prominent figure, summoned to Warsaw after a short stay at home and now present within the grandstand.

Among the others present, Johannes Albrecht Blaskowitz, the commander of the 8th army was now filled with a mix of pride and doubts watching his soldiers (the 8th army was the privileged regime of the parade) marching the conquered city. Following the Polish campaign, Blaskowitz was promoted to colonel-general, awarder with ‘Knight’s Cross’ and assigned as the Commander in Chief in the East. In under two subsequent months, the general would fall out of favor of Hitler after his deprecation towards the mass killings, performed by the SS in Poland with the extermination of the city citizens, the prelude to mass killing actions in the USSR such as Babi yar massacre in 1941. On that October afternoon, Blaskowitz could see Heinrich Himmler nearby, an architecture of the ‘Sonderauftrag’ (special tasks) against Polish and Jews, who had come purposively from Berlin to join the parade after a ten-day ‘vacation’.

As for Adolf Hitler, he was now making the most of the moment, while playing the role of the warlord, a colonizer who reviewed his self-made triumphant army for more than two hours in the heart of Warsaw downtown. October 5, 1939, was a warm and sunny day, yet the German Fuhrer favored a leather coat to appear in front of his army. The bloody war would demand another day until the shatters of the devastated Polish army would capitulate on October 6 (on that day Hitler would voice a triumphant speech in Berlin). In the meantime, waiting for such ‘formality’, Hitler addressed the foreign journalists next to the grandstand, who had been craving his commentaries for a few hours. He made emotional stress on the ruins of Warsaw and proclaimed a verbose statement, that Warsaw suffered so much because of the ‘criminal’ perseverance of its leaders and defenders. Hitler voiced the idea, that the Western powers should pay extreme attention to the possible aftermath of war. Subsequent to a two-hour orchestrated parade, Hitler was now to proceed with a short ride across Warsaw.

Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. Hitler specifically flew to Warsaw on a Focke-Wulf Fw 200 A-0 (S-8) AC+VH "Grenzmark" aircraft to watch the parade. He landed at Okecie airport in Aleja Krakowska, and armed convoy went to the central part of the city where the main event was taking place. After that, he made brief visits to various parts of Warsaw. In addition with Hitler, the main podium was filled by the commanders of the Wehrmacht, while at the bottom left were other generals of lower rank. Also, the bottom right is filled by aides. For identification of the people standing on the podium is, from left to right: Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Werner Kienitz (Kommandierender General XVII. Armeekorps), General der Kavallerie Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs (Kommandierender General XIII. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau (Oberbefehlshaber 10. Armee), Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz (Oberbefehlshaber 8. Armee), General der Flieger Alexander Löhr (Chef Luftflotte 4), General der Flieger Albert Kesselring (Chef Luftflotte 1), and SA-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Brückner (Chefadjutant des Führers und Reichskanzler). Photo by Hugo Jaeger, one of Hitler's personal photographer.

Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. Standing in the podium, from left to right: Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalmajor Friedrich-Carl Cranz (Kommandeur 18. Infanterie-Division), General der Artillerie Emil Leeb (Kommandierender General XI. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel (Chef der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), General der Kavallerie Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs (with glasses, Kommandierender General XIII. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz (Oberbefehlshaber 8. Armee), Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau (blocked by Blaskowitz, Oberbefehlshaber 10. Armee), and General der Flieger Albert Kesselring (Chef Luftflotte 1). Standing directly below Hitler is Generalmajor Erwin Rommel (Kommandeur Führer-Begleit-Bataillon). Photo by Hugo Jaeger, one of Hitler's personal photographer.

Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. Standing in the podium, from left to right: Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalmajor Friedrich-Carl Cranz (Kommandeur 18. Infanterie-Division), General der Artillerie Emil Leeb (Kommandierender General XI. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel (Chef der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), and Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau (Oberbefehlshaber 10. Armee). In the invasion of Poland, 18. Infanterie-Division (Cranz) was under the command of XI. Armekorps (Leeb), which itself is a part of the 10. Armee (Reichenau). Standing directly below Hitler is Generalmajor Erwin Rommel (Kommandeur Führer-Begleit-Bataillon). Photo by Hugo Jaeger, one of Hitler's personal photographer.



Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. From left to right: Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz (Oberbefehlshaber 8. Armee), General der Flieger Albert Kesselring (Chef Luftflotte 1), Generalleutnant Conrad von Cochenhausen (with stahlhelm, Kommandeur 10. Infanterie-Division), General der Flieger Alexander Löhr (Chef Luftflotte 4), Generalmajor Karl-Heinrich Bodenschatz (Verbindungsoffizier zwischen dem Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe und dem Führerhauptquartier), and SA-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Brückner (Chefadjutant des "Führers und Reichskanzlers“). In this photo, Brückner is wearing a rare wartime SA schirmmütze (visor hat) reserved only for Adolf Hitler's personal staff. This type of hat can be identified from the dark brown center with the Reichsadler SA emblem on the top center which resembles the Reichsadler Heer / Kriegsmarine. Photo by Hugo Jaeger, one of Hitler's personal photographer.

Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. This picture shows Panzerkampfwagen IIs passing Adolf Hitler and other Wehrmacht officials who were standing on the podium. Since the only armored formation belonging to the 8. Armee under the siege of Warsaw was I.Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 23, it is likely that the tanks is from that unit. Standing on the podium is, from left to right: General der Kavallerie Erich Hoepner (Kommandierender General XVI. Armeekorps [motorisiert]), Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel (Chef der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), General der Kavallerie Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs (Kommandierender General XIII. Armeekorps), Korvettenkapitän Karl-Jesko von Puttkamer (Adjutant der Kriegsmarine beim Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau (Oberbefehlshaber 10. Armee), Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz (Oberbefehlshaber 8. Armee), General der Flieger Alexander Löhr (Chef Luftflotte 4), and General der Flieger Albert Kesselring (Chef Luftflotte 1).

PaK (Panzerabwehrkanone) 35/36 37mm caliber belonging to a Wehrmacht anti-tank unit passing through the podium during the victory parade of the German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939 in the presence of Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht) and other high-ranking Wehrmacht officials. The PaK 35/36 itself was the standard German anti-tank weapon early in the war, before being replaced by the larger caliber as Allies and Soviet armored vehicles increased in thickness. Note that these anti-tank guns are painted with field gray color so they will "blend" with the color of the tires! The picture was taken by Hugo Jaeger, one of Adolf Hitler's personal photographer.

This photo was taken by Hugo Jaeger and shows the Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of the German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. The Einheits-PKW (standard passenger car) marching past Adolf Hitler and other dignitaries of the Wehrmacht, standing on the podium . The vehicle on the left is the Stoewer Typ M 12 RW, while the one in the center and right is the Horch 830 R Kübelwagen. Those standing in the podium is, from left to right: General der Kavallerie Erich Hoepner (Kommandierender General XVI. Armeekorps [motorisiert]), Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Werner Kienitz (Kommandierender General XVII. Armeekorps), General der Kavallerie Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs (Kommandierender General XIII. Armeekorps), Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau (Oberbefehlshaber 10. Armee), Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz (Oberbefehlshaber 8. Armee), General der Flieger Alexander Löhr (Chef Luftflotte 4), General der Flieger Albert Kesselring (Chef Luftflotte 1), and SA-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Brückner (Chefadjutant des Führers und Reichskanzler). The aides are watching below the podium and - in this photo - they can be seen at far right.

This photo was taken by Hugo Jaeger and shows the Siegesparade (Victory Parade) of the German troops from 8. Armee in Warsaw, Poland, which were held on October 5, 1939. A line of military trucks passes Adolf Hitler and other high-ranking Wehrmacht officials, followed by the Einheits-PKW (standard passenger cars). It seems that these vehicles have been added with a two-tone gray-brown camouflage paint, and they also have a glossy shine as if they were fresh from the factory (the order to use all-grey camouflage only came into effect after the end of French campaign in 1940). Here, too, we can see that the generals around Hitler changing according to their unit's turn to parade. From left to right: Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Werner Kienitz (Kommandierender General XVII. Armeekorps), and General der Kavallerie Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs (Kommandierender General XIII. Armeekorps)

Source :
http://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2010/10/koleksi-ratusan-foto-berwarna-dari-life.html
https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/m064km4b?hl=en
https://www.life.com/history/world-war-ii-erupts-color-photos-from-the-invasion-of-poland-1939/
https://war-documentary.info/hitler-goes-warsaw/

Bio of Generalfeldmarschall Maximilian von Weichs

Maximilian Maria Joseph Karl Gabriel Lamoral Reichsfreiherr von Weichs zu Glon (12 November 1881 – 27 September 1954) was a German Generalfeldmarschall during World War II. He was born into a noble family at Dessau in Anhalt, a son of an Army colonel. Following his graduation from the Wilhelmsgymnasium in Munich, he entered the Bavarian Cavalry in 1900 and fought with them in World War I. From 1915 until 1918 he served with the General Staff of the 3rd Bavarian Army Corps. After the war he remained in the newly created Reichswehr where he worked at a number of General Staff positions and later served as an instructor. Transferred from the 3rd Cavalry Division to command Germany's 1st Panzer Division upon its formation in October 1935, he led the unit in maneuvers that impressed Army Commander in Chief Werner von Fritsch. Weichs' aristocratic and cavalry credentials demonstrated the continuing influence of these military elites in Germany's modernizing force.

In October 1937 he became the commander of the 13th Army Corps, that later served in the 1938 German annexation of the Sudetenland.

For the German invasion of Poland beginning World War II in 1939, Weichs was appointed head of his own Army Corps "Weichs". After the Polish surrender, and in preparation for the invasion of France, he was made Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army, a part of Rundstedt’s Army Group A in the West. For his successes in the French campaign he was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and promoted to colonel-general. Leading his corps, Weichs later took part in the Balkans Campaign, and in preparation for Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, he was assigned to lead the 2nd Army as a part of Fedor von Bock’s Army Group Centre. He led the 2nd Army in 1941 through the Battle of Kiev, the Battle of Smolensk, and then on to Vyazma and Bryansk.

In 1942, for Fall Blau, Weichs was assigned to lead the newly created Army Group B. Army Group B was composed of Hans von Salmuth's 2nd Army, Hermann Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army, and Friedrich Paulus' 6th Army. In addition to the German armies, Army Group B included the 2nd Hungarian Army, 8th Italian Army, the Third and the Fourth Romanian Army. The 6th Army was assigned to take the city of Stalingrad and cover approximately 800 km of front.

Weichs warned about his lines being stretched too thinly, but Adolf Hitler ignored his warnings. Weichs' fears were realised when Operation Uranus smashed the Romanian armies on his flanks, cutting off the 6th Army inside Stalingrad. Suggesting retreat, Weichs fell out of Hitler’s favor. Consequently, parts of Army Group B were taken away from Weichs' command and incorporated into a new Army Group Don, led by Erich von Manstein. Later in February the remaining part merged with the Don Group into a newly reinstated Army Group South, also led by Manstein. Weichs was put in leader reserve.

Weichs was promoted to Generalfeldmarschall on 1 February 1943. As the German situation was starting to become more dire, in August 1943 Weichs was appointed Commander of Army Group F in the Balkans defending against possible Allied invasion in what was seen as Germany’s weak underbelly and fighting off local partisan groups that were gaining strength. In late 1944, he oversaw the German retreat from Greece and most of Yugoslavia.

As Nazi Germany fell apart, Weichs was finally retired on March 25, 1945, and was arrested by American troops in May. During the Nuremberg Trials, Weichs was implicated in war crimes committed while suppressing the partisans, however, he was removed from the Hostages Trial due to medical reasons without having been judged or sentenced.

Weichs died at Burg Rösberg near Bonn.

Medals and decorations
Knight's Cross on 29 June 1940 as General der Kavallerie and commander-in-chief of the 2. Armee
731st Oak Leaves on 5 February 1945 as Generalfeldmarschall and commander-in-chief of Heeresgruppe F, at the same time OB Südost (commander-in-chief south east)
Iron Cross of 1914, 1st and 2nd Class
Clasp to the Iron Cross of 1939, 1st and 2nd Class
Bavarian Military Merit Order, Fourth Class with Swords
Eastern Front Medal
Sudetenland Medal with Prague Castle Bar
Jubilee Medal for the Bavarian Army
Bavarian Military Long Service Award 2nd Class
Wehrmacht Military Long Service Award 1st Class
Order of Franz Joseph, Knight's Cross

Source :
http://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2011/07/album-foto-berwarna-jenderal-heer.html
https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Maximilian_von_Weichs

German Infantryman with MG 13

German infantryman with MG 13 on the Eastern Front. No place given, but probably Russia 1942. Photographer: Artur Grimm. The MG 13 (shortened from German Maschinengewehr 13) is a German light machine gun developed by converting the Dreyse Model 1918 heavy water-cooled machine gun into an air-cooled version. The MG 13 was introduced into service in 1930, where it served as the standard light machine gun until 1935. It was superseded by the MG 34 and then later the MG 42.

Source :
https://www.facebook.com/ww2soldiers/photos/a.1756598311265149/2471299086461731/?type=3

Maintenance of Ju 88 Aircraft

Maintenance of a Junkers Ju 88 bomber at a German air force base in Northern France, autumn 1940 (or spring 1941). Photographer: Artur Grimm. The Ju 88 sported a rather ungainly appearance but was consistent with the German bomber design trend of the period. The heavily-framed cockpit was held in a stepped arrangement overlooking a short, glazed nose section. The fuselage was expectedly tubular and terminated in a single rounded vertical tail fin at rear. The wing mainplanes were low-mounted along the forward section of the aircraft with the engine nacelles installed at each wing leading edge. The engines sported large spinners and drove three-bladed propeller units. Most Ju 88 versions held a belly gondola for a defensive machine gun position. The undercarriage arrangement was of the typical tail-dragger configuration featuring two main legs.

Source :
https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/world-war-ii-air-battle-over-england-maintenance-of-a-ju-88-news-photo/548132153?phrase=artur%20grimm
https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.php?aircraft_id=98

Funeral of General Hans Kamecke

Funeral of Generalleutnant Hans Kamecke, the second commander of 137. Infanterie-Division, who was severely wounded in the battle against the Red Army at Ostrowy / Lojew, Belarus, on 15 October 1943. He then died because of his wounds in the field hospital near Kolpen the next day, 16 October 1943. Kamecke would posthumously awarded the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes on 27 October 1943.

Source :
https://www.facebook.com/ww2soldiers/posts/funeral-of-lieutenant-general-hans-kamecke-the-second-commander-of-the-137th-inf/2596754230582882/

German Victory Parade in Paris

German victory parade at Place de la Concorde, Paris, June 14, 1940. Front row from left to right: General der Kavallerie Georg Stumme (Kommandierender General XXXX. Panzerkorps), General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler (Oberbefehlshaber 18. Armee), and Generaloberst Fedor von Bock (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe B). Far left is Generalmajor Erich Marcks (Chef des Generalstabes 18.Armee), while closest to the camera is Generalleutnant Hans von Salmuth (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe B). Photo by Hugo Jaeger.

Source :
http://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2010/10/koleksi-ratusan-foto-berwarna-dari-life.html

German Soldiers Take Cover in the Bush

Fightings on the southern section of the Eastern Front (Ukraine), probably summer 1941 or 1942. German soldiers take cover in the bush. Photographer: Artur Grimm.

Source :
https://www.pinterest.cl/pin/629026272928634347/

View of Rønvik in Norway

View of Rønvik, which located in Bodø Municipality in Nordland county, Norway, with water and mountains in the background. The picture was taken by Martin Hennig in 1944.

Source :
https://www.tekniskmuseum.no/grossraum-bildegalleri/39-nettutstillinger/grossraum/569-grossraum-korsnes-sorfold-morsvik-leirfjord

Mussolini Inspecting Italian Troops

This picture was taken on 18 July 1944 at Grafenwöhr, Bavaria, and it shows Benito Mussolini (leader of the Italian Social Republic or Repubblica Sociale Italiana, RSI) reviews Italian troops from 3ª Divisione fanteria di marina "San Marco" (3rd Marine Infantry Division "San Marco"), trained by the Germans. Two Wehrmacht generals at right is, from left to right: Generalmajor Konrad von Alberti (Leiter des deutschen Verbindungskommandos 182 bei der italienischen 3. Marineinfanteriedivision "San Marco") and Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm (Chef der Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres). The Italian officer in the middle is Generale di Brigata Aldo Princivalle (Commander of 3rd Marine Infantry Division "San Marco"), and behind him - almost invisible - is Marshal of Italy Rodolfo Graziani (Minister of National Defence of RSI). The officer behind Mussolini is a tenente colonnello, likely the commander of the unit being inspected. He is wearing artillery insignia without a divisional mostrine. The men aren't wearing mostrine nor the M41 guibba that was worn by the sailors of the San marco, so not one the marine regiments. If this is the artillery regiment of the 3º d. «San Marco», that officer is either ten. col. Alfredo Possenti or Giuseppe De Martis.

Source :
http://fondoluce.archivioluce.com/LuceUnesco/ricerca/avanzata/esito.html?persone=Alberti,%20Konrad%20von
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=75&t=238546&p=2434424#p2434424

German Panzer Strength in the Operation Barbarossa

German Panzer III tank on the advance in the Ukraine during Operation Barbarossa, summer 1941. Photographer: Artur Grimm.

There are some that believe the sheer numerical superiority of the Red Army and Allies doomed Germany to defeat less than two years after continent wide war resumed in Europe late in 1939. For instance, the vast majority of David Stahel's decade long work posits that the Wehrmacht in general, but the German army (Heer) in particular, had shot their bolt as early as August of 1941. In assessing such claims this article will take a look at the primary component of the German army's striking power - it's panzer divisions. More to the point, I shall examine the state of the tank complement in those panzer divisions assigned to Operation Barbarossa (the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union) after the campaign's first three months. In doing so, I hope to highlight one of many elements (for instance manpower losses in the infantry divisions would be another) that taken together can help readers understand for themselves whether or not the Ostheer (German army in the east) was beyond repair early in the fall of 1941.

The panzer divisions ready to invade the Soviet Union late in June 1941 were at that time the most powerful combined arms organizations in the world. For that matter, the quality of the armor fleshing out those panzer divisions had taken a quantum leap over that of the previous year. Whereas more than half the panzers deployed in France during May of 1940 were light Panzer I and II variants, by June of 1941 fully two thirds of each division's panzer complement comprised the far more capable Pz 35/38t, Panzer III/IV, and StuG (assault guns). Most importantly, the Panzer III, arguably the main battle tank (MBT) of the German army in 1941, had been significantly improved. On the eve of Barbarossa the Panzer III Ausf G to J series served as the majority of medium tanks in Germany's inventory (1,090 of 1,440 Panzer III).These upgraded Panzer III's featured 30mm thicker frontal armor than their predecessors, offering for greater protection. In terms of hitting power the 50mm L/42 cannon represented a huge improvement over the old 37mm gun. From there, the 50mm L/60 main gun equipping the J model Panzer III's (see picture accompanying this article) that went into production in April 1941 had twice the muzzle velocity and thus penetrating power of even the L/42 gun.

In addition, each panzer division gained a motorized infantry regiment. This had increased the division's ability to operate in built up urban areas, guard it's flanks, sweep up bypassed centers of resistance, hold terrain, and ward off counterattacks. Off-road mobility also had improved as the number of half-tracks increased as did firepower further supplemented by the addition of assault guns and anti-aircraft battalions to the panzer divisions. Moreover, previous TO&E calling for two light artillery battalions had been upgraded so that each panzer division also deployed a heavy artillery battalion including a dozen 100mm cannons and 150mm howitzers. As such, the June 1941 era panzer divisions represented a far better balance of infantry, armor, artillery, supporting arms,and thus combined arms strength than did the Polish/French campaign vintage panzer divisions.

In terms of the number of tanks available, by June of 1941, and even with Rommel's Afrika Corps taking 314 panzers, the German army still held a surplus of 974 panzers and assault guns (including 490 Pz 35/38t, Panzer III/IV, and StuG) - and this doesn't include the 312 armored fighting vehicles produced by German factories in that same month. All told, the German army had 6,052 tanks in June 1941 (including those in repair and being upgraded). It's important to note here that sources vary in regards to the actual numbers of panzers/assault guns in the nineteen panzer divisions initially participating in Barbarossa. But, if one excludes those tanks assigned to the forces fighting in the Arctic Circle and includes the StuG assault guns assigned to the eleven assault gun battalions deployed for Barbarossa as well as those weapons given to the Waffen-SS motorized divisions and Motorized Infantry Regiment Grossdeutschland; and if one then goes with the most reputable estimates published we end up with over 3,500 panzer/assault guns deployed in Eastern Europe. This number can be further broken down as follows: 337 Panzer I, 890 Panzer II, 155 Panzer 35(t), 625 Panzer 38(t), 973 Panzer III, 439 Panzer IV, 225 Beflpz., 259 StuG. So that's what the Germans were starting with when they invaded the Soviet Union. Now, let's fast forward and look at that state of the panzer division's tank strength in each of the three German Army Groups (North, Center, South) following the brutal fighting that characterized Barbarossa's first three months. If Stahel's thesis is correct then by late in August/early September 1941 these divisions should have become mere shells of their former selves.

Let's start with Army Group North's Fourth Panzergruppe. It began Barbarossa with three panzer divisions (the 1st, 6th, 8th) equipped with 156, 256, and 223 panzers respectively. During the campaign it would be reinforced by additional armored elements from Army Group Center. However, by September 10th, or after Army Group North had reached the gates of Leningrad and five days before the Fourth Panzergruppe headquarters, the headquarters for three motorized corps, and four panzer/motorized divisions began their transfer to Army Group Center for Operation Typhoon, these three panzer divisions had lost 131 tanks as total write-offs (Totalausfalle). This meant that on September 10, 1941 the 1st, 6th, and 8th panzer divisions still retained 123, 196, and 187 panzers or 79, 77, and 84 percent of their respective strengths on June 21, 1941. Moreover, these three panzer division's retained these strength levels in spite of receiving only two replacement tanks from Germany during the entire first three plus months of the campaign. Needless to say, this is hardly indicative of a panzer force in collapse. More to the point, it's the first piece of evidence not only challenging Stahel's claims but leaving us to wonder something else: What had the German high command been doing with the surplus of unassigned armor in Germany's tank park (remember this totalled nearly 1,000 armored fighting vehicles) accumulated on the eve of Barbarossa. Perhaps the answer to that question lies in events elsewhere.

German Army Group Center started Barbarossa as by far the strongest Army Group the Wehrmacht had ever assembled. The Second Panzergruppe began Barbarossa with 1,086 panzers in it's 3rd, 4th, 10th, 17th, and 18th panzer divisions. Meanwhile, the Third Panzergruppe started the campaign with 989 panzers in its 7th, 12th, 19th, and 20th panzer divisions. Between June 22nd and early September these two panzer groups (and their initial 2,075 panzers) had fought a series of massive battles as well as penetrating hundreds of miles into the Soviet Union in dusty, hot summer weather not at all friendly to tank engines. Overall, the heavy fighting and rough conditions had resulted in the two panzer groups writing off as completely destroyed (Totalausfalle) 641 tanks. Yet, in spite of all of that by early September Army Group Center's two panzer groups still had 1,480 panzers available or 71.3% of their initial strength. What's more, only 67 of those tanks were replacement vehicles. One interesting takeaway from this is that of the nearly 1,000 surplus tanks in German stocks on the eve of Barbarossa and with German tank production averaging several hundred tanks per month in the intervening three months by early September of 1941 Army Group North and Army Group Center had received a combined total of only 69 replacement tanks. Now to be fair, at the end of September 1941 Army Group Center received from OKH reserve the entire 2nd and 5th Panzer Divisions with 194 and 186 tanks respectively. In addition, Army Group's North (AGN) and South (AGS) also dispatched three panzer divisions to Army Group Center in September (the 1st and 6th from AGN and the 11th from AGS). Many of these formations were quite strong. For instance the 11th Panzer Division while fighting with Army Group South had started Barbarossa with some 157 panzers, and yet it had only suffered permanent losses of 39 vehicles. This thus still leaves us wondering how it was that the Ostheer was already irrepairably damaged. Maybe Army Group South had been sucking up all the replacement tanks?

Army Group South began Barbarossa spearheaded by the First Panzergruppe, which included a powerful armored complement in the form of the 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th, and 16th Panzer Divisions as well as two battalions of assault guns. All told, 792 tanks and 42 StuG's. As is well known, the Soviet Southwestern Front ranked among the Red Army's most powerful formations in June of 1941. It did not fail to make the First Panzergruppe pay dearly for it's advance deep into the Ukraine. By September of 1941 Army Group South had lost 174 tanks as total write-offs. Nevertheless, early in September of 1941 and with the receipt of 20 replacement tanks from Germany First Panzergruppe still had 614 total available panzers of 78% of it's original strength.

So here we are, early in September of 1941 and the three German Army Group's that had been fighting for three and a half months still had on average well over three quarters of their original strength. This, by the way, is remarkable in and of itself. That's because tanks require a tremendous amount of maintenance to stay in running condition. The lay person often forgets that if a panzer division, or a U.S. armored division, or Soviet Tank Corps has an establishment strength of a certain number that in all likelihood and even in ideal conditions this number is almost never held once that unit takes the field. During the Second World War armored units from all nations moving under their own power at any distance greater than relatively short ranges almost always experienced significant numbers of broken down tanks. Even units equipped with the T-34 or M-4 Sherman, the gold-standard of Second World War era tanks in terms of mechanical reliability, often lost as much as twenty percent of their strength to break downs (regardless of combat losses) on extended cross-country operations over a period of days no less weeks or months.

Accordingly, for the Ostheer's panzer divisions to be operating at an average of three quarters their establishment strengths in armor following three plus months of combat against the Red Army says quite a bit about the supposed terminal decline those same panzer divisions had entered as of the late summer of 1941. Furthermore, the Ostheer's Panzergruppe's were maintaining these relatively high rates of available tanks in spite of having received a mere 89 replacement tanks to replace the losses in their original panzer divisions. Now, and to be fair, in September and October of 1941 the German command finally sent 316 replacement panzers to the Ostheer. But again this leaves unaddressed the question surrounding the bulk of the surpluses, what had been done with them, and thus why they weren't being used to maintain Barbarossa's panzer divisions in peak operating condition.

Addressing that issue we find a number of things happening. First off, the German high command had decided to forgo fully reinforcing Barbarossa's panzer divisions in order to pursue a number of competing and, in this author's opinion, questionable and secondary initiatives. For instance, they had been sending considerable numbers of replacement tanks to the Afrika Corp's two panzer divisions. An Afrika Corps that was at that time doing little more than fighting back and forth against the British and their Commonwealth Allies to see who could control Mussolini's strategically irrelevant Libyan colony. In addition, a larger number yet of Germany's surplus tanks had been redirected to equipping new armored formations being formed in the latter half of 1941, such as the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Panzer Divisions. We also know additional tanks were delivered to Germany's Axis allies - albeit these deliveries included only 184 mostly obsolete models such as the Panzer 38(t). As to this last decision it must be said that it greatly bolstered the strength of Germany's allies and thus represented a wise and, given the numbers and quality of vehicles involved, cheap investment.

Taking all of these decisions together however, a larger picture emerges. For instance, in terms of our understanding, does it seem more likely that Germany lacked the productive capacity to maintain Barbarossa's existing panzer divisions (an idea backed by quantitative based theorists like Stahel) and a development that would mean every additional lost tank in Russia truly represented a slow creeping disaster Germany could not overcome? Or are we seeing that, on the other hand, the German high command had decided to divert resources elsewhere at the expense of the most important campaign in the Third Reich's history? The latter would fit within a qualitative based approach to the war's ouctome as it implicates the way Germany prosecuted the war as a primary factor in her defeat, not the fact that she was massively outproduced by the Allies and Soviet Union.

Now, going back and taking this information presented so far we can see in regards to the Ostheer's panzer divisions during the fall of 1941 that far from having shot their bolt the four panzergruppe's deployed in Russia still retained formidable strength when compared to their original complement of pre-Barbarossa panzers. Furthermore, the only thing in September of 1941 standing between the Ostheer's panzer division's fighting at 100% strength instead of roughly 75% strength in reality were the decisions made by Hitler and OKH/OKW in terms of how they allocated the output of German factories producing more than enough vehicles to keep the Ostheer's tank park fully supplied if that is what they had wanted to accomplish. All of which is indicative not of a Wehrmacht being ground into the dust under the weight of Allied and Soviet numerical superiority as postulated by brute force advocates such as David Stahel, but a German high command whose own decision making was undermining the Axis war effort from within. All of which once again leads us back to the fact that the numbers game many use to show the hopelessness of the German position doesn't add up. Nor does it work for producing a better understanding for why the Second World War ended as it did.

Source :
https://www.globeatwar.com/article/state-barbarossas-panzer-divisions-fall-1941
https://www.reddit.com/r/WorldofTanks/comments/wcpo1q/ok_own_up_which_one_of_you_is_this_seen_on_rtinder/

Russian POW Collecting Wood in Norway

Russian prisoners fetch wood for heating. In the background POW camp in Rønvik which located in Bodø Municipality in Nordland county, Norway. The picture was taken by Martin Hennig in 1944.

Source :
https://www.tekniskmuseum.no/grossraum-bildegalleri/39-nettutstillinger/grossraum/569-grossraum-korsnes-sorfold-morsvik-leirfjord

German Soldiers Work to Free Their Panzer

German panzer crew work to free their Panzer III from frozen mud, Ukraine, late 1941. Photographer: Artur Grimm. During the invasion of Russia, the Wehrmacht lacked necessary supplies, such as winter uniforms, due to the many delays in the German army's movements. At the same time, Hitler's plans for Operation Barbarossa actually miscarried before the onset of severe winter weather. Neither Hitler nor the General Staff anticipated a long campaign lasting into the winter. Thus, they failed to make adequate preparations for a possible winter campaign, such as the distribution of warm clothing and winterization of vehicles and lubricants. In fact his eastern army suffered more than 734,000 casualties (about 23% of its average strength of 3,200,000) during the first five months of the invasion before the winter started. On 27 November 1941, Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster General of the German Army, reported that "We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter." Also of note is the fact that the unusually early winter of 1941 cut short the rasputitsa season, improving logistics in early November, with the weather still being only mildly cold.

Source :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Winter
https://www.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/t0pg16/german_panzer_crew_work_to_free_their_panzer_iii/
https://www.warcolorphotos.com/eastern-front